State v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 11 February 1901
• Citation: 37 S.E. 820,59 S.C. 229
• Parties: STATE v. ANDERSON.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

37 S.E. 820

59 S.C. 229

STATE v. ANDERSON.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

February 11, 1901

Appeal from general sessions circuit court of Greenwood county James Aldrich, Judge.

William Anderson was convicted of larceny, and he appeals. Reversed.

Graydon & Giles, for appellant.

U. X Gunter, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

JONES J.

The defendant was convicted under an indictment for larceny of live stock,--a cow alleged to be of the value of $15.

1. The state, over defendant's objections, was allowed five peremptory challenges to jurors, and this ruling is excepted to as error. We think the circuit court erred herein. The right to exercise peremptory challenges to jurors is regulated by statute approved as section 54 of the Criminal Statutes, which allows the state not exceeding five such challenges in cases wherein any person is arraigned for murder, manslaughter, burglary, arson, rape, grand larceny or forgery, and in all other cases not exceeding two such challenges. Larceny of a cow of the value of $15 is not grand larceny, although made punishable under section 146, Id., in more severe terms than prescribed in section 160 for larcenies of other articles under the value of $20. In the case of State v. Moore, 30 S.C. 71, 8 S.E. 437, the court held that a defendant was not entitled to an arraignment under an indictment for the larceny of a cow alleged to be of the value of $15, notwithstanding grand larceny is an offense in which arraignment was necessary; in other words, that such an indictment is not for grand larceny. The offense charged in the indictment in this case must therefore fall under the class of cases in which not exceeding two peremptory challenges are allowed to the state.

2. On the trial the defendant introduced evidence to prove an alibi, and in reference to this matter the circuit court charged the jury: "Where the defendant enters a general plea of not guilty, that is a denial of the state's entire case; it puts the state upon proof of the case,--of the charge. If he goes on further, and enters a special plea (for instance, an alibi), then the defendant assumes the burden of proving that special plea, not beyond a reasonable doubt, but by the preponderance (the greater weight) of the testimony." It is excepted that this charge was erroneous: "(a) In misleading the jury into supposing that the defense of alibi is an affirmative defense, like insanity and self-defense, whereas it is respectfully submitted that an alibi is not a special affirmative defense but a mere fact shown in rebuttal of the state's case. (b) In instructing the jury that the defendant must establish his plea or defense of alibi by a preponderance of the evidence, thus requiring him to prove his innocence of the crime charged, instead of charging that the burden of proof rests on the state all through the case. (c) In not instructing the jury that it is sufficient to entitle the defendant to a verdict of not guilty that the evidence of alibi should raise a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant. (d) In confounding the defense of alibi, which is a mere fact in rebuttal of the state's case, with special defenses, such as insanity and self-defense, which confess the doing of the act, but deny the malice...