State v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 10 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 12–0512.,12–0512.
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent v. John Eugene ANDERSON, Defendant Below, Petitioner.

233 W.Va. 75

754 S.E.2d 761

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Respondent

v.John Eugene ANDERSON, Defendant Below, Petitioner.

No. 12–0512.

Supreme Court of Appeals of

West Virginia.

Submitted Jan. 15, 2014.

Decided Feb. 10, 2014.

Syllabus by the Court

1. “In reviewing challenges to findings and rulings made by a circuit court, we apply a two-pronged deferential standard of review. We review the rulings of the circuit court concerning a new trial and its conclusion as to the existence of reversible error under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court's underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.” Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Vance, 207 W.Va. 640, 535 S.E.2d 484 (2000).

2. “ ‘In a criminal case, the inquiry made of a jury on its voir dire is within the sound discretion of the trial court and not subject to review, except when the discretion is clearly abused.’ Syl. pt. 2, State v. Beacraft, 126 W.Va. 895, 30 S.E.2d 541 (1944).” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Mayle, 178 W.Va. 26, 357 S.E.2d 219 (1987).

3. “When a trial court determines that prospective jurors have been exposed to information which may be prejudicial, the trial court, upon its own motion or motion of counsel, shall question or permit the questioning of the prospective jurors individually, out of the presence of the other prospective jurors, to ascertain whether the prospective jurors remain free of bias or prejudice.” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Finley, 177 W.Va. 554, 355 S.E.2d 47 (1987).

4. “The traditional appellate standard for determining prejudice for discovery violations under Rule 16 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure involves a two-pronged analysis: (1) did the non-disclosure surprise the defendant on a material fact, and (2) did it hamper the preparation and presentation of the defendant's case.” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Rusen v. Hill, 193 W.Va. 133, 454 S.E.2d 427 (1994).

5. “Under the ‘in the possession of’ language of Rule 26.2[ ] of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, a prosecutor is required to disclose statements to which he has access even though he does not have the present physical possession of the statements.” Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Watson, 173 W.Va. 553, 318 S.E.2d 603 (1984).

6. “A trial court's evidentiary rulings, as well as its application of the Rules of Evidence, are subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard.” Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Rodoussakis, 204 W.Va. 58, 511 S.E.2d 469 (1998).

Joseph Munoz, Esq., Parkersburg, WV, for Petitioner.

Patrick Morrisey, Esq., Attorney General, Benjamin F. Yancey III, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, WV, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:

John Eugene Anderson (hereinafter “petitioner”) appeals the Circuit Court of Wood County's March 12, 2012, order denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, or alternatively, motion for a new trial arising out of his conviction of first degree murder, for which he was sentenced to life in prison with mercy. Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred by: 1) allowing a contaminated pool of jurors to be empaneled; 2) permitting a witness to testify when neither his full criminal history nor a prior written statement was produced by the State; and 3) refusing to allow the defense to introduce evidence of the victim's sex offender status. Upon careful review of the briefs, the appendix record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable legal authority, we find that the circuit court committed no reversible error and therefore affirm petitioner's conviction.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the early morning hours of March 24, 2010, the body of 69–year–old Willard Wright (hereinafter “Mr. Wright”) was found in his apartment at 910 Ann Street, Parkersburg, West Virginia. The State Medical Examiner determined that Mr. Wright's death was a homicide and that he died as a result of multiple sharp force injuries leading to exsanguination; ¹ in particular, Mr. Wright suffered from multiple stab wounds, the most significant of which was a long neck wound which severed his jugular veins and nearly decapitated him.

At trial, the State introduced evidence that on the afternoon of March 23, 2010, petitioner, his girlfriend, Tammy Wilfong (hereinafter “Ms. Wilfong”), and Ms. Wilfong's four-year-old daughter, visited Mr. Wright, who was nearly bedridden, at his home and assisted him with household chores; Ms. Wilfong is Mr. Wright's niece. Apparently, during the course of the visit, Ms. Wilfong's daughter advised her mother that Mr. Wright, who was a registered sex offender, had licked her ear. The testimony revealed that later that evening, petitioner borrowed a bicycle and cell phone from two different acquaintances and went to the home of Dorothy Metz where he asked her to accompany him to a home on Ann Street to pick up some money. When Ms. Metz asked how he was going to get the money, he replied “Well, if you must know, I'm going up here to kill this elderly man and take his money.”

