State v. Brown

Decision Date30 November 1936
Docket Number34116
Citation185 La. 1023,171 So. 433
CourtLouisiana Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE v. BROWN

Appeal from Tenth Judicial District Court, Parish of Natchitoches Jas. W. Jones, Jr., Judge.

Clarence Brown was convicted of cow stealing, and he appeals.

Conviction and sentence set aside, and case remanded for a new trial.

John G Gibbs, of Natchitoches, for appellant.

Gaston L. Porterie, Atty. Gen., James O'Connor, Asst. Atty Gen., and H. L. Hughes, Sp. Asst. to Atty. Gen., for the State.

OPINION

ODOM, Justice.

Defendant has appealed from a conviction and sentence to hard labor for cow stealing. We find in the record eight bills of exception. We find it necessary to notice only two of them.

Bill of exception No. 3 presents the question whether the State in a prosecution for cow stealing may prove that the defendant had been previously prosecuted and convicted of like crimes.

The facts in connection with this particular bill are stated by the district judge in his per curiam as follows:

"Deputy Sheriff Black before taking the stand handed the District Attorney two indictments under which defendant was convicted for cattle stealing in the year 1928 and for which defendant served time in the State Penitentiary. The Deputy Sheriff was asked had the defendant been convicted before, and he replied 'Yes, twice for cow stealing.'"

Counsel for defendant objected to this testimony on the ground that it was irrelevant and highly prejudicial to the rights of the accused. The trial judge overruled the objection and permitted the testimony to go to the jury, his reason being, to quote from his per curiam, "that the object is to show that the pending accusation is not the first against the accused and not to show the truth or falsity of such charge."

It is not contended nor can it be inferred that the crimes for which defendant had been previously convicted had any connection with that for which he was then being prosecuted.

As far back as 1848 this court stated that the general rule was that "no evidence can be given of other felonies committed by the prisoner than that charged in the indictment." State v. Patza, 3 La.Ann. 512.

Nearly fifty years later this court said in State v. Bates and Ramp, 46 La.Ann. 849, 15 So. 204, 205: "The general rule is that, when a man is put upon trial for one offense, he is to be convicted, if at all, by evidence which shows that he is guilty of that offense alone, and that other offenses committed by him are wholly excluded."

Between the date on which the first of the above cases was decided and the date of the other one, there are cases too numerous to mention in which the court adhered to that general rule. If the court has ever in any case departed from it, we have no knowledge of it. As late as 1928 in the case of State v. Ward et al., 166 La. 806, 118 So. 26, 27, we quoted and approved the general rule as stated in State v. Bates, supra. To the same effect are the cases of State v. Ard, 160 La. 906, 107 So. 617; and State v. Norphlis, 165 La. 893, 116 So. 374.

In the early case of State v. Patza, supra, the court recognized that to the general rule there are certain exceptions, one of which is that such testimony is admissible when it becomes material to show the intent with which the act charged was done. Numerous other cases might be cited to the same effect. In State v. Ward, supra, the court quoted approvingly the following extract from the opinion in State v. Williams, 111 La. 179, 35 So. 505:

"Whilst, as a general rule, a distinct crime, unconnected with the one charged in the indictment, cannot be given in evidence, exceptions to that rule arise when it becomes necessary to rebut the possible inference of accident, or to prove the intent with which the act charged was committed."

In other cases another exception was recognized, to the effect that such testimony is admissible to prove a system of wrongdoing, as in cases of forgery, embezzlement, the making of false entries in books, etc. State v. Norphlis, supra. In State v. Smith et al., 156 La. 818, 101 So. 209, the court recognized the general rule stated in the Patza Case, supra, and cited numerous cases recognizing that rule as well as the exceptions thereto.

In the case at bar the general rule is applicable. None of the exceptions can be applied. The testimony that the defendant had been convicted of cow stealing was, according to the per curiam of the district judge, offered for the sole purpose of showing that he had been previously convicted of crimes committed four years prior to the date on which the crime for which he was then being prosecuted was committed.

In support of his ruling the judge cited the case of State v. Quinn, 131 La. 490, 59 So. 913. The ruling in that case was unquestionably correct, but it has no application here. There the defendant took the stand as a witness in his own behalf and on cross-examination was asked if he had not been arrested and convicted of other crimes. The objection was made that such testimony was inadmissible. The court ruled otherwise on the ground that when a defendant makes himself a witness his testimony may be impeached like that of any other witness by inquiring of him concerning his past record.

In the recent case of State v. Florane, 179 La. 453, 154 So. 417, 419, we said:

"The character of an accused person cannot be attacked by the state unless he puts his character in evidence and thereby opens the door. But, when he takes the stand for himself, he becomes a witness, and his credibility as such is open to attack, and, for the purpose of impeaching his credibility, he may be compelled, on cross-examination, to reveal his record concerning indictments and arrests."

In support of this ruling we cited a long list of cases.

The rule stated in the Florane Case and those cases cited in support of it is precisely the same as that embodied in article 495 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which reads in part as follows:

"Provided, always, that a witness, whether he be the defendant or not, may be compelled to answer on cross-examination whether or not he has...

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15 cases
  • State v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • March 21, 1955
    ...false entries in books, etc. State v. Williams, 111 La. 179, 35 So. 505; State v. Norphlis, 165 La. 893, 116 So. 374; and State v. Brown, 185 La. 1023, 171 So. 433. 'In the instant case the question if intent or motive is not at issue and there being no connection between the previous sales......
  • State v. Latil, 42777
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • May 7, 1956
    ...is tendered in limine (State v. Posey, 157 La. 55, 101 So. 869; State v. Sullivan, supra; State v. Hayes, supra; State v. Brown, 185 La. 1023, 171 So. 433; and State v. Gendusa, supra), to the jury (State v. Anderson, 51 La.Ann. 1181, 25 So. 990; State v. Posey, 157 La. 55, 101 So. 869; Sta......
  • State v. Guillot
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • April 27, 1942
    ...of prescription before trial and to insist upon a ruling thereon is equivalent to a waiver of the right to urge the plea. State v. Brown, 185 La. 1023, 171 So. 433. On the other it has been held that notwithstanding negation of prescription in the indictment, the accused may plead and show,......
  • State v. Crook, 49415
    • United States
    • Louisiana Supreme Court
    • March 31, 1969
    ...to the admissibility of evidence of offenses other than the one charged are State v. Rives, 193 La. 186, 190 So. 374; State v. Brown, 185 La. 1023, 171 So. 433; State v. Bates, 46 La.Ann. 849, 15 So. 204; State v. Johnson, 38 La.Ann. It is the generally accepted rule not only in Louisiana1 ......
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