State v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 07 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 32,663.,32,663.
• Citation: 364 P.3d 306
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Joe ANDERSON, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico

364 P.3d 306

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Joe ANDERSON, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 32,663.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

Oct. 7, 2015.

Certiorari Denied, Dec. 7, 2015, No. 35,591.

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Nicole Beder, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender, Tania Shahani, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.

OPINION

KENNEDY, Judge.

{1} Defendant appeals from his conviction for second degree murder asserting that fundamental error was committed when the district court failed to give a necessary instruction that it had agreed to give. Defendant asserts this was fundamental error. Because the instruction was critical to the jury's determination on the issue of self-defense and because the district court had a duty to fully instruct the jury on all relevant aspects of the law, we agree with Defendant, reverse his conviction, and remand for a new trial.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} The trial presented differing accounts to the jury of what happened between Defendant and Vicente Sanchez the night of November 19, 2010. It appears, however, that the following events occurred, subject to some variation.

A. Altercation

{3} Sanchez attended a house party on November 19, 2010, at which Defendant was present. The two men took an immediate dislike to each other and got into an argument. When Sanchez's girlfriend tried to intervene, Defendant moved her out of the way, and Sanchez punched Defendant. Defendant fell backward into the next room, and a brawl began between several individuals with apparent loyalties to either Sanchez or Defendant. Sanchez's girlfriend armed herself with a handgun taken from Sanchez's pocket and, upon brandishing the handgun, brought the brawl to a momentary standstill. During the lull, Defendant removed himself and hid behind the doorway of the room into which he fell where he, too, drew a handgun. Believing Sanchez had obtained the gun from his girlfriend by this time, Defendant came out from behind the doorway with his gun raised and fired six shots from a distance of approximately two to three feet, four of which hit Sanchez. Sanchez died from the wounds he sustained, and Defendant was charged with murdering Sanchez.

B. Trial—Diagrams

{4} Detective Anton Maltby created diagrams of the home where the altercation occurred as part of his investigation of the incident. The diagrams gave a rough depiction of the location of the house, yard, surrounding buildings, cars, and rooms, as well as provided the layout of the furniture in the rooms. Defense counsel objected to the State's proffer of these diagrams, both during trial and in a motion in limine, claiming that they should be excluded under Rule 11–403 NMRA, asserting they were cumulative because the jury could understand the layout of the buildings and rooms by examining photographs, and misleading because they were not drawn to scale and did not accurately portray the location of the furniture in the living room. The district court overruled the objection because it believed the diagrams were instructive to the jury and because witnesses had acknowledged that they were not drawn to scale.

C. Trial—Jury Instructions

{5} During trial, Defendant requested a self-defense instruction (UJI 14–5171 NMRA) and a stand-your-ground (or no-retreat) instruction (UJI 14–5190 NMRA). The district court allowed the self-defense instruction. In response to the State's objection to the no-retreat instruction, the district court held that it was for the jury to decide whether Defendant was standing his ground or re-involving himself in the conflict and that the jury should be able to make an informed decision on that issue. As such, the district court decided to submit the no-retreat instruction to the jury as well.

{6} It is undisputed that, although the district court determined that both a general self-defense instruction and a stand-your-ground instruction were warranted in the case, it did not instruct the jury on New Mexico's stand-your-ground law, either orally or in the written instructions.¹ The omission of UJI 14–5190 appears to have been the result of an oversight on the part of the district court and all counsel. During the course of deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the district court asking if there was a "stand-your-ground" law in New Mexico. The jury ultimately withdrew the question because it had "found what [it was] looking for." Defense counsel mistakenly believed that the no-retreat instruction had been included in the written instructions given to the jury and offered the district court reassurances to that effect. Counsel's reassurance, coupled with the withdrawal of the jury's question, ended the court's discussion with counsel regarding the stand-your-ground instruction. The jury ultimately found Defendant guilty of second degree murder, and he appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

{7} Defendant makes several assertions of error, which we consolidate as an assertion of fundamental error based on the missing jury instruction, an assertion of error based on the admission of a diagram of the house where the altercation occurred, and an assertion of error based on the district court's denial of a modification to UJI 14–250 NMRA.

