State v. Arbolay
| Docket Number | I.D. 1810013334A |
| Decision Date | 07 November 2023 |
| Parties | STATE OF DELAWARE, v. ANGEL ARBOLAY, Defendant. |
| Court | Delaware Superior Court |
SUBMITTED: September 15, 2023.
on Defendant S Motion for Post Conviction Relief - DENIED;
on Post Conviction Counsel S Motion to Withdraw - GRANTED.
Michael Cooksey, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Counsel to the State of Delaware.
Christopher S. Koyste, Esquire, Law Office of Christopher S Koyste, LLC, Counsel to Angel Arbolay.
On July 19, 2019, following a nonjury trial, Angel Arbolay was found guilty of: (1) Possession of Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony ("PDWDCF"); (2) Drug Dealing; (3) Tier One Possession; (4) Operating or Attempting to Operate a Clandestine Laboratory ("OAOCL"); (5) Tampering with Evidence; (6) Possession of a Controlled Substance ("PCS"); (7) Resisting Arrest; and (8) Possession of Drug Paraphernalia ("PDP").[1]
On November 15, 2019 Arbolay was sentenced and declared a Habitual Offender.[2] Arbolay appealed the Court's decision with the Delaware Supreme Court.[3] At the time of Arbolay's November 15, 2019 conviction, Arbolay was represented by his then counsel, Andrew J. Meyer, Esquire.[4]
On January 7, 2021, Arbolay filed to proceed pro se[5] in the Supreme Court, this request was ultimately granted.[6] On September 14, 2021, the Delaware Supreme Court denied Arbolay's appeal and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.[7]On May 31, 2022, Arbolay filed a Motion for Post Conviction Relief and a motion for appointment of counsel.[8] Christopher S. Koyste, Esquire was appointed as counsel for Arbolay.
On September 15, 2023, Mr. Koyste filed a motion to withdraw as Arbolay's counsel pursuant to Rule 61(e)(6), maintaining that there is no merit for relief.[9]
Arbolay was afforded an opportunity to respond to Mr. Koyste's motion and filed a response on October 13, 2023.[10]
The Delaware Supreme Court summarized the underlying facts of this case in its decision on direct appeal:
Around 11:30 p.m. on October 23, 2018, Delaware State Police Officer, Pierre Lawler, assigned to the Governor's Task Force ("GTF") team, was patrolling the area around the Dutch Inn on Route 13 in Minquedale. While in the motel parking lot, Detective Lawler heard a man screaming and yelling "mommy" from one of the rooms. Detective Lawler traced the noise to Room 54, which had an exterior window open. Detective Lawler contacted additional members of GFT for back-up, and the officers approached the room.
Detective Lawler spoke to Arbolay through the motel room window. When Detective Lawler asked Arbolay about the screaming, Arbolay said he was having a domestic. Detective Lawler could only see part of the room through the window and was concerned that there could be at-risk people inside the room. He asked Arbolay if he could come inside the room to make sure nobody else was there. Arbolay initially consented, but after recognizing a different police officer, he refused to open the door, tried to close the window, and began swallowing pills.
One of the officers deployed a Taser on Arbolay, who fell to the floor. Detective Lawler and another officer climbed through the window. They opened the door so the other officers could enter the room. The police tried to handcuff Arbolay, but he struggled and tried to conceal his hands. After Arbolay was handcuffed, he tried to consume the pills on the floor until he was moved off of the floor. In addition to the pills, two prescription pill bottles with no labels, two blenders of coffee grinders cased with powder, and a bag of suspected cocaine on the night table were in plain view.
Probation Officer Bryan Vettori searched the room. He found a loaded handgun, male clothing, $573.00 in cash, and a rubber stamp in a dress. In the closet, he found many blue wax paper bags, a bag of powder suspected to be heroin, and a bag of leafy material suspected to be marijuana. No drug prescriptions were found. Detective Lawler determined that the motel room was registered to a female friend of Arbolay.
A forensic analytical chemist testified that the leafy material found in the closet was 373.126 grams of marijuana. The bag of powder found in the closet did not contain a controlled substance. The powder on the grinders was also not a controlled substance. The bag of suspected cocaine contained .9 grams of cocaine. The pills in the motel room were Alprazolam, also known as Xanax.
Before addressing the merits of any postconviction claim, the Court must first determine whether the claims pass through the procedural filters of Rule 61.[11] This Court will not address the substantive aspects of Mr. Arbolay's claims if the claims are procedurally barred.[12] Rule 61 imposes four procedural requirements on Mr. Arbolay's motion: (1) the motion must be filed within one year of a final order of conviction; (2) any basis for relief must have been previously asserted in any prior postconviction proceedings; (3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by court rules; and (4) any basis for relief must not have been formerly adjudicated in any proceeding. Under Rule 61(i)(5), a defendant may avoid the first three procedural imperatives if the claim is jurisdictional or is a "colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation."[13] Further, challenges based on ineffective assistance of counsel may only be raised during a defendant's first Rule 61 proceeding.[14] Upon review, the Court is satisfied Mr. Arbolay's motion is timely and procedurally proper except as indicated below.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington.[15] The Strickland test requires the defendant to prove "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."[16] Evaluating counsel's conduct begins with a "strong presumption" the representation was reasonable.[17] This presumption is meant to avoid the "distorting effects of hindsight."[18]
Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(6), [19]
Further, under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(e)(7), post-conviction counsel has an obligation to assist the movant in presenting any substantial ground for relief.[20] However, if counsel "considers the movant's claim to be so lacking in merit that counsel cannot ethically advocate it, and counsel is not aware of any other substantial ground for relief available to the movant, counsel may move to withdraw."[21] If counsel moves to withdraw, they must explain the factual and legal basis for their opinion and provide notice to the movant, who may respond within thirty days of service, unless the court grants an extension of this deadline.[22]
Defendant asserts nine reasons in support of his claim for post-conviction relief. The Court will address each in turn.
In his first claim, Mr. Arbolay asserts that procedural bars set forth in Delaware Supreme Court Rule of Criminal Procedure 61 do not apply to his postconviction arguments as this is his first postconviction motion and his motion was filed within 1 year of the Delaware Supreme Court's affirmance. (A866-67). While Mr. Arbolay is correct that Rule 61's procedural bars typically do not apply to first postconviction motions filed within a year of the conclusion of a direct appeal, as outlined below, two of Mr. Arbolay's pro se postconviction claims are procedurally barred as the claims were previously adjudicated.[23]
In his second claim, Mr. Arbolay requests that this Court take judicial notice of "the allegations" raised by Mr. Arbolay in his 1983 civil lawsuit in Angel Luis Arbolay v. Bryan Vettori, et al., Civ. No. 19976-GBW, which is pending in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware. (A867-69).
Delaware Rule of Evidence 201 permits this Court to take judicial notice of certain adjudicative facts.[24] "The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."[25] If there is any possibility of a dispute, the fact may not be judicially noticed.[26]
A review of the docket report for Mr. Arbolay's federal lawsuit reveals that on August 14, 2023, the Delaware District Court granted in part and denied in part Mr Vettori's motion for summary judgment. (A910). In particular, the District Court granted Mr. Vettori's motion "as to Plaintiff's claims for illegal search and seizure, delaying medical care, and filing false reports, and judgment is entered in Defendant's favor as to those claims." (A910). However, the District Court denied Mr. Vettori's motion ...
To continue reading
Request your trial