State v. Arias

• Citation: 661 A.2d 850,283 N.J.Super. 269
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff, v. John ARIAS, Defendant.
• Decision Date: 16 June 1992
• Court: Superior Court of New Jersey

Page 269

283 N.J.Super. 269

661 A.2d 850

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff, v. John ARIAS, Defendant.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division Middlesex County.

Decided June 16, 1992.

Thomas Kapsak, Asst. Prosecutor, for the State (Robert W. Gluck, Prosecutor of Middlesex County, attorney).

Edward Byrne, Deputy Public Defender, First Asst., Middlesex County, for defendant (Wilfredo Caraballo, Public Defender, attorney).

HOFFMAN, J.S.C.

This case of first impression involves a motion to suppress by a person accused of forcibly entering a private residence while armed, murdering a resident thereof, shooting another, and holding a young child hostage for 28 hours. ¹ Defendant, John Arias, seeks to suppress evidence seized by the police in the residence after his surrender. The exceptional set of facts encompasses numerous unique issues related to search and seizure.

I. Facts

The facts in this case are basically not in dispute. On Thursday, May 30, 1991, at approximately 3:00 p.m, Linda K. Galbo (Linda) arrived at her home at 36 Roxey Avenue in Edison. As she exited from her car in the garage, Linda was met by the defendant, whom she knew as a former lover. A struggle ensued between the two. During the altercation, Linda's 9-year old brother, John Jr., returned home from school. He called to his mother, Linda M. Galbo (Mrs. Galbo) from the front door, and she rushed to the garage, striking defendant with a mop handle. Defendant then allegedly pushed both Linda and Mrs. Galbo into the house.

According to the State, once inside the Galbo home, defendant allegedly fired an automatic rifle several times, mortally wounding Mrs. Galbo and seriously wounding Linda. The State contends that defendant then handcuffed Linda and put her in the trunk of her car in the attached garage. Linda Galbo managed to escape from the trunk. Meanwhile, John Jr. was handcuffed, bound and gagged inside the house. Edison police and special units arrived at the scene at approximately 3:20 p.m.

The testimony at the suppression hearing revealed the following: Mr. Galbo, the owner of the home, reached Roxey Avenue at approximately 5:30 p.m., to find the street was barricaded. A neighbor informed him that his house had been invaded. Mr. Galbo spoke with police officers at a command post stationed two houses away from his home, and directed police to "do whatever it takes to get [defendant] out of there." Mr. Galbo indicated he wanted to see his family safe, and he wanted the investigators to take any and all evidence necessary to prosecute the defendant once the crisis was over.

It was not until twenty-eight hours after his initial entrance that defendant surrendered. John Jr. was released from the house at 7:15 p.m. Friday, May 31, and defendant was led into a police vehicle. John Jr. informed the police that he had witnessed defendant's attempts to conceal his weapons prior to his surrender.

Police entered the house immediately after defendant was arrested. It was urgent that they find Mrs. Galbo, since they knew she might need medical assistance. However, the police were too late. Mrs. Galbo had died as a result of two gunshot wounds. Her body was found on the entrance foyer floor covered by an afghan and a bedspread. A trail of blood appeared to indicate that her body was dragged to its final resting place.

The police conducted a quick room to room search because they believed the circumstances warranted it. John Jr. was under the mistaken impression that a bomb had been planted in the house. ² The police were determined to find the bomb if one existed, as well as locate any dangerous weapons defendant had left behind. They found the house in disarray, with broken glass, blood stains, bullet damage, and furniture barricades at the doors. They took pictures and seized numerous items. Defendant concedes that some of these items were immediately visible when the police entered the house. However, defendant asserts, the following seized items could not be classified as items that were plainly seen:

--6 discharged .45 caliber shell casings from a plant to the right of the wall unit in the living room

--1 live .45 caliber round from a plant to the right of the wall unit in the living room

--1 bullet from a loveseat in the living room

--4 bullet fragments from under the carpet in the living room

--1 bullet from under the carpet near the threshold between the kitchen and dining room

--1 bullet from the rear wall cavity of the garage

--1 bullet from the wall cavity between the kitchen and the dining room

--1 bullet from the dining room floor (near garage wall) by the mirror

--2 bullet fragments from the baseboard in the dining room

--ammo magazine containing 7 live .45 caliber rounds from the center drawer of the dresser in the master bedroom.

