State v. Anthony
| Decision Date | 03 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2013AP467–CR.,2013AP467–CR. |
| Citation | 361 Wis.2d 116,860 N.W.2d 10 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Eddie Lee ANTHONY, Defendant–Appellant–Petitioner. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs filed by Kimberly L. Alderman and Alderman Law Firm, Madison, and oral argument by Kimberly L. Alderman.
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.
¶ 1 On August 20, 2010, Eddie Lee Anthony (Anthony) killed S.J., the mother of his children. The evidence showed that Anthony beat and stabbed S.J. 45 times with an ice pick while their children hid in a closet in the next room. In addition to the puncture wounds
, S.J. suffered four broken ribs, as well as numerous abrasions and contusions, leading the medical examiner to consider the cause of death “multiple sharp and blunt force injuries.”
¶ 2 Anthony never denied killing S.J. His theory of the case was self-defense. To support that theory, Anthony planned to serve as the sole eyewitness at his jury trial. But that strategy never came to fruition, as the circuit court1 refused to allow Anthony's testimony.
¶ 3 The impetus for the circuit court's decision regarding Anthony's right to testify involved an unusual situation: Anthony adamantly insisted that he would inform the jury of his prior conviction for armed robbery which occurred in 1966.2 Anthony protested that this conviction was wrongful3 and that he “stayed [in prison] like 12 mother-fucking years for something [he] didn't do.” He argued that he had a right to inform the jury of this information because he wanted the jury to know “the truth, the whole truth.”
¶ 4 Needless to say, it is unusual for a defendant on trial for first-degree intentional homicide to insist on bringing up a prior felony conviction involving a violent crime. However, Anthony explained that he wanted the predominantly white jury in “one of the most racist cities in the country” to know that he believed his purportedly wrongful conviction from 1966 was racially motivated.4 Apparently, Anthony believed that the State's charge of first-degree intentional homicide in this case was also racially motivated, as Anthony insisted that he killed S.J. in self-defense.
¶ 5 The circuit court decided that Anthony's proposed testimony concerning the alleged wrongful conviction was irrelevant. The circuit court explained the basis for its ruling multiple times. With each explanation, Anthony became more agitated, to the point where additional sheriff's deputies were called into the courtroom (a total of eight were present). Anthony promised numerous times that, if permitted to testify, he would disobey the circuit court's evidentiary ruling. He emphasized at one point,
¶ 6 Anthony gave every indication that his irrelevant testimony would not stop at the alleged wrongful conviction. He insisted he would tell the jury “everything I can remember all the way back to when I was five years old.” In fact, he stated more than once that he wanted to “bring everything out.”
¶ 7 In light of Anthony's conduct, detailed further below, the circuit court determined that Anthony forfeited his right to testify at trial. The jury convicted Anthony of first-degree intentional homicide. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release under extended supervision.
¶ 8 The primary issue before the court is a significant one: did the circuit court violate Anthony's constitutional right to testify when it determined, over timely defense objection, that Anthony forfeited his right by exhibiting stubborn and defiant conduct that threatened both the fairness and reliability of the criminal trial process as well as the preservation of dignity, order, and decorum in the courtroom?
¶ 9 The secondary issue that this case presents is one that we have recently addressed: is a violation of the right to testify subject to harmless error analysis?
¶ 10 Because the circuit court's forfeiture determination was not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes it was designed to serve,5 we hold that the circuit court did not err in denying Anthony the right to testify. Anthony forfeited his right to testify by displaying stubborn and defiant conduct that presented a serious threat to both the fairness and reliability of the criminal trial process and the preservation of dignity, order, and decorum in the courtroom.
¶ 11 Although we conclude that the circuit court did not err in refusing to allow Anthony's testimony, we further hold that, even if we assumed error, such error is subject to harmless error analysis. Given the overwhelming evidence of Anthony's guilt, the assumed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 12 Therefore, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals and uphold Anthony's conviction.
¶ 13 On the night of August 20, 2010, Anthony and S.J. argued at their home. Anthony had accused S.J. of having an affair. Their argument spanned the course of approximately one hour and a half, taking place both inside and outside their home.
