State v. Andrae

• Decision Date: 25 February 1909
• Citation: 116 S.W. 561,216 Mo. 617
• Parties: STATE ex rel. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1. v. ANDRAE et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

116 S.W. 561

216 Mo. 617

STATE ex rel. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 1. v. ANDRAE et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

February 25, 1909.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 67) — DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT — DIVISION OF POWERS — JUDICIAL POWER.

Under Const. art. 6, § 1 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 212) providing that the judicial power of the state as to matters of law and equity shall be vested in the Supreme Court, and other courts specifically named, the judicial power referred to, as a matter of law and equity, must be such powers and authority as courts and judges exercise; such as legitimately pertains to an officer in the department designated by the Constitution as "judicial"; such as exercised in the ordinary forms of a court of justice, in a suit between parties with process. It does not include every authority judicial in its nature which requires the exercise of judgment or discretion.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 63) — DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER — SCHOOL BOARDS.

It is not a prohibited delegation of legislative power that the General Assembly gives by general laws to boards of school directors and county superintendents the rights of local self-government in school matters.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 52) — ENCROACHMENT ON JUDICIARY — CONSOLIDATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS.

Rev. St. 1899, § 9742 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 4463), relating to school district boundaries, and providing that if, on an election to consolidate districts, all the districts do not vote in favor thereof, the matter may be referred to the county commissioner, who shall appoint four disinterested persons, who, with him, shall constitute a board of arbitrators to decide on the necessity, which decision shall be final, does not contravene Const. art. 6, § 1 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 212), providing that the judicial power of the state "as to matters of law and equity" shall be vested in the specified courts.

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 52) — ENCROACHMENT ON JUDICIARY — CONSOLIDATION OF SCHOOL DISTRICTS.

Neither does the fact that by Rev. St. 1899, § 9739 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 4461), the school districts are a body corporate, and hence are interested parties to the proceedings before the board, make it a matter of law and equity, since the districts are bodies corporate for a public purpose only, being formed by Const. art. 11, § 1 et seq. (Ann. St. 1906, p. 296), for the establishment of free public schools.

5. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS (§ 22) — STATUTORY PROVISIONS — CONSTRUCTION.

A statute regulating the public school system, and providing, in Rev. St. 1899, § 9742 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 4463), the procedure for the organization of school districts, the formation of new districts, and consolidation of districts, will be liberally construed, since school matters are usually in the hands of persons not learned in the law.

6. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS (§ 39) — CONSOLIDATION OF DISTRICTS — PETITION FOR APPEAL.

Under Rev. St. 1899, § 9742 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 4463), relating to the consolidation of school districts, and providing that notices shall be given by the clerks of the districts on petition being received by them of the election to determine the question, and providing for an appeal to the county commissioner if all votes are not in favor of the consolidation, a petition for appeal is not insufficient in not showing that the clerk of the district voting against the consolidation posted the notices required, where it was alleged that no votes were cast in favor of the consolidation and 23 against it, since it will be presumed that he did his duty.

7. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS (§ 39) — CONSOLIDATION OF DISTRICTS — TIME OF FILING APPEAL.

Under Rev. St. 1899, § 9742 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 4463), relating to the consolidation of school districts, and providing that if an appeal is taken to the county commissioner, it must be taken within five days after the annual meeting of the board of directors, that the county commissioners' records do not show that the petition was filed within the five days does not render the proceedings thereunder negatory, where there is no requirement in the school law that he should keep a record, as it must be presumed that he did not act on a petition not filed in time.

Error to Circuit Court, St. Louis County; John W. McElhinney, Judge.

Certiorari by the State of Missouri, on the relation of School District No. 1, in township No. 45 of range No. 3 E., against J. Will Andrae and others, to review the consolidation of school districts. From a final judgment for defendants, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

J. C. Kiskaddon, for plaintiff in error. D. C. Taylor, for defendants in error.

GRAVES, J.