The State called a litany of witnesses inculpating petitioner in the crime including two acquaintances of Ms. Wilfong who picked petitioner up late that night near the crime scene. Megyn Rollyson (hereinafter “Ms. Rollyson”) and Derek Zimmerman (hereinafter “Mr. Zimmerman”) testified that upon picking up petitioner and the borrowed bicycle near the scene, petitioner directed them to take him back to 910 Ann Street to retrieve the borrowed cell phone, which he had left there. While there, Mr. Zimmerman testified he was told to serve as a “look out” while petitioner retrieved the cell phone, which he later told them had been “under a dead body.” When Ms. Rollyson inquired if anyone was in the home at 910 Ann Street, petitioner replied, “No one that's alive.” Ms. Rollyson and Mr. Zimmerman further testified that after they left the scene, they observed petitioner with the bloody cell phone, a bloody knife, and a black wallet matching Mr. Wright's wallet which was ultimately recovered in a storm drain near the scene. Ms. Rollyson and Mr. Zimmerman further observed petitioner changing clothes and trying to clean the bloody items when they returned to Ms. Wilfong's apartment. Ms. Wilfong testified that, upon returning to her apartment, petitioner told her that he had killed her uncle and that her “baby would be safe now.”

In addition to the witnesses who testified to petitioner's actions immediately before and after the crime, the State called James Claypool (hereinafter “Mr. Claypool”), who was housed with petitioner in the Washington (Ohio) County Jail after petitioner was arrested. Mr. Claypool, who was being held on federal charges stemming from his role as an “enforcer” in the Pagans motorcycle gang, testified that while he was housed with petitioner, petitioner confessed to the crime ² and asked Mr. Claypool if he could “take care of” some of the witnesses who would testify against him.

Trial began on January 3, 2012 and at the close of the six-day trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder; the same jury recommended mercy to the court. Petitioner moved for a judgment of acquittal or new trial asserting the same errors raised in this appeal. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced petitioner to life in prison with mercy on March 12, 2012. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Generally,

[i]n reviewing challenges to findings and rulings made by a circuit court, we apply a two-pronged deferential standard of review. We review the rulings of the circuit court concerning a new trial and its conclusion as to the existence of reversible error under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court's underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.

Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Vance, 207 W.Va. 640, 535 S.E.2d 484 (2000). Additional standards of review as pertain to the specific assignments of error are incorporated as appropriate in the discussion below.

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by 1) allowing a jury to be empaneled from a venire which had been contaminated by a prospective juror's prejudicial remarks; 2) permitting Mr. Claypool to testify when neither his full criminal history nor a prior written statement was produced by the State; and 3) refusing to allow the defense to introduce evidence of Mr. Wright's sex offender status.

A. Contamination of the Venire

During voir dire, prospective juror Sarah Markell advised the trial court in chambers that she overheard a juror, later identified as Jennie Ankrom (hereinafter “Ms. Ankrom”), remark that petitioner “just looks guilty” while standing in the hallway with “half a dozen” other prospective jurors whom she could not identify. Upon individual questioning, Ms. Ankrom admitted that she remarked that petitioner “just looks guilty, looks like my ex-husband.” However, Ms. Ankrom stated that she made the remark to only one other prospective juror, later identified as Matthew Minton (hereinafter “Mr. Minton”), when walking from the parking lot to the courtroom. During individual voir dire, Mr. Minton confirmed that Ms. Ankrom made an inappropriate comment, which he could not specifically recall and immediately disregarded. After individually questioning these prospective jurors ³ and based upon Ms. Markell'sindication that the comment was made in the presence of other jurors, the trial court inquired of the entire panel in open court regarding whether they heard a “female juror ma[ke] a remark regarding the Defendant.” Petitioner did not object to the trial court's questioning the panel in open court, nor did he request individual questioning of the remaining members of the venire on this issue. No one other than Ms. Markell and Mr. Minton acknowledged hearing the remark.⁴ At the close of voir dire, petitioner moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied.

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