State v. Ard

Decision Date01 March 1926
Docket Number27666
Citation160 La. 906,107 So. 617
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE v. ARD

Appeal from Twenty-Second District Court, Parish of Washington Prentiss B. Carter, Judge.

McCauley Ard was convicted of uttering as true a forged document, and he appeals.

Judgment avoided, and case remanded.

Brock &amp Carter, of Franklinton, for appellant.

Percy Saint, Atty. Gen., Percy T. Ogden, Asst. Atty. Gen., C. S Frederick, Dist. Atty., of Covington (E. R. Schowalter, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for the State.

OPINION

BRUNOT, J.

The accused was prosecuted under section 833, R. S. The information contained two counts. The first count charged forgery; the second, uttering as true a forged document. The trial resulted in the conviction of the accused under the second count. From this verdict, and a sentence of not less than one nor more than two years in the state penitentiary, he appealed.

Preliminary to the trial there were two motions for continuance, and during the trial five objections to rulings of the court were noted. The minutes show the reservation of a bill to each ruling, but only five bills were submitted for approval and signature.

We find no merit in bills 1, 2, and 3, reserved to the overruling of the two motions for continuance, and to the overruling of an objection to the testimony of L. B. Aldridge, and we therefore dismiss consideration of these bills without further comment.

Our consideration of bill No. 4 convinces us that the court erred in overruling defendant's objection to the testimony elicited by the district attorney from Mrs. Minnie Miller, while on cross-examination, and, as this ruling was urged in the motion for a new trial as one of the grounds why the verdict was contrary to the law, the overruling of that motion was also erroneous.

Mrs Miller was a witness for the defendant. Her testimony tended to establish an alibi. She had accounted for the whereabouts and acts of the defendant during the day on which the crime is alleged to have been committed, except for about 30 minutes, and another witness had previously testified that defendant was in his presence, some distance from the place of business of the prosecuting witness, during that time. Mrs. Miller was then tendered for cross-examination, whereupon the district attorney, over the objection of counsel for defendant, was permitted to prove by the witness that, subsequent to the date of the offense alleged in the information, the defendant was charged with the commission of a similar offense in Tylertown, state of Mississippi. The district attorney announced that the testimony was offered for the purpose of testing the credibility of the witness, and the court admitted it for that purpose. There is no showing that there was any connection whatever between...

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5 cases
  • State v. Palmer
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • March 21, 1955
    ...v. Donelon, 45 La.Ann. 744, 12 So. 922; State v. Anderson, 120 La. 331, 45 So. 267; State v. Blount, 124 La. 202, 50 So. 12; State v. Ard, 160 La. 906, 107 So. 617; State v. Cole, 161 La. 827, 109 So. 505; State v. Schmidt, 163 La. 512, 112 So. 400; State v. Norphlis, 165 La. 893, 116 So. 3......
  • State v. Rives
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • June 26, 1939
    ...are they so mutually connected or interdependent that the proof of one is not coherent without the evidence of the other.’ In State v. Ard, 160 La. 906, 107 So. 617, defendant was charged with the crime of forging and uttering. The State offered testimony to show that the defendant was subs......
  • State v. Guillory
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1942
  • State v. Brown
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • November 30, 1936
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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