State v. Arnold

• Citation: 61 S.E. 891,80 S.C. 383
• Parties: STATE v. ARNOLD.
• Decision Date: 27 June 1908
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina

61 S.E. 891

80 S.C. 383

STATE v. ARNOLD.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 27, 1908

Appeal from General Sessions Circuit Court of Greenwood County, R C. Watts, Judge.

Henry Arnold was convicted of violating Dispensary Act, Feb. 16 1907, § 27 (Acts 1907, p. 473), and he appeals. Affirmed.

D. H Magill, for appellant.

Solicitor R. A. Cooper, for the State.

JONES J.

The defendant was convicted and sentenced at court of general sessions for Greenwood county for violating section 27 of the dispensary act approved February 16, 1907. Acts 1907, p. 473. The indictment charged: "That Henry Arnold, late of the county and state aforesaid, on the second day of March, 1907, with force and arms, at Greenwood, in the county and state aforesaid, did willfully and unlawfully carry and transport from place to place in Greenwood county, in said state, where the manufacture and sale of liquor is prohibited, certain alcoholic liquors intended for unlawful use and contraband, against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state." The defendant moved to quash the indictment on the ground that it failed to charge any offense; that the said section of the dispensary act does not make it an offense to transport liquor for unlawful use from place to place within a county, but only forbids such transportation from without to a place within a county where the manufacture and sale of alcoholic liquors is prohibited; that the indictment did not follow the statute, and did not allege any place or county to which the defendant carried said liquor. The refusal to quash the indictment is made a ground of exception. We think there was no error.

Section 27 provides "*** any person who shall carry or transport alcoholic liquors or beverages for unlawful use to any place or county where the manufacture and sale of alcoholic liquors is prohibited, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor," etc. The construction contended for by appellant strikes the word "place" out of the statute or makes it synonymous with the word "county" which in our view is not the proper construction. While "county" means the entire territory included by the county lines "place" means any spot within the county at which it would be unlawful to manufacture or sell liquors. Had the statute merely read "to any county where manufacture or sale of alcoholic liquors is prohibited," etc., it might be contended that it referred to transportation from without into a county where it was unlawful to manufacture or sell liquor, thus limiting the application of the statute to that transportation only which was from without and into a dry county. Doubtless to prevent such a narrow range of the statute, the Legislature inserted the word "place" so as to make it unlawful to transport liquors for an unlawful purpose to any spot or place where the manufacture or sale of liquors is prohibited. In a county having no dispensary or place for lawful manufacture of liquors, it is unlawful to sell or manufacture liquors at any place or spot within its territory and in a county having a dispensary or lawful liquor manufacturing establishment, it is unlawful to sell or manufacture at any other spot or place within such county than that designated by law. The design of the statute was to prevent the unlawful sale or use of intoxicating liquors throughout the state, and as a means of accomplishing this design the transportation of such liquors for unlawful use is prohibited. Hence a transportation of alcoholic liquors for an unlawful purpose to any spot in the state where such liquors may not be...