State v. Angel
| Decision Date | 31 December 1846 |
| Citation | 29 N.C. 27,7 Ired. 27 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE v. DANIEL ANGEL et al. |
Where on the trial of an indictment for murder, the prisoner's counsel objected, that the name of the deceased as mentioned in the indictment was not his true name, that was a fact to be tried by the jury.
The purpose of setting forth the name of the person, on whom an offence has been committed, is to identify the particular fact or transaction, on which the indictment is founded, so that the accused may have the benefit of an acquittal or conviction, if accused a second time. The name is generally required as the best mode of describing the person; but he may be described otherwise, as by his calling or the like, if he be identified thereby as the individual and distinguished from all others, and if the name be not known, that fact may be stated as an excuse for omitting it altogether.
The Act of Assembly restraining Judges from expressing to the jury an opinion as to the “facts,' of the case, only applies to those “facts,” respecting which the parties take issue or dispute, and on which, as having occurred or not occured, the imputed liability of the defendant depends.
Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Yancy County, at the Fall Term, 1846, his Honor Judge CALDWELL presiding.
The prisoner was indicted, with another, for the murder of Robert B. Roberts, by stabbing with a knife, and found guilty. Upon the trial, witnesses for the State testified, that the prisoner gave the mortal wound without any previous provocation from the deceased. Witnesses for the prisoner, however, stated, that the deceased was in the act of striking at the prisoner, when the stab was given; and other witnesses for the prisoner testified, that the deceased had struck the prisoner one slight blow on the head or hat, and was in the act of striking another, when he received the stab.
In the course of the charge to the jury, the presiding Judge remarked, “that the witnesses differed in their accounts of the transaction,” and then recapitulated their testimony as to the manner in which the rencounter took place; and after some instructions upon matters of law, he remarked further, that, “according to the testimony of the prisoner's witnesses, the mortal blow was given at or about the commencement of the rencounter.” The Judge informed the jury, that they were the judges of the truth and weight of the testimony of the witnesses.
The Judge subsequently remarked to the jury, that the counsel for the prisoner had not, in his argument, contended, that the law touching the degree of the homicide was otherwise than it had been laid down by the Judge, “but that they had argued the facts with much ingenuity;” and therefore, his Honor reminded the jury as to the importance of the matter in hand, and that it was their duty to weigh the evidence deliberately and give a verdict according to the facts, and to the law as it had been expounded by the Court.
During the examination of the witnesses, the prisoner's Counsel made the point, that the deceased was not properly named in the indictment, “Robert B. Roberts,” and requested the Court to reserve the question. But the Court declined doing so, and said that it was a question of fact for the decision of the jury, whether that was the name of the deceased. Witnesses then stated, that “Robert Burton Roberts” was supposed to be his full name, but that he was commonly known as “Robert B. Roberts,” and often called for short, “Burt Roberts.” Upon that evidence, the counsel for the prisoner in the argument before the jury did not deny, that the deceased was described by his proper name in the indictment, or raise any question thereon.
After the verdict against the prisoner, his counsel moved for a new trial upon the ground, that the deceased was not properly named in the indictment; and it was refused by the Court.
The prisoner's counsel then moved for a venire de novo, upon the ground that, in making the remarks to the jury before mentioned, the presiding Judge had given an opinion upon the facts. That was also refused, and sentence of death pronounced; and the prisoner appealed.
Attorney General, for the State .
Baxter and Alexander, for the defendant .
The Court is of opinion, that there is no error in the judgment.
On the point respecting the name of the deceased, his Honor was certainly right in saying, that it was the province of the jury to determine what the name was. We do not understand what was meant by...
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State v. Hart
...made in the court's charge. It is a broadside attack on the court's conduct below in the trial of this cause. Judge Ruffin, in State v. Angel, 29 N.C. 27, "His honor, undoubtedly, did not transcend his powers and duty, under the act of 1796, in delivering his charge to the jury. The 'facts,......
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State v. Howard
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