State v. Antonio T.

• Decision Date: 22 June 2015
• Docket Number: 33,999.,33,997
• Citation: 2015 NMSC 019,352 P.3d 1172
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. ANTONIO T., a child, Defendant–Petitioner, State of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner, v. Antonio T., a child, Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

352 P.3d 1172

2015 NMSC 019

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Respondent

v.ANTONIO T., a child, Defendant–Petitioner

State of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner

v.Antonio T., a child, Defendant–Respondent.

33,997

33,999.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

June 22, 2015.

Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender, J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner and Respondent Antonio T.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Joel Jacobsen, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent and Petitioner State of New Mexico.

OPINION

CHÁVEZ, Justice.

{1} Having granted the State's motion for rehearing in this case, we withdraw the opinion filed October 23, 2014, and substitute the following in its place.

{2} Antonio, a seventeen-year-old high school student, was taken to Assistant Principal Vanessa Sarna's (Principal Sarna) office because he was suspected of being under the influence of alcohol. Possession of alcohol by a minor is a delinquent act under NMSA 1978, Section 32A–2–3(A)(2) (2009) of the Delinquency Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 32A–2–1 to –33 (1993, as amended through 2009). Principal Sarna questioned Antonio about his possession of alcohol in the presence of Deputy Sheriff Emerson Charley, Jr. (Deputy Charley), whom she had asked to be present, and requested that he bring a breath alcohol test to be administered to Antonio. Antonio admitted that he had brought alcohol to school, where he consumed it. At Principal Sarna's request, Deputy Charley administered the breath test to Antonio, which tested positive for alcohol. After administering the test to Antonio, Deputy Charley advised Antonio of his right to remain silent, and Antonio declined to answer Deputy Charley's questions about his possession of alcohol.

{3} Antonio was charged with the delinquent act of possession of alcohol by a minor. He filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to Principal Sarna because his statements were elicited without a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent, citing Section 32A–2–14(D). The district court denied his motion, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. State v. Antonio T., 2013–NMCA–035, ¶ 26, 298 P.3d 484. We reverse both the district court and the Court of Appeals. Although a school official may insist that a child answer questions for purposes of school disciplinary proceedings, any statements elicited by the official in the presence of a law enforcement officer may not be used against the child in a delinquency proceeding unless the child made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his or her statutory right to remain silent. Section 32A–2–14(C), (D). Because the State failed to prove that Antonio effectively waived this statutory right, his statements were inadmissible in the delinquency proceeding.

I. BACKGROUND

{4} Two teachers at Kirtland Central High School (KCHS) escorted Antonio to Principal Sarna's office because they suspected he was under the influence of alcohol. Principal Sarna called the student resource officer on duty, Deputy Charley, to administer a portable breath test to Antonio. Deputy Charley is a certified law enforcement officer with the San Juan County Sheriff's Office who spent over eleven years on the police force before being assigned to KCHS as a student resource officer. Deputy Charley wears a full uniform, including his badge and duty belt with a holstered gun, to work in the school. He was wearing his uniform and his sidearm when he entered Principal Sarna's office.

{5} Deputy Charley stood about five feet away from Antonio, preparing the breath test, while Principal Sarna questioned Antonio about drinking alcohol at school. Deputy Charley's normal procedure was to question a student suspected of using alcohol prior to administering a breath alcohol test. However, in this instance, because Principal Sarna was asking questions that were identical to the ones that Deputy Charley would have asked, he merely listened attentively to Principal Sarna's questioning “in case something [did] come up ... further on in the investigation that [he] might have to look back onto.” Principal Sarna asked Antonio if he had been drinking, what he had to drink, how much he had consumed, and if anyone else was drinking with him. Principal Sarna testified that she told Antonio that he would receive a lesser term of suspension if he told her the truth. These kinds of questions and bargains were routine for Principal Sarna because her job is to enforce discipline at KCHS, where she often deals with student disciplinary cases “just one right after another.” In response to Principal Sarna's questions, Antonio admitted that he had consumed two shots of alcohol, he had brought the alcohol to school in a soda or Gatorade bottle, and he had disposed of the bottle in a bathroom trash can east of the school library.

