State v. Armstrong

• Decision Date: 09 February 1906
• Citation: 84 P. 584,41 Wash. 601
• Parties: STATE v. ARMSTRONG.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

84 P. 584

41 Wash. 601

STATE v. ARMSTRONG.

Supreme Court of Washington

February 9, 1906

Appeal from Superior Court, Chehalis County; Mason Irwin, Judge.

A. A Armstrong was convicted of murder in the first degree, and petitioned for a writ coram nobis. From a judgment of dismissal, petitioner appeals. Affirmed.

See 79 P. 490.

W. H Abel, for appellant.

E. E Boner, for the State.

ROOT, J.

The appellant was informed against in the trial court on a charge of murder in the first degree, and a verdict finding him guilty thereof returned. Motion for a new trial was made and denied, and judgment entered on the verdict. An appeal from the judgment was taken to this court, where an affirmance was had. Thereafter appellant filed in the superior court a petition for a writ coram nobis, alleging therein that one Robert Lowry, who was one of the members of the jury before whom appellant was tried, and who on his voir dire ahd stated that he was not acquainted with appellant, had never seen or heard of him before, and had not formed nor expressed any opinion, and had no impression respecting the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and was entirely free from bias and ill will, and knew of no reason why he could not sit as a juror, had, a few days prior to said trial, stated, in the presence of one May Lamb, that if he sat upon the trial of said cause as a juror he would see to it that appellant was hung, meaning thereby that he would insist on convicting appellant of murder in the first degree, and that said Lowry then and there expressed great animus and bias against appellant; that neither affiant nor his attorney knew of the said statements at the time the said juror was examined upon his voir dire; that said juror was actuated by strong personal bias, and entertained the fixed opinion at said time that this appellant was guilty and should be convicted of murder in the first degree (all of which was unknown to appellant or his attorney until long after the trial and entry of judgment, and after the termination of the appeal in the Supreme Court); that defendant did not receive a fair and impartial trial on account of these matters. To this petition the prosecuting attorney interposed a motion to dismiss upon the following grounds: '(1) The court is without authority in law to issue said writ; (2) the said petition is not verified according to law; (3) the petition does not set forth facts sufficient to warrant or upon which to base the issuance of said writ, or to grant the relief prayed for in the petition.' This motion was sustained by the trial court, and the petition dismissed. From the order and judgment of dismissal, this appeal is taken.

The petition...