At the school meeting in April in the year 1905, an attempt (whether successful or unsuccessful remains to be determined) was made to change the boundary line between two adjoining school districts in St. Louis county. The relator is one of said two, and School District No. 4, in township 45 N., range 3 E., is the other. After the school election, one district having voted for said change of boundary and the other against it, the matter was taken before J. Will Andrae, the then superintendent of public schools of said county, for determination. He is one of the defendants in error herein. The other four defendants in error are the four men appointed by him as a board of arbitration, under the provisions of section 9742, Rev. St. 1899 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 4463). This board of arbitration, in a written decision signed by the members thereof, found that a necessity existed for the change of the boundary line in question. The relator then made application to the circuit court of St. Louis county for a writ of certiorari, and was granted such writ. Returns were made to the writ, and after the filing of the returns, relator filed its objections thereto, and moved for judgment. These both being overruled, final judgment was entered in favor of the respondents in that court, the defendants in error here. Relator filed motion for new trial, which was overruled, and in proper time, to complete its record, filed its bill of exceptions. Thereafter, within one year, the pending writ of error was sued out in this court. J. Will Andrae having died before the hearing in this court, and proper suggestions of such death having been made, W. T. Bender, the successor in office of said Andrae, entered his appearance as defendant in error.

The numerous alleged weaknesses in the record of this inferior tribunal, the board of arbitrators, are thus set out by relator, in its objection to return and motion for judgment: "Now comes the relator, and objects to the returns herein made by the several defendants, and alleges that it appears by said returns that the proceedings of defendants, as superintendent of public schools of said county and alleged arbitrators, are void, and that defendants had no jurisdiction to hear or determine or decide the matter in controversy, as stated in the petition for writ of certiorari filed herein, and which petition is made a part hereof, for the following reasons, to wit: It does not appear by any act, record, finding, order, or judgment of said alleged board of arbitration (1) that said petition or appeal was filed with or presented to said superintendent within 5 days after the annual meetings in said two districts; (2) that said superintendent appointed four disinterested men, resident taxpayers of said county, to act with himself as a board of arbitration; (3) that the other defendants alleged and claimed to be said board were or are disinterested or were or are resident taxpayers of said county; (4) that said alleged board met said superintendent at any time or place in said county; (5) that said alleged board met within 15 days after said annual school meeting; (6) that any notice of the time and place of said meeting, if any was held, was given to the relator herein; (7) that a petition desiring any change of boundary between said districts was given or received by the clerks of either of said two districts 15 days or more prior to the annual meeting in said districts; (8) that any such alleged petition desiring a change of boundary was signed by at least 10 qualified voters residing in both or either of said districts; (9) that any such petition described the change of boundary desired; (10) that both of the clerks of said districts posted, or caused to be posted, notices of said desired change in at least five public places in both of said districts, at least 15 days before said annual meetings; (11) that any notices claimed to have been posted in said districts contained a description of said proposed change of boundary; (12) that either or both of said districts voted on said proposed change of boundary; (13) that any vote taken by said districts, or by either of them, did or did not favor said proposed change of boundary; (14) that the decision of said alleged board of arbitration conforms to the proposition contained in any notice of the said proposed change of boundary; (15) that the decision of said alleged board of arbitration conforms to the proposition voted on at the annual meeting of either or both of said districts; (16) that the alleged decision of said board of arbitration defines, sets out, or describes the proposed change of boundary between said districts, and that said decision is so vague and indefinite that the rights of the respective districts cannot be determined therefrom; (17) that the proposed change of boundary does not leave in any district, by actual count, less than 20 pupils of school age; (18) that the proposed change of boundary between said districts is not made simply for the acquisition of territory one from the other; (19) that any necessity exists for the proposed change, or the facts upon which any such necessity is supposed to depend; and it further appears that said board of arbitration exceeded its jurisdiction in said controversy, and that said board had no jurisdiction...