State v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 24 January 1989
• Docket Number: No. 13112,13112
• Citation: 553 A.2d 589,209 Conn. 622
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Hartley ANDERSON.

Page 589

553 A.2d 589

209 Conn. 622

STATE of Connecticut v. Hartley ANDERSON.

No. 13112.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Nov. 9, 1988.

Decided Jan. 24, 1989.

Timothy P. Pothin, with whom were Jonathan J. Einhorn, New Haven, and, on the brief, Gabriel H. Cusanelli, North Haven, for appellant (defendant).

Julia DiCocco Dewey, Asst. State's Atty., with whom were Lawrence Daly, Asst. State's Atty., and, on the brief, Christine Marsching, Legal Intern, for appellee (state).

Before PETERS, C.J., and ARTHUR H. HEALEY, CALLAHAN, GLASS and COVELLO, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

The defendant, Hartley Anderson, was convicted after a jury trial of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a. ¹ He appeals from the judgment of the trial court sentencing him to a forty-five year term of imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant maintains that he was deprived of a fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial by the admission into evidence of statements that he claims were elicited in violation of his rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 8, of the Connecticut constitution. He also claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to "reopen." We find no error.

The jury could reasonably have found the following facts. On May 6, 1985, at approximately 1:20 p.m., Edmund and Leslie Joyner drove their automobile into the parking lot of Bill's Liquor Locker in East Windsor. The only other vehicle in the package store parking lot at that time was a blue Ford Mustang later identified as the defendant's. When the brothers exited their vehicle and approached the liquor store, they heard a woman scream several times. Concerned, the Joyners hurried toward the store. As they were about to enter, the defendant ran past them out of the building. His clothes and hands were covered with blood. At about the same time, through the open door of the store, the Joyners glimpsed the victim lying on the floor in a pool of blood. The Joyners then turned and chased the defendant to a parking area at the rear of the store. There the defendant stopped and faced his pursuers. At that point Leslie asked him who he was, to which inquiry the defendant replied, "nobody." Thereafter, in fear that the defendant was armed, the Joyners retreated inside the store.

Once in the store, Leslie called the police and Edmund attended to the victim, the proprietress of the store, who had been repeatedly stabbed but was still conscious. While waiting for the police, Edmund observed the defendant enter his car and drive rapidly away. Before the defendant left the area, however, Edmund managed to write his automobile registration number on the back of a lottery ticket. Returning to the victim, Edmund asked who had stabbed her and, although she was having trouble communicating, she replied, "a regular customer." When the police arrived, Edmund gave them the license plate number he had recorded along with a description of the defendant's car and the clothing he was wearing. The victim, Sharon Ruggiero, died en route to a nearby hospital.

The defendant was arrested at his home less than one hour after he left the liquor store. At the time of his arrest, he had cuts on his face, lip, neck and hand. These cuts were fresh but were not then bleeding. The defendant's clothes, hands and forearms, however, were stained with blood. At the time of his apprehension the defendant was wearing, with the exception of his coat, clothes similar to those Edmund Joyner had described to the police. Also a search of the defendant's trouser pockets, incident to his arrest, uncovered a bloodstained receipt from Bill's Liquor Locker. Thereafter, during a search of the defendant's house, the investigating officers found droplets of blood, bloodstains and smudges in several areas including the hallway, attic stairs and bathroom. In addition, they discovered a bloodstained T-shirt in the master bedroom and a bloodstained handkerchief in the living room. At the house the police officers also seized an empty leather knife case. Finally, a wet, bloodstained coat belonging to the defendant was found in his attic hidden under insulation and rafters.

At trial, evidence was introduced to show that the defendant was, in fact, a regular customer at Bill's Liquor Locker. Further, Officer Raymond Fahey of the East Windsor police department, an acquaintance of the defendant, testified that as he was on his way to Bill's Liquor Locker in response to an emergency call, he saw the defendant driving away from the homicide scene. Moreover, bloody fingernail scrapings were secured by the police after the defendant's arrest and the defendant's bloody fingerprint was found on the door of the liquor store. The defendant's blood was found on the victim's shoes and there were bloodstains discovered in his car.

