State v. Andrew
| Citation | 61 N.C. 205 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Decision Date | 31 January 1867 |
| Parties | STATE v. ANDREW. |
What amounts to such threats or promises as render confesssions inadmissible, as being not voluntary; what evidence the Judge will hear to establish the facts of threats or promises; and whether there be any evidence to show that the confessions were not voluntary; are questions of law, and the decision upon them is subject to review in the Supreme Court. Whether the evidence, if true, proves the fact of threats or promises; whether the witnesses testifying to the court as to such fact are worthy of credit; and in case of conflict, which of them is to be believed, are questions of fact for the Judge, and his decision upon them is not subject to review.
Where there was some evidence that the confessions of the prisoner were not voluntary, and in his argument to the jury his counsel, for the first time, asked the Judge to withdraw them; Held to be the duty of the Judge to decide whether the objection to the confessions came too late, and whether the jury should consider them as evidence.
( State v. Dick, 2 Win. 45; State v. George, 5 Jon, 233, and State v. Lawson 61 N.C. 47, cited and approved.)
ARSON, tried before Merrimon, J., at Spring Term, 1866, of the Superior Court of BUNCOMBE.
The prisoner, late the slave of Robert L. Gudger, was indicted for burning a barn belonging to one John Reeves, in Madison county, where the indictment was found and whence the trial was removed. The evidence of the prisoner's guilt consisted mainly in his confessions, made while he was tied and under the charge of one T. R. James, who was acting as an officer. James and three other witnesses testified that the confessions were voluntary, and made without inducements by threat or promise. A witness for the defence testified that James did threaten the prisoner, and three others swore that James had told them before the trial that the prisoner would not have confessed had he not been “scared, and thought he would be hanged to the first limb.” All the evidence was set forth in detail.
The confessions were not objected to till after the evidence was closed; but in his argument to the jury, the prisoner's counsel asked the court to withdraw them. His Honor refused, but charged the jury that if they believed the prisoner had made confessions, they would give them such weight as they might think proper; they might believe them as a whole, or reject them as a whole; that they must consider of the circumstances under which they were made, in fixing the weight to be allowed them, &c.
Verdict of guilty; rule for a new trial; rule discharged; judgment and appeal.
Whitfield, for the prisoner .
“It is the duty of the Judge to decide the facts upon which depends the admissibility of testimony; he cannot put upon others the decision of a matter, whether of law or of fact, which he himself is bound to make.” State v. Dick, 2 Win., 45. In that case the Judge decided the fact against the prisoner, and admitted the evidence; but, in his instructions to the jury, he told them not to consider the confessions, if they believed them not to have been made voluntarily. This was held to be error, but one of which the prisoner could not complain, because “it could not by any possibility have wrought him harm.” As the Judge had decided the fact against him, it was only giving him another chance to have the same fact passed on by the jury. What facts amount to such threats or promises as make confessions not voluntary and admissible in evidence is a question of law, and the decision of the Judge in the court below can be reviewed by this court; so, what evidence the Judge should allow to be offered to him to establish these facts, is a question of law. So, whether there be any evidence tending to show that confessions were not made voluntarily, is a question of law. But whether the evidence, if true, proves these facts, and whether the witnesses giving testimony to the court touching the facts are entitled to credit...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Vickers, 739
...of testimony; he cannot put upon others the decision of a matter, whether of law or of fact, which he himself is bound to make.' State v. Andrew, 61 N.C. 205. The requirement now recognized in North Carolina that there should be a preliminary investigation in the absence of the jury to dete......
-
State v. Moore
... ... 730, 87 S.E. 62; State v. Fisher, 51 N.C. 478; ... State v. Scates, 50 N.C. 420; State v ... Gregory, 50 N.C. 315; 16 C.J., 722 ... In this ... jurisdiction, the competency of a confession is a preliminary ... question for the trial court, State v. Andrew, 61 ... N.C. 205, to be determined in the manner pointed out in ... State v. Whitener, 191 N.C. 659, 132 S.E. 603. The ... court's ruling thereon will not be disturbed, if ... supported by any competent evidence. State v ... Stefanoff, 206 N.C. 443, 174 S.E. 411; State v ... Christy, 170 ... ...
-
State v. Newsome
... ... voluntarily made. Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, ... 266 U.S. 1, 45 S.Ct. 1, 69 L.Ed. 131. The voluntariness of a ... confession is a preliminary question to be determined by the ... judge in passing upon its competency as evidence. State ... v. Andrew, 61 N.C. 205. And, in deciding the question of ... its admissibility in evidence, the judge may hear the ... testimony of witnesses pro and con. State v ... Whitener, 191 N.C. 659, 132 S.E. 603. If an alleged ... confession is excluded, its competency cannot arise on ... appeal; but, if ... ...
-
State v. Rogers
...of fact whether it was or was not voluntary before he permits it to go to the jury. State v. Litteral, 227 N.C. 527, 43 S.E.2d 84; State v. Andrew, 61 N.C. 205. In making this preliminary inquiry, the judge should afford both the prosecution and the defense a reasonable opportunity to prese......