State v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 25 May 1994
• Docket Number: No. 91-1826,91-1826
• Citation: 517 N.W.2d 208
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Paul A. ANDERSON, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 208

517 N.W.2d 208

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Paul A. ANDERSON, Appellant.

No. 91-1826.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 25, 1994.

Rehearing Denied June 17, 1994.

James L. Ottesen, Davenport, and Kent A. Simmons, for appellant.

Bonnie J. Campbell, Atty. Gen., Richard J. Bennett, Asst. Atty. Gen., William E. Davis, County Atty., and Joseph Grubisich, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.

Considered by CARTER, P.J., and NEUMAN, SNELL, ANDREASEN, and TERNUS, JJ.

CARTER, Justice.

Paul A. Anderson was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree in connection with the shooting death of Joseph Brown on March 5, 1988. The court of appeals reversed that conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding of guilt. We granted further review of the court of appeals decision.

After reviewing the record and considering the arguments of the parties, we disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that a rational jury could not have found from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was the perpetrator of Brown's murder. In addition, we have considered the defendant's other assignments of error relating to admission of evidence and pretrial and trial procedures and find no basis for reversing his conviction as a result of those claims. Consequently, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court.

At approximately 5:50 p.m. on March 5, 1988, a passerby discovered Joseph Brown's body in a wooded ravine in Devil's Glen Park in Bettendorf. This person had been in the park for some time before discovering the body. She had heard no gunfire and had not observed any unusual activity. Joseph Brown had been shot twice in the head, and he died later that day without regaining consciousness. An acquaintance of the victim testified that he had spoken with him on the telephone about 4 p.m. on the day the body was discovered. This witness indicated that Brown was at his Moline, Illinois, apartment at the time of this conversation and told the caller that he was about to leave to meet someone. After determining that the victim lived in Moline, Illinois, authorities attempted to contact his wife at their apartment in that city. This led to the discovery of Brown's wife's dead body in the couple's apartment. The circumstances indicated foul play.

Authorities learned that the victim and the defendant, Paul Anderson, had been associated together in a criminal operation involving the theft and resale of various types of property. Authorities attempted to interview the defendant at the apartment building where he resided in McHenry, Illinois, and he refused to talk to them. Using a ruse to cause him to believe they had left the building, one investigator remained hidden in a stairwell and overheard certain inculpatory statements that defendant made to a third party. These remarks were in response to a question as to whether the police believed that defendant had committed the murder. The officer testified that defendant responded "know it, but they can't prove nothing."

A tire track found adjacent to the park where Brown's body had been discovered matched the tires on defendant's motor vehicle. The last precipitation sufficient to obliterate tire tracks had occurred on February 16, 1988. Witnesses were found who ultimately testified that the defendant had quarreled with the victim over the division of the proceeds from their joint criminal activity and had made threats against the victim's well-being. Prior to the time that the present criminal charge was filed, defendant was arrested on another matter. Another prisoner at the jail where he was incarcerated testified that he inquired about the Brown murder at that time and that defendant responded in a manner that confessed involvement in the crime.

The defendant presented an alibi defense wherein he claimed to have been at his residence in McHenry, Illinois, at the time the victim was killed. This claim was only directly supported by the testimony of the defendant's wife. Other witnesses testifying as to defendant's presence at his McHenry, Illinois, residence on the day of the murder last saw him there at 2 p.m. The driving time between McHenry, Illinois, and Bettendorf, Iowa, was established to be approximately two and one-half hours. In rebuttal of defendant's alibi testimony, the State produced testimony from a neighbor of the victim. That witness testified to overhearing the victim's wife conversing with two persons in her Moline apartment around dusk on March 5. He indicated that she called one of these persons "Paul." Moline is located only minutes from Bettendorf. Other facts that relate to the issues on appeal will be set forth in our discussion of the points of law that have been argued by the parties.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Conviction.

In arguing in support of his entitlement to a directed verdict of acquittal, the defendant urges that the evidence of the State merely raises suspicion or speculation and is not enough to allow a rational fact finder to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was Brown's killer. This argument is built around the proposition that the term "substantial evidence," which is the criterion for reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal conviction, denotes some elevated quantity of proof. This is not a correct assumption.

For purposes of reviewing criminal convictions, we have defined "substantial evidence" as being "such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Iowa 1980). In making the determination whether that standard is met, the evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the State and assisted by all reasonable inferences. State v. Geier, 484 N.W.2d 167, 170-71 (Iowa 1992); State v. Garr, 461 N.W.2d 171, 173 (Iowa 1990). Although we review all of the evidence in determining its legal sufficiency to support the verdict, we do not ourselves determine whether the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d at 339.

Inherent in our standard of review of jury verdicts in criminal cases is the recognition that the jury was free to reject certain evidence, and credit other evidence. In reaching its verdict in this case, the jury could rationally have disbelieved defendant's alibi witnesses and believed from the other evidence in the case, including the threats and inculpatory statements attributed to the defendant, that he was the perpetrator of the crime. The court of appeals erred in concluding otherwise.

Because we disagree with the basis on which defendant's conviction was reversed, it is necessary to consider other assignments of error raised in defendant's argument that the court of appeals did not consider under its theory of the case. These issues include claims of error with respect to: (1) admitting evidence of statements made by defendant in the hallway of his apartment building, (2) admitting evidence concerning tires taken from defendant's motor vehicle, (3) admitting evidence of a conversation overheard from the victim's wife's apartment prior to her death, (4) failure of the State to produce photographs of footprints found at the scene of the crime in response to a motion to produce, (5) failure to preserve and actively investigate all footprints at the scene of the crime, and (6) the use of a willful injury offense as the designated felony in the murder instruction. We separately consider these claims.

II. Evidence of Statements Overheard in the Hallway of Defendant's Apartment Building.

Defendant contends that unlawful eavesdropping occurred when a law enforcement officer concealed himself in the stairwell of defendant's apartment building and overheard a statement that defendant made to a third party that was deemed to be inculpatory. This circumstance occurred after two officers had gained entry to the apartment building by randomly pushing apartment buzzers until someone let them in the locked building. Upon gaining entry, the officers proceeded to defendant's apartment and attempted to interview him. After defendant declined to speak with them the officers retreated, ostensibly to leave the premises. One of the officers slammed the outside door of the building to give the impression that they were gone. The other officer, however, took this opportunity to conceal himself in a building stairwell in order to eavesdrop on defendant's conversation with a third party in the hallway above.

At defendant's trial, over his objection and motion to suppress evidence, the officer who had eavesdropped was permitted to testify concerning inculpatory statements defendant made to a third party. Defendant asserts that the eavesdropping was unlawful and a violation of the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution. We disagree. In answering this question, it is not necessary to fully explore the extent to which the occupants of a multiple housing dwelling unit are entitled to an expectation of privacy. Whatever that expectation of privacy might be, defendant has failed to demonstrate that the eavesdropping activity in the present case was unlawful. At the time of overhearing defendant's statement to a neighbor, the officer was in a place where he was lawfully entitled to be.

The means of entry was in effect a ruse resulting in some occupant of the dwelling granting entry to the common areas of the building. As a result of this occurrence, the officers' presence in the hallways and stairwells of the building was lawful. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-71, 94 S.Ct. 988, 992-93, 39 L.Ed.2d 242, 248-49 (1974...