State v. Arellano

• Decision Date: 06 May 2020
• Docket Number: NO. PD-0287-19,PD-0287-19
• Citation: 600 S.W.3d 53
• Parties: The STATE of Texas v. Cesar Ramiro ARELLANO, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

600 S.W.3d 53

The STATE of Texas

v.Cesar Ramiro ARELLANO, Appellee

NO. PD-0287-19

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

DELIVERED: May 6, 2020

John R. Messinger for State.

Cesar Ramiro Arellano, Luis A. Martinez, for Appellee.

OPINION

Slaughter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Keasler, Hervey, Richardson, Yeary, Newell, and Walker, JJ., joined.

Code of Criminal Procedure Article 18.04(5) requires, in part, that a search warrant contain a legible magistrate's signature. So what effect does an illegible magistrate's signature have upon the applicability of the statutory good-faith exception? See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(b) (setting forth statutory good-faith exception). The short answer is none. Therefore, we vacate the judgment of the court of appeals and remand this case to that court for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Procedural Posture

After Appellee Cesar Ramiro Arellano was arrested for driving while intoxicated, the arresting officer, Phillip Garcia, prepared a probable cause affidavit to support a search warrant for a blood draw. Officer Garcia submitted his sworn affidavit to the on-duty magistrate. Using a cursive signature, the magistrate signed the blank signature line of a form search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of Appellee's blood. Below the signature line appeared the words, "Magistrate, Victoria County, Texas." Aside from the cursive signature, the magistrate's name was not typed or handwritten anywhere on the warrant. Upon execution of the search warrant, Appellee was charged with DWI.¹

In the trial court, Appellee filed a motion to suppress all evidence stemming from the blood draw. At the pretrial suppression hearing, Appellee argued that the search warrant to obtain the blood specimen was facially invalid because the magistrate's signature was illegible in violation of the requirements of Code of Criminal Procedure Article 18.04(5). See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 18.04(5) (providing that a search warrant "shall be sufficient" if it contains, among other "requisites," "the magistrate's name [ ] in clearly legible handwriting or in typewritten form with the magistrate's signature"). Therefore, he contended, the evidence was subject to suppression under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23(a).² In support of his motion, Appellee offered into evidence the signed search warrant and Officer Garcia's affidavit, both of which were admitted as exhibits. Aside from this, Appellee did not present any evidence or call any witnesses.

The State rested without offering any evidence. Instead, the State relied on the argument that because Officer Garcia acted in good-faith reliance on a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause, the blood evidence should be exempted from suppression under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.23(b).³ The State contended that an illegible magistrate's signature, much like a typographical error or other technical defect, does not invalidate an otherwise valid warrant. It further asserted that Officer Garcia's sworn affidavit that was admitted into evidence was sufficient to show that he acted in good-faith reliance on the warrant. Because there was no evidence presented that Officer Garcia did not act in good faith, that the magistrate was not neutral, or that the magistrate did not issue the warrant based on probable cause, the State concluded that under the statutory good-faith exception, the evidence was not subject to suppression.

During the State's arguments, the trial judge expressed concern about the unknown identity of the magistrate. The prosecutor responded that he did not know which magistrate had signed the warrant but could find out.⁴ The trial court did not respond to this offer. Instead, it ordered the parties to file briefs addressing any relevant case law or arguments that it should consider before making its ruling. Attached to the State's brief submitted in response to the trial court's request was an affidavit from Officer Garcia attesting to the identity of the magistrate who had signed the warrant and asserting that he acted in good-faith reliance upon the legality and validity of the warrant.⁵

The trial court granted Appellee's motion to suppress. In its written findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court determined that the magistrate's signature "was not in legible handwriting, nor was it accompanied by any name identifying the magistrate in either clearly legible handwriting or in typewritten form." Thus, the court concluded that the warrant was facially invalid in light of its failure to comply with Article 18.04(5). Given the warrant's facial invalidity, the court further concluded that the statutory good-faith exception could not apply because "in order to rely on the ‘good faith exception’ to the exclusionary rule ... an officer must rely on a facially valid warrant." Alternatively, it reasoned that even assuming the good-faith exception could apply, there was no evidence to show that Officer Garcia objectively relied in good faith on the warrant. With regard to Officer Garcia's affidavit attached to the State's post-hearing brief, the trial court indicated that it had discretion to ignore that evidence, but at the same time stated that it believed the affidavit was inadequate to establish Officer Garcia's good faith.⁶

On direct appeal, the court of appeals upheld the trial court's suppression ruling. State v. Arellano , 571 S.W.3d 422 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2019). The court of appeals agreed that the illegible magistrate's signature rendered the warrant facially invalid under Article 18.04, and therefore, the good-faith exception in Article 38.23(b) could not apply as a matter of law. Id. at 426 ("In executing a warrant, that officer ‘acts in objective good faith reliance upon’ the warrant, ‘as long as the warrant is facially valid.’ .... Because the ‘good faith exception’ requires a facially valid warrant, and here, by contrast, no valid search warrant existed, the ‘good faith exception’ is inapplicable to this case.") (quoting McClintock v. State, 541 S.W.3d 63, 73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) ). The court of appeals also rejected the State's argument that the trial court had erred by declining to consider its documentary evidence attached to its post-suppression-hearing brief, including Officer Garcia's affidavit. Id. at 427. It reasoned that the evidence was immaterial given the warrant's facial invalidity, and moreover, the trial court had discretion to decline to consider this evidence. Id.⁷

We granted the State Prosecuting Attorney's petition for discretionary review on four grounds to determine whether the court of appeals erred by upholding the trial court's suppression ruling.⁸

II. Analysis

The issue we must decide is whether the magistrate's illegible signature on the search warrant rendered the warrant facially invalid and thereby prohibited application of the statutory good-faith exception. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 18.04(5) ; art. 38.23(b). While we agree with the court of appeals that pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure Article 18.04(5), a search warrant lacking a legible magistrate's signature is defective, we further conclude that even with such a defect, a warrant is still a warrant for purposes of Article 38.23(b). Thus, the good-faith exception will nevertheless apply when the record establishes that the officer was acting in objective good-faith reliance upon a warrant based upon a neutral magistrate's determination of probable cause. See id. art. 38.23(b); Dunn v. State , 951 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Moreover, this type of defect highlights the reason why our Legislature enacted the statutory good-faith exception. Dunn , 951 S.W.2d at 479. Accordingly, we hold that the good-faith exception is not automatically precluded where, as here, the defect is an illegible magistrate's signature.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard. Weems v. State, 493 S.W.3d 574, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). We afford almost total deference to a trial court's findings of historical fact and determinations of mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility and demeanor if they are reasonably supported by the record. Sims v. State , 569 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). We review de novo a trial court's determination of legal questions and its application of the law to facts that do not turn upon a determination of witness credibility and demeanor. Id. The trial court's ruling will be sustained if it is correct on any applicable theory of law and the record reasonably supports it. State v. Ruiz , 581 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).

B. The search warrant's defect did not preclude application of the statutory good-faith exception.

Appellee challenged the blood evidence obtained by the search warrant under our statutory exclusionary rule. That rule provides:

No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(a). The law violation requiring suppression, Appellee argued, was that the warrant used to obtain his blood sample was facially invalid because it failed to comply with Article 18.04(5) by having an illegible magistrate's signature.⁹

The State, however, argued that Article 38.23 ’s good-faith exception applied such that the motion to suppress should be denied. That provision states that "[i]t is an exception to the provisions of Subsection (a) of this Article that the evidence was obtained by a law enforcement officer acting in objective good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(b).

The proper scope of both the exclusionary...