State v. Armstead

• Decision Date: 17 February 1913
• Docket Number: 16,341
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. MOSE ARMSTEAD

60 So. 778

103 Miss. 790

STATE v. MOSE ARMSTEAD

No. 16,341

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 17, 1913

October, 1912

APPEAL from the circuit court of Panola county, HON. N. A. TAYLOR Judge.

Mose Armstead was charged with violating the labor contract law. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to the affidavit, the state appeals.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Affirmed.

Frank Johnston, assistant attorney-general, for the state.

This is a prosecution against Mose Armstead for the breach of a labor contract under section 1147 of the Code of 1906. Judge Taylor, the circuit judge, sustained a demurrer to the affidavit in the case and discharged the appellee. From this the district attorney takes an appeal in the name of the state.

I will call the attention of the court to the case of Alonzo Bailey v. State of Alabama, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States at the October term, 1910, upon the construction of an Alabama statute similar to the Mississippi statute under consideration, and the question of its unconstitutionality under the Federal Constitution, and the fourteenth amendment thereto. The Supreme Court not only held that the Alabama statute was in violation of the terms of the fourteenth amendment but that it was in violation of the provisions of the acts of Congress forbidding peonage. See U S. Rev. Stat., secs. 1990 and 5526, and the U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, 1260 and 3755, which acts of Congress were intended to secure the enforcement of the fourteenth amendment. (This case is reported in 219 U. S. S.Ct. 250, 55 L.Ed. 218, bottom page 191.)

OPINION

REED, J.

The state appealed from the judgment of the circuit court, sustaining a demurrer to the affidavit in this case, charging defendant with the violation of the labor contract law, as provided in section 1147 of the Code of 1906. The affidavit charges that "on the 17th day of January, 1912, Mose Armstead was under contract in writing with affiant to work on shares as a share cropper with him during the year 1912 in making a crop upon the premises of affiant in said justice's district, county, and state, said contract being dated September 14, 1911, and witnessed by two witnesses whose names appear thereto; and the said Mose Armstead, on the 17th day of January, 1912, entered upon the said premises and upon the performance of said contract, and on said date wrongfully, willfully, and unlawfully, before the expiration of said contract and without the consent of affiant, left said premises and made a second contract in said justice's district, county, and state with R. M. Arnold, without giving notice to said Arnold of his contract with affiant." The demurrer filed by defendant to the affidavit presents the objection that "the statute under which said affidavit is drawn, and under which defendant is sought to be penalized, is unconstitutional and void."

Section 1147 of the Code of 1906 was originally chapter 101 of the Laws of 1900. The title to that act of the legislature is "an act to punish a laborer, renter or share cropper who has made one contract in writing and makes a second contract without giving notice of the first." Section 1147 of the Code of 1906 is as follows: "Any laborer, renter or share cropper who has contracted with another person for a specified time in writing, not exceeding one year, who shall leave his employer or leased premises before the expiration of his contract, without the consent of the employer or landlord, and makes a second contract with a second party without giving notice of the first contract to the second party, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be fined not exceeding fifty dollars."

We do not find that the constitutionality of this law has ever been decided by this court. The statute has been before the court in two cases. In the case of Hendricks v. State, 79 Miss. 368, 30 So. 708, it was decided that the charge against the defendant had not been proven, and that it was not necessary to the disposition of the cause for the court to decide the constitutional question; and in Ex parte Harris, 85 Miss. 4, 37 So. 505, the court decided that the testimony was insufficient to hold the defendant, who was before the court on a writ of habeas corpus seeking his discharge, and that under the situation presented it was not necessary to pass upon the constitutional question presented. However, we note that in both of these cases counsel for the defendant contended that the statute was unconstitutional.

Section 15 of the Constitution of Mississippi provides that "there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in this state, otherwise than in the punishment of crime, where the party shall have been duly convicted. " Article 13 of the Constitution of the United States is in the following words: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." In article 14 of the Constitution of the United States the rights of all citizens are protected by the limitation on the several states in enacting laws, as follows: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

We fully recognize the general powers given to the legislature to enact laws for the purpose of governing the people. Under our Constitutions the lawmaking power is generally lodged in the legislature; however, there are limitations, and these arise chiefly from the Constitutions. In discussing the broad powers given to the legislature in the political organization of the American states, REDFIELD, C. J., in Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 140, 62 Am. Dec. 625, said: "They have committed these in the most general and unlimited manner to the several state legislatures, saving only, such restrictions as are imposed by the Constitution of the United States, or of the particular state in question." Mr. Cooley, in his Constitutional Limitations, page 131, says: "The legislative power we understand to be the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them. Laws, in the sense in which the word is here employed, are rules of civil conduct, or statutes, which the legislative will has prescribed. 'The laws of a state,' observes Mr. Justice Story, 'are more usually understood to mean the rules and enactments promulgated by the legislative authority thereof.'"

It is incumbent upon the state to maintain social order. It is, therefore, proper for the legislature to enact all laws necessary to this end. For the purpose of promoting the general welfare and happiness of the people, it is the duty of the legislature to provide by statute proper rules for the citizen's conduct. It is also the duty of the legislature to safeguard the life, liberty, and rights of the people by the necessary laws. In the course of government it may be necessary for citizens to be restricted in what they may deem to be their natural rights for the general good of the public. But the Constitutions limit the extent to which their rights and privileges may be abridged.

In this case we are confronted with the serious question as to whether the statute interferes with the rights and liberties of the citizen, and we must also consider the question as to whether it is in violation of his right to freedom in contract, and whether the plain purpose of the statute is to use the criminal law for the purpose of enforcement of the contract for personal services. It will be noted that the statute is intended to punish the laborer, renter, or share cropper who had made a contract with another person. There is nothing in the law aimed at the other party to the contract called his employer. The offense consists of his leaving the leased premises before the expiration of his contract without the consent of the employer landlord and making another contract with another party without giving notice of the first contract which he had with the employer landlord. The punishment is by fine, but it necessarily follows that the failure to pay the fine carries with it imprisonment. This last gives ground for the objection to the law that a result of a prosecution for a violation may be involuntary...