{6} After Antonio confessed to consuming alcohol, Deputy Charley advised Antonio that he would have to blow into the portable breath test machine, which Antonio did; Antonio tested positive for alcohol, which corroborated his confession. No parent or guardian was present, and Deputy Charley did not provide Antonio with any Miranda warnings prior to administering the breath test because at that time he “was going by what the school was requesting.” While Deputy Charley was administering the breath test, Principal Sarna searched Antonio's backpack and located a folding pocketknife.¹

{7} Principal Sarna then asked Deputy Charley to search for the plastic bottle that Antonio claimed he threw away. Deputy Charley searched three trash cans in the vicinity of the bathroom near the library, but he could not find the bottle. After the search for evidence turned up nothing, Deputy Charley returned to Principal Sarna's office and advised Antonio of his full constitutional rights as announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478–79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Antonio answered Deputy Charley's questions about the knife, but he refused to answer Deputy Charley's questions regarding alcohol consumption. The statements Antonio made during Principal Sarna's questioning were documented in Deputy Charley's police report under the “investigation” heading. Deputy Charley confiscated the pocketknife that Principal Sarna found in Antonio's backpack. The State later charged Antonio only with possession of alcoholic beverages by a minor.

{8} Antonio filed a motion to suppress his statement or confession pursuant to Section 32A–2–14(C) through (E), contending that “the State cannot prove that the statement or confession offered in evidence was elicited after a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the Child's rights and must be suppressed.” Antonio specifically cited Section 32A–2–14(D), which “requires that the state ‘shall prove the statement or confession offered in evidence was elicited only after a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the child's constitutional rights was obtained.’ ” Antonio requested the district court find that he “did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive constitutional and statutory rights and suppress any statements or confession.”

{9} An evidentiary hearing was held on Antonio's motion to suppress on September 1, 2010. After hearing testimony from Principal Sarna and Deputy Charley, the district court denied the motion. Antonio entered into a conditional plea and disposition agreement, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. He appealed to the New Mexico Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court's ruling. Antonio T., 2013–NMCA–035, ¶ 26, 298 P.3d 484.

{10} The Court of Appeals analyzed the suppression as a constitutional issue, discussing the constitutional rights of children during custodial interrogation, id. ¶¶ 8–10, and investigatory detentions, id. ¶¶ 12–16. It first concluded that Antonio had been subject to an investigatory detention, not a custodial interrogation. Id. ¶¶ 11, 17. The Court of Appeals noted that “Section 32A–2–14 has thus far only been applied in cases where law enforcement has interrogated or detained a child, never in instances of school discipline involving only a school administrator,” Antonio T., 2013–NMCA–035, ¶ 18, 298 P.3d 484, and that “Section 32A–2–14 applies to investigations by or on behalf of law enforcement officials,” Antonio T., 2013–NMCA–035, ¶ 20, 298 P.3d 484. The Court of Appeals then determined that Principal Sarna was acting within the scope of her duties as a school administrator and was not acting as an agent for law enforcement, and accordingly concluded that she was not obligated to issue Miranda warnings to Antonio. Id. ¶¶ 24, 26. The Court of Appeals did not address Antonio's statutory claim that his statement was inadmissible under the plain language of Section 32A–2–14(D), which was the original basis for Antonio's motion to suppress. Both Antonio and the State appealed to this Court.

{11} We granted certiorari on two questions raised in Antonio's appeal: (1) did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the lower court's denial of Antonio's suppression motion, and (2) was the plea invalid because there was insufficient evidence? State v. Antonio T., 2013–NMCERT–003, 300 P.3d 1181 (No. 33,997, Mar. 1, 2013). We also granted certiorari on one question raised in the State's appeal: did the Court of Appeals err in holding that Antonio was in investigatory detention? State v. Antonio T., 2013–NMCERT–003, 300 P.3d 1182 (No. 33,999, Mar. 1, 2013). We hold that Deputy Charley's mere presence during Principal Sarna's questioning of Antonio subjected Antonio to an investigatory detention that triggered the statutory protections provided by Section 32A–2–14(C) and (D). Pursuant to Section 32A–2–14(C), Deputy Charley was required to advise Antonio that he had a right to remain silent, and that if Antonio waived the right, anything he said could be used against him in criminal delinquency proceedings. Because Deputy Charley...