State v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 23 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 20050229.,No. 20050202.,20050202.,20050229. |
| Parties | STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Daniel James ANDERSON, Defendant and Appellant. State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Jesse Mikal Anderson, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Aaron Grayson Birst, Assistant State's Attorney, Fargo, N.D., for plaintiff and appellee.
Monty Grant Mertz (on brief), Fargo, N.D., for defendant and appellant Daniel James Anderson.
Jesse N. Lange, Larivee & Light, Fargo, N.D., for defendant and appellant Jesse Mikal Anderson.
[¶ 1] Jesse Anderson ("Jesse") and Daniel Anderson ("Daniel") appeal from a criminal conviction for carrying a concealed weapon or dangerous firearm, entered upon a conditional guilty plea after the district court denied their motions to suppress evidence. We affirm, concluding: (1) law enforcement officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle; (2) the officers' actions during the vehicle stop were reasonable; (3) a statement Jesse made to law enforcement officers before being given a Miranda warning was not illegally obtained; (4) the search of the vehicle falls within a safety exception to the warrant requirement.
[¶ 2] On the evening of February 7, 2005, Gregory Anderson ("Greg") called Barnes County Deputy Joseph Gress regarding Greg's brother, Jesse, and Greg's son, Daniel. When he called Deputy Gress, Greg was in Jamestown, North Dakota. Greg told Deputy Gress he had received a call from Jesse, who was traveling to Fargo, informing Greg of Jesse's plan to settle some bad drug deals in Fargo. Greg told Deputy Gress he believed Jesse was heavily armed, was wearing a bulletproof vest, and was with Daniel. Deputy Gress testified Greg provided him with the information because Greg was worried about Jesse and Daniel's safety and Greg wanted Deputy Gress' help.
[¶ 3] Deputy Gress was familiar with Daniel, Jesse, and Greg through prior investigations as a narcotics officer. Deputy Gress previously had arrested Greg for drug violations. After Greg's arrest, he began voluntarily providing Deputy Gress with information on drug deals. Deputy Gress testified that Greg was very truthful, except for one occasion when he lied about a neighbor selling drugs.
[¶ 4] Deputy Gress knew Jesse was from Kathryn, North Dakota, and Jesse usually drove a green four-door Ford Pickup or an Intrepid. In December 2004, Deputy Gress received information from Jesse's ex-wife, who believed Jesse had a handgun in the console of his pickup and that he often carried an AK-47 rifle. According to Deputy Gress, she had asked Jesse why he carried weapons and Jesse replied, "In case the law tries to fuck with me!"
[¶ 5] Later on February 7, 2005, Deputy Gress received another call from Greg, informing him that Jesse was at a McDonald's or a Stop-N-Go convenience store in north Fargo awaiting further directions to the intended target's residence. Deputy Gress provided the Fargo Police Department with all of his information, and the Fargo Police Department relayed that information to its officers, including Officer Jared Crane.
[¶ 6] Officer Crane observed a green four-door Ford Pickup matching the description of the suspect's vehicle at a McDonald's drive-through in north Fargo. Officer Crane ran a license check on the vehicle and determined the pickup was registered to Hjalmer and Laraine Anderson of Kathryn, North Dakota. Based on his corroboration and the information relayed from Deputy Gress to the Fargo Police Department, Officer Crane testified he believed a high-risk stop was necessary for officer safety.
[¶ 7] After other officers arrived at the scene and the suspect's vehicle had pulled into a parking spot, the vehicle was stopped. Two squad cars blocked the vehicle, and six officers exited their squad cars, positioning themselves around the vehicle with their weapons drawn. Officer Crane instructed the driver, later identified as Jesse, to turn the vehicle off, throw the keys out the window, exit the vehicle, put his hands in the air, and turn around in a 360 degree circle. Officer Crane repeated those commands several times because Jesse was not cooperating. Fargo Police Officer Messmer instructed Jesse to walk backwards toward him. Officer Messmer asked Jesse several times to get on his knees, and eventually Jesse complied. Officer Messmer then instructed Jesse to lay on the ground so the officers could handcuff him. Jesse did not cooperate, and eventually Officer Messmer had to physically put Jesse on the ground. Upon placing his hands on Jesse, Officer Messmer physically determined Jesse was wearing a bulletproof vest. Officer Messmer informed the other officers that Jesse was wearing a bulletproof vest. Once on the ground, Jesse continued to lift his head and chest off the ground, disregarding the officers' instructions. The officers handcuffed Jesse, but told him he was not under arrest. Jesse was advised he was being detained pending investigation and that he was being handcuffed for officer safety. While handcuffing Jesse, but before giving him a Miranda warning, Officer Crane asked Jesse if he had any weapons. Jesse stated there was a rifle in the truck. Jesse was then placed in the back of a squad car.
