State v. Andre
| Decision Date | 17 June 1938 |
| Docket Number | 27066. |
| Citation | 80 P.2d 553,195 Wash. 221 |
| Parties | STATE v. ANDRE. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Department 1.
Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; John M. Wilson, Judge.
Maurice Andre, alias Maurice Renee, alias Maurice Larios, was convicted of kidnapping in the first degree, and from the judgment and sentence he appeals.
Affirmed.
J. T. Trullinger and Wallace G. Mills, both of Olympia, for appellant.
Smith Troy, John S. Lynch, Jr., and E. A. Philbrick, all of Olympia, for respondent.
The defendant in this case was charged by information with the crime of kidnapping in the first degree. The trial resulted in a verdict of guilty, as charged, and a special finding against the death penalty. The defendant moved in arrest of judgment and, in the alternative, for a new trial, both of which motions were overruled, and from the judgment and sentence he appeals.
The facts essential to be stated are these: One Arlington C Jones was the operator of a taxicab in the city of Olympia. During the evening of October 28, 1936, he was employed by the appellant to take him on two or three trips to designated places in the city. About two-thirty or three o'clock the following morning, or October 29th, the defendant again engaged Jones for the announced purpose of taking him to one of the hotels in the city. After he had driven about a block the appellant climbed from the back seat of the cab into the front seat and put a small knife against Jones' neck and told him to keep on driving and that he wanted to go to Portland. Jones drove him towards Portland to a point about a mile south of Chehalis. At this time he saw a chance to escape because a truck was approaching and he thought he might get help from the driver of that truck. As he approached the truck, Jones set the brakes on the taxi and came to a sudden stop. He opened the door and fell out on the pavement. The appellant jumped out on the other side and called to the driver of the truck, 'This man is crazy.' The truck driver, believing that it was a drunken brawl, did not interfere and moved on. The appellant administered a beating to Jones and then he disappeared.
Jones was a cripple, in that he had a deformed back, and the appellant was a much more powerful man than he. The appellant was a fugitive from justice, and at the time he entered the cab and directed Jones to drive him to Portland, he was aware, or at least thought, that the officers were close upon his trail. Subsequently, the appellant was arrested, charged and convicted, as above stated.
The question presented upon this appeal is whether the evidence offered by the state is sufficient to establish the crime of kidnapping in the first degree. That crime is defined in section 1 of chapter 6, p. 8, Laws of 1933, Ex.Sess., where it is provided that:
From this statute it will be noticed that the crime of kidnapping in the first degree may be committed either by seizing, confining, or inveigling another with intent to cause him without authority of law to be 'secretly confined or imprisoned,' or with seizing, confining, or inveigling another to be 'held to service.' Following this is the statement, with intent to extort or obtain 'money or reward' for the release or disposition of the subject of the kidnapping. The appellant construes the statute as meaning that the language, to extort or obtain 'money or reward,' relates to both methods in which the crime may be committed. The state says that the correct construction is that the words 'money or reward' do not relate to the first method of committing the crime, that of secretly confining or imprisoning the victim, but only refer to the second method, or that of being 'held to service.'
It will not be necessary here to determine whether the appellant or the state has the correct view of the statute. Without so deciding, it will be assumed that the construction contended for by the appellant is the correct one. The question, then is reduced to whether...
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State v. Knutson
...355 S.W.2d 151 (Ky.); Crum v. State, 131 Tex.Cr.R. 631, 101 S.W.2d 270; Futerll v. State, 501 P.2d 901 (Okl.Cr.); State v. Andre, 195 Wash. 221, 80 P.2d 553. Other decisions are collected in Annot. 43 A.L.R.3d 699, Apart from the authorities, we reach the same result on reason. Suppose a ma......
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People v. Knowles
...1, Art. 27, § 385. Possibly Washington should also be listed here as a result of judicial construction of their statute. State v. Andre, 195 Wash. 221, 80 P.2d 553; State v. Berry, 200 Wash. 495, 93 P.2d 782, noted and criticized in 38 Colamb.L.R. 1287; 19 Ore.L.R. 301.3 In California, alth......
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State v. Berry, 27458.
...would be contrary to the clearly expressed intent of the legislature to strengthen, not weaken, the kidnaping statute. In State v. Andre, 195 Wash. 221, 80 P.2d 554, appellant contended that the language 'to extort obtain money or reward' related to both methods in which the crime of first ......
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State v. Randall
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