State v. Arnal
Decision Date | 15 November 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 3D06-608.,3D06-608. |
Citation | 941 So.2d 556 |
Parties | The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Daisy ARNAL, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Douglas J. Glaid, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Jauregui & Jauregui and Sabino Jauregui, Miami, for appellee.
Before FLETCHER and WELLS, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
The State appeals from an order granting a sworn motion to dismiss an information charging Daisy Arnal with insurance fraud and grand theft in the third degree. We reverse.
In July 2004, the State filed a two count information charging Arnal with violating section 440.105(4)(b) of the Florida Statutes which makes it unlawful to knowingly make false, fraudulent or misleading statements for the purpose of obtaining workers' compensation benefits or payments:
It shall be unlawful for any person:
1. To knowingly make, or cause to be made, any false, fraudulent, or misleading oral or written statement for the purpose of obtaining or denying any benefit or payment under this chapter.
2. To present or cause to be presented any written or oral statement as part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to any provision of this chapter, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim.
3. To prepare or cause to be prepared any written or oral statement that is intended to be presented to any employer, insurance company, or self-insured program in connection with, or in support of, any claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to any provision of this chapter, knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim.
4. To knowingly assist, conspire with, or urge any person to engage in activity prohibited by this section.
5. To knowingly make any false, fraudulent, or misleading oral or written statement, or to knowingly omit or conceal material information, required by s. 440.185 or s. 440.381, for the purpose of obtaining workers' compensation coverage or for the purpose of avoiding, delaying, or diminishing the amount of payment of any workers' compensation premiums.
§ 440.105(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005).
The State also charged Arnal for theft of the allegedly wrongfully obtained insurance proceeds.
In response to these charges, Arnal filed a Rule 3.190(c)(4) sworn motion to dismiss claiming that she had "never presented or caused to be presented any written or oral statement as part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to any provision of the law knowing that such statement contained any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim."
The State traversed, stating:
3. The State denies this sworn fact. On February 8, 2002, the defendant failed to inform Physical Health Center when filling out patient paperwork, and when talking to a Doctor, that that she had previously been injured in the same area where she was now experiencing pain. The defendant also failed to tell Dr. Ballweg on July 25, 2002, that she had previously been injured in the same area where she was now experiencing pain. Additionally, in her deposition dated August 5, 2002, the defendant denied ever being in an auto accident or filing claims with an insurance company for injury to the same area as she was now experiencing pain.
. . . .
8. The State denies this sworn fact. On at least five different occasions the defendant failed to inform the examiner that she had a previous accident and injury in the same area where she was now suffering pain.
Despite this traverse, the charges were dismissed.
As our decision in State v. Ortiz, 766 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), makes clear, Rule 3.190(c)(4) motions to dismiss are treated like summary judgment motions in civil cases, the purpose of which is to test the legal sufficiency of the underlying case. To avoid dismissal under this rule, the State is not obligated to pre-try its case, only to provide sufficient facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, to show that a reasonable jury could rule in its favor:
A motion to dismiss, made pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), must allege and establish that "there are no material disputed facts and the undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie case of guilt against the defendant." State v. Kalogeropolous, 758 So.2d 110, 111 (Fla.2000). A motion to dismiss in a criminal case is analogous to a motion made for summary judgment in civil cases, and as such "[b]oth should be granted sparingly." State v. Bonebright, 742 So.2d 290, 291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Kalogeropolous, 758 So.2d at 111. See also State v. McQuay, 403 So.2d 566, 567-68 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) .
Moreover, on a motion made pursuant to Rule 3.190(c)(4), the state is entitled to the most favorable construction of the evidence with all inferences being resolved against the defendant. See State v. Paleveda, 745 So.2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Davis v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr.
... ... See Doc. 1. Davis is proceeding on an Amended Petition and Supplemental Claims. See Docs. 11, 27 (Petition). Davis challenges a 2011 state court (Duval County, Florida) open plea of guilty and resulting judgment of conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, aggravated ... ...
-
State v. Espinoza
...State is only required to provide sufficient facts to demonstrate that a reasonable jury could rule in its favor. See State v. Arnal, 941 So.2d 556, 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). The State, in order to defeat a motion to dismiss, "need only specifically dispute a material fact alleged by the defe......
-
State v. Terma
...facts, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, to show that a reasonable jury could rule in its favor." State v. Arnal, 941 So.2d 556, 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). Contrary to the trial court's finding, the State is not required to oppose a defendant's motion to dismiss with "affidav......
-
E.I. v. State
...522 So.2d 890, 890 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (holding that intent is not ordinarily determined on a motion to dismiss); State v. Arnal, 941 So.2d 556, 559 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (same); State v. Atkinson, 490 So.2d 1363 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (same). Here, however, E.I. did not raise the issue in a motio......