State v. Angle
| Decision Date | 07 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | #29208 |
| Citation | 958 N.W.2d 501 |
| Parties | STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Natalie Marie ANGLE, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
JASON R. RAVNSBORG, Attorney General, ANN C. MEYER, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, South Dakota, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.
MANUEL J. DE CASTRO, JR., Madison, South Dakota, Attorney for defendant and appellant.
[¶1.] Natalie Marie Angle appeals her convictions for vehicular homicide and driving under the influence, arguing that the circuit court erred when it denied her motion to suppress statements to law enforcement following the accident, which prompted this case. Angle also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions. We affirm.
[¶2.] Natalie Angle left her boyfriend's home in Madison at around 5:15 p.m. on December 17, 2018, and was driving her sport utility vehicle (SUV) west on Highway 34 near the small community of Junius when she swerved over the center line and collided with an eastbound pickup driven by James Birgen. An investigation later revealed that Angle's SUV made contact with Birgen's pickup behind the driver's-side door. The force of the impact flipped the pickup onto its side. Birgen was ejected from the truck and was fatally injured.
[¶3.] Angle's SUV rolled several times and came to rest upright in the south ditch of Highway 34. A truck driver traveling a short distance behind Birgen saw the entire accident, including Birgen being thrown from his pickup. He stopped to render such assistance as he could in the moments before emergency personnel arrived.
[¶4.] Deputy Grant Lanning with the Lake County Sheriff's Department was the first law enforcement officer to arrive on the scene. After checking Birgen for vital signs and finding none, he approached Angle's vehicle. Deputy Lanning was soon joined by Officer Heath Abraham from the Madison Police Department, and the two visited with Angle in an effort to keep her calm1 while waiting for emergency personnel to extract her from her heavily damaged vehicle. Both Deputy Lanning and Officer Abraham detected the smell of an alcoholic beverage, and Angle admitted she had been drinking prior to the accident.
[¶5.] Once Angle was removed from her SUV, she was transported to the Madison Regional Hospital. Officer Abraham followed in his patrol vehicle while Deputy Lanning obtained a search warrant authorizing officers to obtain a sample of Angle's blood. A sample taken at 7:34 p.m.—two hours after the accident—subsequently revealed a blood alcohol content (BAC) of .243. A second blood test obtained at 8:43 p.m. showed a BAC of .220.
[¶6.] At 9:05 p.m., Deputy Lanning requested an interview with Angle at the hospital. A short while before, Lake County Sheriff Tim Walburg had told Deputy Lanning to provide Angle with Miranda2 warnings, and if she waived her rights, to "get as much information as he could." Deputy Lanning did not have with him a preprinted card containing the Miranda warnings often carried by law enforcement officers. See State v. Willingham , 2019 S.D. 55, ¶ 36, 933 N.W.2d 619, 628 (). Working from memory, he had the following exchange with Angle:
[¶7.] During the interview, Angle admitted to drinking before the accident and to being distracted by her dogs in the backseat. After the interview, Sheriff Walburg spoke with Angle and advised her that Birgen had been killed as a result of the crash. He placed Angle under arrest and transported her to the Lake County Jail after she was discharged from the hospital a short time later. A Lake County grand jury returned an indictment charging Angle with one count of vehicular homicide and three counts of driving under the influence under alternative theories. See SDCL 22-16-41 ; SDCL 32-23-1(1) ; SDCL 32-23-1(2) ; SDCL 32-23-1(4). She pled not guilty and moved to suppress her statement to Deputy Lanning at the hospital, arguing she was not properly advised of her Miranda rights.
[¶8.] After conducting a hearing, the circuit court denied Angle's motion to suppress. The court recognized that Deputy Lanning had provided Angle with three of the four advisories required by Miranda , omitting the right to appointed counsel. However, the court concluded that the fact Deputy Lanning advised Angle of her right to have an attorney present sufficiently communicated her separate right to appointed counsel. The court went on to find that Angle voluntarily waived her rights before she was questioned.
[¶9.] Angle waived her right to a jury trial, and the case was tried to the circuit court on October 23, 2019. Prior to trial, the parties entered into several stipulations regarding the admission of evidence. Included among these was a stipulation of fact, which established that the December 17 crash was the cause of Birgen's death. A separate stipulation acknowledged that the two blood samples taken from Angle had produced BAC results of .242 approximately two hours after the crash and .220 three hours after the crash. In addition, an affidavit from a state chemist was admitted without objection and contained the expert opinion that Angle's BAC was approximately .274 at the time of the accident.
[¶10.] As part of its case-in-chief, the State also provided expert testimony from South Dakota Highway Patrol Trooper Jeremy Gacke, who is a certified accident reconstructionist. Citing the findings of his investigation, Trooper Gacke testified that Angle was traveling approximately 85 miles per hour, 20 miles per hour over the speed limit, at the time she collided with Birgen's pickup. In Trooper Gacke's opinion, Angle did not apply her brakes before the collision, which, he concluded, occurred when she crossed the centerline and struck the pickup halfway inside the eastbound lane of Highway 34.
[¶11.] At the close of the State's case, Angle moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State had not proven that she was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. The court denied Angle's motion and found her guilty of vehicular homicide and driving under the influence (DUI) under SDCL 32-23-1(1), which states that: "[n]o person may drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle while: (1) There is 0.08 percent or more by weight of alcohol in that person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of that person's breath, blood, or other bodily substance[.]"3
[¶12.] For the vehicular homicide conviction, the circuit court sentenced Angle to fifteen years in the penitentiary with credit for 350 days served and two years suspended upon certain conditions. The court also sentenced Angle to 350 days in county jail for Angle's DUI-first offense conviction with credit for 350 days served.
[¶13.] Angle presents two arguments for our review:
[¶14.] Requiring law enforcement officers to provide Miranda warnings before custodial interrogation protects an individual's constitutional privileges "against self-incrimination and [the] right to retained or appointed counsel." Miranda , 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S. Ct. at 1628. We review "the denial of a motion to suppress based on the alleged violation of a constitutionally protected right as a question of law by applying the de novo standard of review." Willingham , 2019 S.D. 55, ¶ 21, 933 N.W.2d at 625 (quoting State v. Rolfe , 2018 S.D. 86, ¶ 10, 921 N.W.2d 706, 709 ).
[¶15.] Whenever a defendant is subject to custodial interrogation,4 officers must give four basic warnings: "[1] the right to remain silent, [2] that anything [she] says can be against [her] in a court of law, [3] that [she] has the right to the presence of an attorney, [4] and that if [she] cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for [her] prior to any questioning if [she] so desires." Miranda , 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S. Ct. at 1630. The requirement to provide a complete statement of Miranda warnings, including notice of the right to appointed counsel, is unyielding:
In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of [her] rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn [her] not only that [she] has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if [she] is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent [her]. Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that [she] can consult with a lawyer if [she] has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a right to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the indigent—the person most often subjected to interrogation—the knowledge that [she] too has a right to have counsel present.
Id. at 473, 86 S. Ct. at 1627 (emphasis added).
[¶16.] This is not to say, however, that the Miranda rule requires rigid conformity to a prescribed script or "talismanic incantation." California v. Prysock , 453 U.S. 355, 360, 101 S. Ct. 2806, 2809, 69 L. Ed....
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...protected right as a question of law by applying the de novo standard of review." State v. Angle , 2021 S.D. 21, ¶ 14, 958 N.W.2d 501, 506 (citation omitted). We review any underlying factual findings of the circuit court "under the clearly erroneous standard." State v. Doap Deng Chuol , 20......
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