The defendant first claims that his constitutional rights were violated by the admission into evidence of the testimony of State Police Detective Ronald Ruel. Ruel testified that during interrogation he asked the defendant whether he had assaulted anyone. In reply, the defendant stated that he did not recall but then clenched his fists and said that if he had, "I would have used these." Similar statements were made by the defendant when he was asked whether he remembered hurting anyone. According to Ruel's testimony, when the defendant was asked whether he killed anyone, he became very angry and again stated that if he had he would have done it with his fists or his car. In addition, Ruel testified that the defendant stated to him "that it's not unusual for him to drink a case [of beer] or more in one day; and that it doesn't really affect him that much." The defendant claims that these statements should have been excluded at trial because he did not waive his right to counsel and the statements were elicited from him by police officers after he had requested an attorney on two separate occasions. ²

Initially, we note that the defendant failed to raise this claim at trial either by way of an objection to the admission of Ruel's testimony or a motion to suppress any statement he made to Ruel. While we do not generally entertain claims not raised below, we have recognized "two situations that may constitute 'exceptional circumstances' such that newly raised claims can and will be considered by this court." State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973). One of the two " 'exceptional circumstance[s]' may arise where the record adequately supports a claim that a litigant has clearly been deprived of a fundamental constitutional right and a fair trial." Id. Accordingly, we must review the record to determine whether it is adequate for consideration of the defendant's constitutional claim.

The defendant contends that he asserted a desire to speak with an attorney, first to Chief Thomas Laufer of East Windsor while he was being transported to East Windsor police headquarters, and then to State Police Detectives Ruel and George Heg prior to being interrogated by them. It is axiomatic at this point in time that "[a]n accused in custody, 'having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him,' unless he validly waives his earlier request for the assistance of counsel. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. [477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, reh. denied, 452 U.S. 973, 101 S.Ct. 3128, 69 L.Ed.2d 984 (1981) ]." Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 94-95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 492-493, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984).

Whenever there is a question as to whether the accused actually requested counsel, a factual inquiry is required to determine whether he attempted to invoke a present right to counsel; United States v. Jardina, 747 F.2d 945, 949 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058, 105 S.Ct. 1773, 84 L.Ed.2d 833 (1985); see also Bruni v. Lewis, 847 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 403, 102 L.Ed.2d 391 (1988); and whether his asserted request was unambiguous or unequivocal. Smith v. Illinois, supra, 469 U.S. at 95, 105 S.Ct. at 492; United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cir.1988); United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1756, 100 L.Ed.2d 218 (1988); State v. Acquin, 187 Conn. 647, 672-77, 448 A.2d 163 (1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229, 103 S.Ct. 3570, 77 L.Ed.2d 1411 (1983). Although the United States Supreme Court has not defined ambiguity in this context or ruled on the consequences of such ambiguity, the trend among the federal courts that have considered the problem is that all questioning need not stop as soon as the word "lawyer" or "attorney" is mentioned. United States v. Gotay, supra; see also Bruni v. Lewis, supra, at 564; United States v. Jardina, supra (mere mentioning of the word "attorney" does not constitute a request for counsel ... "[t]he word 'attorney' has no talismanic qualities"). Rather, if "a suspect makes an equivocal statement that arguably can be construed as a request for counsel, interrogation must cease except for narrow questions designed to clarify the earlier statement and the suspect's desire for counsel." United States v. Gotay, supra; see also Bruni v. Lewis, supra, at 563-64; Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 517 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981, 100 S.Ct. 485, 62 L.Ed.2d 409 (1979). This rule has been adopted by this court. State v. Acquin, supra. "Under this approach, questions aimed at clarifying a request must be strictly limited to that purpose and may not be used to elicit incriminating information...." United States v. Gotay, supra; Nash v. Estelle, supra; see also State v. Acquin, supra. "[I]f the clarification reveals that the suspect wants counsel, interrogation must cease until counsel is provided. If ... the clarification 'reveals...