State v. Anderson, No. M2005-02086-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. 8/17/2006)
| Decision Date | 17 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. M2005-02086-CCA-R3-CD.,M2005-02086-CCA-R3-CD. |
| Parties | STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RAMIE ANDERSON AKA JAMIE ANDERSON. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals |
Paul D. Cross, Monteagle, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ramie Anderson.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Assistant Attorney General; J. Michael Taylor, District Attorney General; and Steven Strain, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, the State of Tennessee.
Gary R. Wade, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which Jerry L. Smith and Alan E. Glenn, JJ., joined.
The defendant, Ramie Anderson,1 was convicted of aggravated burglary and theft over $1,000. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-403, -103 (2003). The trial court imposed sentences of five years and six months for the aggravated burglary and four years for the theft over $1,000. The defendant was ordered to serve six months in jail for the theft and twelve months for the aggravated burglary, a total of eighteen months. The remainder of the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently on probation. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress evidence seized from his residence and contends that the remaining evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Because the trial court erred by its refusal to suppress, the judgments of the trial court are reversed and remanded for a new trial.
On March 23, 1999, the victim, Danny Layne, returned home from work and discovered that his residence had been burglarized. At trial, he testified that a side door to his garage was "tore all to pieces" and that his truck, four-wheeler, welder, air tools, hydraulic jacks, and air tanks had been stolen. He also testified that the back door to his residence was pried open and that several guns, including an antique gun from the 1800s, some old coins, cash, a portable compact disc player, and over one hundred compact discs had been taken from his property. Some of the tools and compact discs were recovered. The truck was burned. Later, when the victim's son, Jackie Layne, confessed to his participation in the burglary, the victim "disowned him" and forced him to turn himself in to the police. The son, who eventually pled guilty to burglary, informed the victim where he and the others involved in the crime had sold some of his possessions.
Jackie Layne, who was a witness for the state, testified that on the day of the burglary, he, Josh Shrum, and the defendant, after ingesting methamphetamine, began to discuss ways to obtain money in order to purchase ingredients to make more of the illegal drug. He recalled that he informed Shrum and the defendant about the "nice things that [his] dad had and how [they] could probably get a lot of money." According to Jackie Layne, the three men traveled to the victim's residence, pried open the back door with a crowbar, and stole guns, compact discs, and coins from the residence. He stated that they also took the victim's truck, which was loaded with a four-wheeler, a battery charger, and several tools from the garage. Jackie Layne testified that he and the defendant sold all of the tools for a total of $400. When the defendant tried to hide the truck in a remote area and got stuck in some mud, he and Shrum burned the vehicle. Jackie Layne described himself as distraught, explaining that "drugs [were] messing with [his] head . . .[,] and [he] just wanted to see [his father] and make sure he was all right." He eventually turned himself in to the police and implicated the two other men in the burglary.
Glendon Ferrell Hicks, the chief of police for the city of Gruetli-Laager, investigated the burglary, compiled a list of missing items, and checked for fingerprints. He testified that after signing an affidavit for a warrant to search the defendant's residence and obtaining a warrant from a magistrate, he and the sheriff drove to the residence. He explained that he chose not to serve the document when the defendant's brother voluntarily handed over several of the stolen compact discs. Chief Hicks recalled that the victim later identified the compact discs as a portion of those stolen from his residence.
On cross-examination, Chief Hicks acknowledged that he and the sheriff obtained the search warrant for the defendant's residence based upon his affidavit. He conceded that when he arrived at the defendant's residence around 2:00 a.m., the sheriff, who had the document in his hand, "told the boy that came to the door [that] he had [the warrant]" and that afterward they were given eight of the stolen compact discs, which were listed on the return. Questioned about who actually obtained the warrant and who filed the return, the chief stated,
Later in the trial, during a jury-out hearing on an unrelated issue, the trial judge observed, "I think we have to take the position that they did a search, it may have been a sloppy search, it may not have been a good search, but they did a search, because they made a return."
After entering into the record the search warrant, which included the return prepared by the executing officers, the defense rested.
In this appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. Specifically, he argues that the affidavit in support of the search warrant was insufficient. Although the state concedes that the affidavit was insufficient, it argues that the evidence was admissible because it was voluntarily surrendered without a search of the residence.
The substantive portion of the affidavit provided by Chief Hicks in support of the search warrant provides as follows:
On the 24 day of March 1999, I received information from John Doe/Alias a confidential informant, whom I have known for at least eight years (8) and whom I know to be honest, reliable and credible. In addition to the said informant he has given reliable information to me and other law enforcement officers which has resulted in arrest and convictions of the individuals involved in the illegal possession of stolen property and have resulted in the seizure of contraband, vehicles associated with the possession of stolen property.
The aforesaid informant advised me that he/she had been on premises of [the] defendant, within seventy two (72) hours preceding the 25 day of March 1999, and while on the said premises he/she had personally observed one 38 S&W 4in brl nickle plat[e,] one 38cal S&W 4in brl blue steel, one Rossi 22cal pump rifle, one Westerfield single shot 22cal rifle and Schummalker battery charger SE 2001, 50 asst CD, on the said premises which are under the control of said . . . defendant. The said premises are located in Grundy County, Tennessee . . . .
Wherefore, as such officer acting in performance of my duty in the premises I pray the Court issue a warrant authorizing the search of the said premises described in Exhibit" A," of the said person of the defendant and of the house or buildings and vehicles on the said premises for evidence of the crime of the Possession of stolen property, and such search be made either by day or night.
At the pre-trial hearing, defense counsel argued that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause that any of the items enumerated were evidence of or had any connection to any criminal activity. The trial court ruled as follows:
The combination of the warrant and the affidavit taken together . . . establishes that an impartial magistrate knew what was being asked for and based on what she says was a sworn statement of Chief Glendon Hicks, that it was stolen, that that's sufficient. It is not the best way to have done it, but I think the bottom line is she issued a warrant based on Glendon Hicks telling her that he had an informant on stolen property, that had seen stolen property in the home and they may have left the word stolen property out in the affidavit, but, I mean, you could draw that assumption from it.
The standard of review applicable to suppression issues is well established. When the trial court makes a finding of facts at the conclusion of a suppression hearing, the facts are accorded the weight of a jury verdict. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994). The trial court's findings are binding upon this court unless the evidence in the record preponderates against them. State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996); see also Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d at 544; State v. Goforth, 678 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). Questions of credibility of witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact. The party prevailing in the trial court is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23. This court's review of a trial court's application of law to the facts, however, is conducted under a de novo standard of review. See State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Tenn. 1999).
An affidavit is an indispensable prerequisite to the issuance of any search warrant. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-103; State ex rel. Blackburn v. Fox, 292 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Tenn. 1956). It must establish probable cause. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-6-104; Tenn. R. Crim. P. 41(c). Probable cause has been defined as follows:
Whether at [the] moment [of arrest] the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information...
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