State v. Arnold

• Decision Date: 16 July 1924
• Docket Number: 18569.
• Citation: 227 P. 505,130 Wash. 370
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. ARNOLD.

227 P. 505

130 Wash. 370

STATE v. ARNOLD.

No. 18569.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 16, 1924

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Brenker, Judge.

L. D Arnold was convicted of robbery, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Henry Clay Agnew, of Seattle, for appellant.

Malcolm Douglas and Bert C. Ross, both of Seattle, for the State.

BRIDGES J.

Appellant was charged with and convicted of the crime of robbery. On his cross-examination by the deputy prosecuting attorney the following occurred:

'Q. Were you ever convicted of a crime before? A. I was not, sir.

'Q. What disposition was made of your case in the juvenile court? A. In the juvenile court, when I was in court you came up here, and I was tried, and you made a statement to the judge that I was in the hands of an expert forger, and you didn't think I was guilty; but I was turned over to the juvenile authorities, and they said they had no records up there of it, and they turned me loose.

'Q. You think I told the judge that you were not guilty at all? You state that I told the judge any such thing as that? A. I can't remember just exactly what you told the judge.

'Q. Let me refresh your recollection. Wasn't this what I said, that you had fallen in with an expert forger and you had been passing this paper for him. For that reason I would like to have you handled through the juvenile court. Isn't that in substance what I told the court? A. That is partly right and partly wrong. * * *

'Q. You and your mother came up to my office and talked the thing over and told me about your young wife at that time; and I told you then I would go to the front for you didn't I? You and your mother both were present in my office in 1920; isn't that a fact? * * * A. I don't remember whether we came up there before the trial or not but we came up there, my mother and I, and we went to see Mayor Brown. 'Q. There never was any trial. A. But my mother and I came up, and afterwards we went down to Mayor Brown. I got my picture, as I had my picture taken there on this case. We went up there. You gave me a written statement saying I was not convicted. I was turned over to the juvenile authorities.

'Q. You were turned over to the juvenile authorities and not handled in the superior court at all. But you were charged with forgery in the first degree. A. The case was thrown out of court as far as I can remember.

'Q. But you know it was transferred automatically, on my suggestion, to the juvenile court; you know that was the disposition made of your case at that time, was it not? A. It was transferred to the juvenile court; but nobody went up to the juvenile court at all, and when I went to the juvenile court they said they didn't know anything about it. So they just released me.'

To all of this examination and some more of like tenor the appellant's objections were overruled.

By authority of section 2290, Rem. Comp. Stat., the prosecuting attorney, upon cross-examination of appellant, had a perfect right to seek to make him admit that he had been previously convicted of a crime, for that statute provides that----

'Every person convicted of a crime shall be a competent witness in any civil or criminal proceeding, but his conviction may be proved for the purpose of affecting the weight of his testimony, either by the record thereof, or a copy of such record duly authenticated by the legal custodian thereof, or by other competent evidence, or by his cross-examination, upon which he shall answer any proper question relevant to that inquiry, and the party cross-examining shall not be concluded by this answer thereto.'

If by the cross-examination the prosecuting attorney was seeking to make the appellant admit that he had been previously convicted of a crime, we have no doubt that he would have been within his rights, but if such was not the purpose there was error. We cannot find anything in the record to show that appellant had previously been convicted of a crime. It seems to us that the purpose of this cross-examination, except the first question or two, was to bring out from the appellant that the prosecuting attorney's office had previously accused him of a certain crime, and that because of certain facts or conditions he had not been tried in the superior court but had been remanded to the juvenile court, where no action was taken concerning his guilt or innocence. In other words, it seems plain that this cross-examination was not for the purpose of trying to prove that appellant had been previously convicted of a crime, but to show that he had been charged with a crime and for some reason not prosecuted. Proving that one has been charged with a crime is not permissible under the statute quoted, nor is it admissible under any rule of law for the purpose of affecting the credibility of his testimony, because a perfectly innocent man may be so accused, nor can we say that this cross-examination was not prejudicial. When a jury is informed that the defendant has previously been accused by the prosecuting attorney of some offense, it is manifest that it may thereby be prejudiced. But the state contends that this cross-examination was made...