State v. Anklam, Criminal 796
| Decision Date | 25 April 1934 |
| Docket Number | Criminal 796 |
| Citation | 43 Ariz. 362,31 P.2d 888 |
| Parties | STATE, Appellant, v. GEORGE H. ANKLAM, JAY C. HICKS and W. R. DENISON, Respondents |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Pima. Fred W. Fickett, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Mr Arthur T. La Prade, Attorney General, Mr. John Francis Connor, Assistant Attorney General, and Mr. Clarence E Houston, County Attorney, for the State.
Mr. R G. Darrow, for Respondents.
Mr Emil Wachtel, Amicus Curiae.
The defendants, constituting the board of supervisors of Pima county, were informed against in the superior court of said county by the county attorney for failure to pay Roy Jones, a janitor and common laborer performing manual labor for said county, the minimum wage fixed by the state highway commission for such labor, in that the said defendants paid said Jones for fourteen days' labor, of eight hours each, in August, 1933, the sum of $47.50, whereas the wage fixed by the state highway commission for common labor was 50 cents per hour, or $56 for fourteen days of eight hours each.
Two of the defendants, Anklam and Hicks, demurred to the information on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a public offense, and they now contend and argue that the law under which the information was drawn is unconstitutional and void, in that it contains no ascertainable standard of guilt; is vague, indefinite and uncertain; provides no notice or method for giving notice to an employer of what minimum wage may be fixed by the state highway commission; and subjects the employer to the arbitrary whim of such commission, permitting it without notice to him to change the minimum wage and expose him to criminal liability for failure to comply with requirements of which he has no knowledge or means of knowledge. The demurrer was sustained, and the information dismissed. The state has appealed.
The only question is the one raised by the demurrer, and that is whether the statute describes the offense with sufficient certainty to advise or inform an employer of the acts, the commission or omission of which would make him answerable to a criminal prosecution. The statute defining the offense is section 1350, Revised Code of Arizona 1928, section 1, chapter 12, Laws Regular Session 1933, reading as follows:
Before this section was amended, it provided that all persons doing manual or mechanical labor for the state or any of its political subdivisions should receive for their labor "not less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed." In State v. Jay J. Garfield Building Co., 39 Ariz. 45, 3 P.2d 983, 984, we held, following the Supreme Court in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322, that the "current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work is performed" was not susceptible of determination by any known rule, because, first, "locality" is boundless and indefinite; and, second, that the "current rate of per diem wages" might be anything from the minimum up to and including the maximum wage. We did, however, in that case state that the power of the legislature to fix hours of labor and the minimum wages of employees of the state and its political subdivisions was unquestioned.
This general statement of the legislature's power we again affirm, except as to matters of municipal or local concern of cities with freeholders or home rule charters voted and approved under sections 2 and 3, article 13, of the state Constitution.
When the Eleventh Legislature met in January, 1933, the members thereof were in possession of the facts concerning the Minimum Wage Law, and the ruling of the court thereon, and with such knowledge they wrote and passed the amended section. There is, then, absolutely no question about what the legislature wanted and tried to do, and to accomplish its purpose it provided that the minimum wages for manual and mechanical labor fixed by the state highway commission should be paid certain kinds of employees of the state and its political subdivisions.
The primary rule of construction of statutes is that the court, if possible, should give effect to the intention of the legislature. Another rule of universal application is that a court should approach a legislative act on the assumption that it is valid and constitutional and should uphold it if not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it is invalid.
The state highway commission is one of the largest institutions of the state, employing hundreds of men in all kinds of labor incident to road building and paying wages scaled according to the grade or character of labor. Its operations are statewide, and its employees grade from common laborers to highly skilled engineers. One might therefore well regard the state highway commission's scale of wages for manual and mechanical labor to be a just and fair criterion for fixing wages for the state employees and the employees of its political subdivisions. At all events, that is what the legislature did.
But it is said the language of section 1350 as amended authorizes the state highway commission to fix a minimum wage for its employees and to fix another minimum wage for employees of contractors performing work under contract for the commission. We can hardly conceive of the state highway commission so construing the statute. But, suppose it should conclude that its employees and employees of contractors performing contracts for it should receive a different wage and accordingly adopt two scales of wages for the same type of labor, an employer paying wages of either...
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...by an administrative agency. The principle has heretofore been recognized in Arizona. Hernandez v. Frohmiller, supra; State v. Anklam, 43 Ariz. 362, 31 P.2d 888. It is predicated upon obvious governmental '* * * Indeed, it is not too much to say that a denial to Congress of the right, under......
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... ... Clayton v. State, 38 Ariz. 135, 297 P. 1037; ... Northeast Rapid Transit Co. v. Phoenix, 41 Ariz. 71, ... 15 P.2d 951; State v. Anklam, 43 Ariz. 362, 31 P.2d ... 888; State v. Jaastad, 43 Ariz. 458, 32 ... ...
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...in several cases, involving similar prevailing wage laws, which have held that sufficient standards have been stated. State v. Anklam, 43 Ariz. 362, 31 P.2d 888; Metropolitan Water District of Southern California v. Whitsett, 215 Cal. 400, 10 P.2d 751; Bradley v. Casey, 415 Ill. 576, 114 N.......
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...the law for Arizona has been determined by the cases of State v. Jay J. Garfield Bldg. Co., 39 Ariz. 45, 3 P.2d 983, and State v. Anklam, 43 Ariz. 362, 31 P.2d 888. We have also in the case of State Jaastad, 43 Ariz. 458, 32 P.2d 799, held that chapters 12 and 71, supra, apply not only to p......