¶ 14 Multiple people witnessed the argument. One witness, L.J., S.J.'s 17 year-old daughter, recounted most of the incident leading to her mother's death. L.J. testified that she overheard Anthony tell S.J. that if she (S.J.) left the house he would kill her. At the time, Anthony was holding an ice pick in his hand.
¶ 15 Despite Anthony's threat, S.J. left the house and went for a walk. Anthony tailed her with the ice pick. L.J. followed Anthony and S.J. to a neighborhood park, where she witnessed the couple continuing their argument. Anthony and S.J. eventually returned home; L.J. went to a friend's house.
¶ 16 Roughly 15 minutes later, L.J. received a phone call from S.J. S.J. was screaming and asked L.J. to hurry home. When L.J. arrived, the doors were locked and she could hear S.J. screaming. L.J. called 9–1–1. Anthony then exited the home and told L.J. that her mother did not want her to call the police. He said that S.J. would come outside in 10 to 15 minutes.
¶ 17 Once Anthony drove away, L.J. kicked in the front door and found her mother dead in an upstairs room.
¶ 18 Neighbors Sandra Rasco and Tiera Patterson Hogans corroborated much of L.J.'s testimony. They also testified that S.J. told them that Anthony had held an ice pick to her throat and threatened to take her to the woods and kill her. That threat occurred just two days prior to S.J.'s death.
¶ 19 Three witnesses were inside S.J. and Anthony's home at the culmination of the argument. R.J. is the daughter of S.J. and Anthony. She saw Anthony enter S.J.'s room with an ice pick. At the time, R.J. was hiding in a closet in another room with her two sisters, M.J. and A.J. R.J. heard S.J. yell “stop, please stop” and “I'm sorry, I'm sorry.”
¶ 20 After fleeing the scene, Anthony visited Janet Mayfield, the mother of his teenage son. He told Mayfield that he stabbed S.J. “forty to fifty times.” He never mentioned self-defense. He explained that he believed S.J. was having an affair and that Rasco had something to do with it. He asked Mayfield for a gun and money. He stated that he was going to return to his home to kill Rasco and the man that he suspected of having an affair with S.J.
¶ 21 The medical examiner, Christopher Poulos, testified that S.J. suffered 45 “sharp force injuries” involving the head, chest, abdomen, arms, hands, and leg. Poulos opined that seven of these wounds
could be considered “defensive puncture wounds.”7 Poulos testified to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the 45 “sharp force injuries” could have been caused by an ice pick.
¶ 22 S.J. also sustained numerous “blunt force trauma wounds
.” These included a contusion of the head, multiple abrasions and contusions of the torso, and four broken ribs.
¶ 23 However, the single most lethal injury, according to Poulos, was a three to four inch puncture wound
to S.J.'s aorta.
¶ 24 Anthony was arrested in Bradley, Illinois, after a highway police chase. The State charged Anthony with one count of first-degree intentional homicide, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1)(a).8 Anthony entered a not guilty plea and went to trial.
¶ 25 At trial, the State presented the evidence detailed above. After the State rested, the circuit court asked Anthony's counsel whether Anthony wanted to testify. Counsel responded that Anthony wished to do so.
¶ 26 The circuit court then addressed the matter of Anthony's prior convictions relevant for impeachment purposes.9 Based on a pretrial ruling,10 the circuit court instructed Anthony to answer “two” if asked how many prior convictions he possessed.11 After some explanation, Anthony stated that he understood.
¶ 27 However, Anthony then asked whether he had a right to “open the door” and “bring in all [his] convictions all the way back to 1966.” He explained:
I'm thinking now it might be to my benefit to show that in my mind if I go back all the way to 1966—because like I say [ ] I don't care what nobody do think, but in 1966 I was convicted of an armed robbery of a white man. I was only 19 and I was innocent. I stayed like 12 mother-fucking years for something I didn't do. I'm going to tell it to the jury.
¶ 28 The circuit court ruled that such testimony was irrelevant to the charge of first-degree intentional homicide, to which Anthony responded The circuit court explained that the alleged wrongful conviction could not help the jury decide whether Anthony committed the charge he currently faced. Anthony retorted that he wanted the jury to “know the truth, the whole truth.” In the midst of this discussion, Anthony's reasoning became clearer:
I know when I got convicted of [ ] the armed robbery, do you understand, [I had] an all...
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