[¶ 8] Another officer repeated the same procedure with Daniel, who fully cooperated with the officer's requests. After officers secured Daniel, Officer Crane testified he was not sure if anyone else was in the vehicle and he asked any other occupants to exit the vehicle. The incident took place at night and the pickup had tinted windows. Officer Crane testified he could not visually determine if anyone else was inside the vehicle. Officer Crane and a second officer approached the passenger side of the vehicle and opened the rear door. Upon opening the door, Officer Crane immediately saw an uncased AK-47 style rifle lying on the floor of the vehicle. He informed the other officers that he had found a weapon. Officer Crane searched the vehicle and seized the rifle, a switch blade, ammunition, a machete, and a 9 millimeter handgun.
[¶ 9] The police took Jesse and Daniel to the police department, where they were given Miranda warnings before making statements. Daniel and Jesse were subsequently charged with carrying a concealed firearm or dangerous weapon in violation of N.D.C.C. § 62.1-04-02. They moved to suppress the evidence seized in the parking lot and Jesse's statements, claiming the officers' conduct violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution and N.D. Const. art. I, §§ 8 and 12. The district court denied their motions to suppress, concluding: (1) the officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle; (2) the officers' seizure of Jesse and Daniel was reasonable; (3) a statement by Jesse before he was given a Miranda warning was an officer safety issue and not Fifth Amendment activity; (4) the search of the vehicle was appropriate; and (5) Jesse and Daniel were not under arrest when they were handcuffed and placed in the squad car. Jesse and Daniel conditionally pled guilty to the charge under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), reserving their right to appeal the denial of their motions to suppress.
[¶ 10] When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we defer to the district court's findings of fact. State v. Kitchen, 1997 ND 241, ¶ 11, 572 N.W.2d 106. We resolve conflicts in testimony in favor of affirmance, because we recognize the district court is in a better position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence. Id. "[A] trial court's decision to deny a motion to suppress will not be reversed if there is sufficient competent evidence capable of supporting the trial court's findings, and if its decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence." Id. Although we defer to the district court's findings of fact, questions of law are fully reviewable. State v. Linghor, 2004 ND 224, ¶ 3, 690 N.W.2d 201.
[¶ 11] Jesse and Daniel argue the police officers did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop their vehicle. They argue the information the officers received from the informants was not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of the vehicle.
[¶ 12] In order to legally stop a vehicle, "an officer must have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the motorist has violated or is violating the law." State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 640 (N.D.1994). An objective standard is used to determine if an officer has reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop. State v. Bryl, 477 N.W.2d 814, 816 (N.D.1991). "`The question is whether or not a reasonable person in the officer's position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect the defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity.'" Id. (quoting State v. Lykken, 406 N.W.2d 664, 666 (N.D.1987)). The determination of whether the facts in a case support a reasonable and articulable suspicion is fully reviewable on appeal. State v. Smith, 2005 ND 21, ¶ 11, 691 N.W.2d 203.
[¶ 13] Information from an informant may provide the factual basis to establish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop. Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 640. In evaluating the factual basis for an investigatory stop, we must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the quantity, or content, and quality, or degree of reliability, of the officer's information. Id. "As a general rule, the lesser the quality or reliability of the tip, the greater the quantity of information required to raise a reasonable suspicion." Id.
[¶ 14] Jesse and Daniel argue the information provided to law enforcement was insufficient to establish a reasonable and articulable suspicion because Greg Anderson is a member of the "criminal milieu" and...
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