Defendant, therefore, maintains that these items must be suppressed because they were seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

II. Issues

A. Standing

The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

In order to challenge the admission of illegally obtained evidence at trial, a defendant must first prove he has standing to challenge the search or seizure. While the United States Supreme Court has limited standing to defendants who demonstrate they have "a legitimate expectation of privacy" in the place searched or the item seized (Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980)), New Jersey has afforded its citizens even broader protection against unreasonable search and seizure. State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981).

Undoubtedly, states have the power to give broader individual liberties under their constitutions than those enforced by the United States Constitution. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980). The Supreme Court of New Jersey may provide greater shelter to its residents from unreasonable searches and seizures than that supplied by the United States Supreme Court. State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353, 346 A.2d 66 (1975). Although the United States Supreme Court has predicated standing on a showing of a "legitimate expectation of privacy" when a violation of the Fourth Amendment has occurred, New Jersey has taken a different approach in interpreting the same language under its state constitution. See N.J. Const. art. 1, par. 7.

In Alston, supra, 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the accused defendant need only have a "proprietary, possessory or participatory interest" in either the place searched or the property seized to claim standing to contest that Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Despite this apparently liberal view of standing, neither case nor commentary has catalogued the contents of the phrase. State v. Curry, 109 N.J. 1, 9, 532 A.2d 721 (1987). However, according to State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 339-40, 554 A.2d 1315 (1989), "participatory" connotes some involvement in the underlying criminal conduct in which the seized evidence is used by the participants to carry out the unlawful activity. Additionally, New Jersey has retained "automatic standing" for possessory offenses, a concept rejected with regard to federal Fourth Amendment cases in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980).

Under the test enunciated in State v. Alston, supra, it is difficult to envision a scenario in which a defendant would not have a "proprietary, possessory or participatory interest" in the place searched or item seized. Yet, the New Jersey Supreme Court has not granted "automatic standing" except for possessory offenses. This would seem to imply that under certain circumstances, a defendant would not have standing. If there is a residuum of circumstances where a defendant has no standing, this case must be the situation. In the case at bar, defendant intruded upon a peaceful home, bringing with him an assault rifle, an electronic stun gun, a B.B. pistol, handcuffs, and a knife. He is alleged to have killed Mrs. Galbo, shot Linda Galbo, cuffed and gagged John, Jr., and then hidden his weapons in the Galbo home prior to surrendering from the twenty-eight hour hostage situation. In short, defendant was the "ultimate uninvited guest." Did the framers of the Constitution actually want to protect this type of defendant when they drafted the Fourth Amendment? Did the Supreme Court of New Jersey intend to so broadly construe the Fourth Amendment so that defendant and others similarly situated would have the right to challenge seizures made under these circumstances? This seems unlikely.

It should be noted that Justice Schreiber, in a separate opinion in Alston, supra, expressed that "the majority has unnecessarily interpreted New Jersey's constitutional search and seizure provision so that it serves to afford a windfall to defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have not been violated." 88 N.J. at 235, 440 A.2d 1311. Defendant's challenge here certainly illustrates that "windfall." ³ However, Justice Schreiber's view did not prevail, and under the majority holding of Alston, I must reluctantly hold that this defendant has standing. ⁴

B. Was There a Search?--The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Standard.

Although the broad language of Alston virtually compels standing, this merely gives defendant the right to challenge searches and seizures made. The next area of inquiry is whether the protections of the Fourth Amendment inure to this defendant. This requires an analysis of whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

New Jersey caselaw has...