A. The Omission of the Jury Instruction Was Fundamental Error

1. Fundamental Error

{8} Defendant did not object to the absence of UJI 14–5190 from the jury instructions when they were given. We therefore review only for fundamental error. State v. Benally, 2001–NMSC–033, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134 ("The standard of review we apply to jury instructions depends on whether the issue has been preserved. If the error has been preserved we review the instructions for reversible error. If not, we review for fundamental error." (citation omitted)); State v. Cunningham, 2000–NMSC–009, ¶ 8, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176. An error is fundamental when it " ‘goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant's rights.’ " Cunningham, 2000–NMSC–009, ¶ 13, 128 N.M. 711, 998 P.2d 176 (quoting State v. Garcia, 1942–NMSC–030, ¶ 25, 46 N.M. 302, 128 P.2d 459 ). "We will not ‘uphold a conviction if an error implicated a fundamental unfairness within the system that would undermine judicial integrity if left unchecked.’ " State v. Rodarte, 2011–NMCA–067, ¶ 10, 149 N.M. 819, 255 P.3d 397 (quoting State v. Barber, 2004–NMSC–019, ¶ 18, 135 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 633 ).

{9} When reviewing jury instruction issues for fundamental error, we first apply the standard for reversible error by determining if a reasonable juror would have been "confused or misdirected" by the jury instructions that were given. Barber, 2004–NMSC–019, ¶ 19, 135 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 633. Juror confusion or misdirection may stem "from instructions which, through omission or misstatement, fail to provide the juror with an accurate rendition of the relevant law." Benally, 2001–NMSC–033, ¶ 12, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134. If we determine that a reasonable juror would have been confused or misdirected by the instructions given, our fundamental error analysis requires us to then " ‘review the entire record, placing the jury instructions in the context of the individual facts and circumstances of the case, to determine whether the [d]efendant's conviction was the result of a plain miscarriage of justice.’ " State v. Sandoval, 2011–NMSC–022, ¶ 20, 150 N.M. 224, 258 P.3d 1016 (quoting Barber, 2004–NMSC–019, ¶ 19, 135 N.M. 621, 92 P.3d 633 ). If such a miscarriage of justice exists, we deem it fundamental error.

2. The Jury Was Misdirected by the Instructions Issued

{10} The State makes no challenge to the district court's decision that the instruction was warranted but states it was solely Defendant's responsibility to ensure it was given. We disagree with this limited view. Where there is any evidence to establish a self-defense theory, it is the duty of the court to fully and clearly instruct the jury on all relevant aspects of self-defense. Benally, 2001–NMSC–033, ¶ 41, 131 N.M. 258, 34 P.3d 1134 ; State v. Heisler, 1954–NMSC–032, ¶ 23, 58 N.M. 446, 272 P.2d 660 (stating that "where self-defense is involved in a criminal case and there is any evidence, although slight, to establish [self-defense], it is not only proper for the court, but its duty as well, to instruct the jury fully and clearly on all phases of the law on the issue that are warranted by the evidence"). The district court's conclusion that there was evidence to support the issuance of both the general self-defense instruction and the no-retreat instruction triggered the district court's duty to fully and clearly instruct the jury on both self-defense and no-retreat. See Heisler, 1954–NMSC–032, ¶ 23, 58 N.M. 446, 272 P.2d 660.

{11} The jury was informed of the elements of self-defense: (1) Defendant was put in fear by an apparent danger of immediate death or great bodily harm, (2) the killing resulted from that fear, and (3) Defendant acted reasonably when he or she killed.

State v. Rudolfo, 2008–NMSC–036, ¶ 17, 144 N.M. 305, 187 P.3d 170 ; see also UJI 14–5171 (enumerating the elements of self-defense). The jury was not, however, informed as required by UJI 14–5190 that a person "who is threatened with an attack need not retreat. In the exercise of his right of self[-]defense, he may stand his ground and defend himself."

{12} Because of the omission, the jury's understanding of all of the elements of the law governing self-defense was deficient. We conclude not only that a reasonable juror would have been misdirected by the jury instructions given, but also that the jury in Defendant's case was misdirected. As such, there was reversible error below; we now turn to an analysis of whether there was fundamental error.

{13} The State maintains that UJI 14–5190 is a definition or amplification of an essential self-defense element and that its omission from the given instructions therefore does not rise to the level of fundamental error. See State v....