State v. Arnold
| Decision Date | 06 December 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 34,194-KA.,34,194-KA. |
| Citation | 779 So.2d 840 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Christopher R. ARNOLD and Derrick Garror, Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Carey J. Ellis, III, Abita Springs, Counsel for Appellants.
Richard Ieyoub, Attorney General, William R. Coenen, Jr., District Attorney, Penny Doucier, Thomas Allen, Assistant District Attorneys, Counsel for Appellee.
Before GASKINS, KOSTELKA and DREW, JJ.
The state originally charged Christopher Arnold ("Arnold") and Derrick Garror ("Garror") with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute marijuana. Following the denial of their motions to suppress confessions and physical evidence, Arnold and Garror (collectively referred to as "defendants") pled guilty to the conspiracy charge, reserving their rights under State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976) to challenge the denial of the motions on appeal. The court sentenced each defendant to five years at hard labor and denied subsequent motions for reconsideration of sentence. On appeal, defendants argue that their motions to suppress should have been granted and that the sentences imposed are excessive. We affirm.
On July 9, 1998, State Trooper John Neal ("Neal") made a traffic stop of a Chevrolet Suburban ("Suburban"), bearing Alabama license plates, which was eastbound on 1-20 in Lincoln Parish, Louisiana, after he saw the vehicle cross the fog line several times. Another vehicle with Alabama license plates, which appeared to be accompanying the Suburban, proceeded east down 1-20. The driver of the Suburban, Garror, had no driver's license. Arnold, who claimed to own the vehicle, was in the front passenger seat; he possessed a driver's license. Neal ran a criminal background check and discovered that both defendants had narcotics histories. Arnold consented to a search of the vehicle which disclosed a wallet belonging to an individual named Elmer Jack Bailey and about $1,000 in cash. Neal ran a criminal background check on Elmer Jack Bailey and learned that he also had a previous narcotics violation. State Trooper Chris Jordan ("Jordan") overheard Neal's radio conversations and joined Neal at the location of the stop. Neal released defendants without issuing any citation.
Neal then radioed to Trooper Jack Coleman ("Coleman") to be on the lookout for the other car, describing it specifically as a maroon Ford Escort ("Escort"), driven and occupied by one black male, having an Alabama tag beginning with the number "2." Neal informed Coleman that he believed the Escort contained contraband and would be driven by an individual named Elmer Jack Bailey. He also suggested that "[I]f [Coleman] had a chance to see it, if it committed a violation, [Coleman] might want to check it out."
Coleman observed the Escort following another vehicle too closely on 1-20 east of Neal's location and made a traffic stop. The driver identified himself as Eric Garror and presented Coleman with a driver's license bearing that name. When "Garror" opened the passenger side door to get the car rental papers, Coleman detected the odor of marijuana. After the nervous driver signed a consent to search, Coleman searched the car and found a shopping bag filled with marijuana in the trunk. "Garror" was placed under arrest; while booking "Garror," the police determined he was actually Elmer Jack Bailey ("Bailey").
The state police again began looking for the Suburban. Senior Trooper Scott Easley ("Easley"), through radio transmissions of Neal and Coleman, was made aware that the occupants were involved in a conspiracy with Bailey. Easley observed the Suburban as it passed through Monroe,
Louisiana and followed it eastward into Richland Parish while waiting for backup to join him because he was in an unmarked car. After another officer, Harvey Robideaux ("Robideaux"), joined Easley, the two made a traffic stop near Start, in Richland Parish, Louisiana. Simultaneously, Neal and Jordan arrived at the scene and arrested defendants. As the result of a subsequent search of the Suburban, the police officers seized $7,020 which was divided into seven bundles of cash and was in a back pack in the rear of the Suburban.
At police headquarters, Bailey stated that he had been paid $500 by defendants to drive a rental car to Fort Worth, pick up the marijuana, and drive back home to Mobile, Alabama. Defendants instructed Bailey to drive the car to a Fort Worth hotel where he met with them. Defendants provided him with a hotel room for the night and awakened him early in the morning. After breakfast, defendants told Bailey that the marijuana was in the car and that it was time to travel back to Mobile. Garror told officers the money in the Suburban was his from a maritime injury settlement and that the three men had gone to Fort Worth to buy marijuana and split it between himself and Arnold. Arnold denied knowledge of the marijuana.
The defendants first argue that the initial stop was unlawful because there was no reasonable suspicion that the Suburban committed a traffic violation by touching the fog line because it did not leave its lane of travel.
La. R.S. 32:79(1) requires that "[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane ...." The right of law enforcement officers to temporarily detain and interrogate persons reasonably suspected of criminal activity is well established. Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The right to make an investigatory stop must be based upon reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspect has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Jackson, 31-836 (La.App.2d Cir.03/31/99), 736 So.2d 967. Reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop is something less than probable cause, but the officer must have "articulable knowledge" of particular facts which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, provide reasonable grounds to suspect the detainee of criminal activity. Id. Whether an officer has a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop should be determined under the totality of the circumstances, in light of the officer's experience, training, and common sense. The officer's experience may be a consideration in ascertaining whether his inferences from the given facts were reasonable. Id. Indeed, to assess the validity of an investigatory stop, the critical inquiry focuses on the officer's knowledge at the time of the stop. State v. Branch, 30,733 (La.App.2d Cir.07/06/98), 714 So.2d 1277, writ denied, 98-2359 (La.01/08/99), 734 So.2d 1227.
In this case, Neal testified that at approximately 3:00 p.m., he observed both of the right side tires of the Suburban drift several times over the fog line onto the right shoulder. He thought that the driver may have been impaired or falling asleep at the wheel. Under these circumstances, we find that Neal clearly had an articulable, reasonable cause to believe the driver of the Suburban had committed a lane usage violation. Accordingly, this stop was valid.
The defendants also urge that the first detention of the Suburban was illegal before Arnold consented to the search because the detention prior to consent lasted too long.
There is no bright-line rule for determining when a lawful detention lasts too long. Each instance must be assessed in view of the surrounding circumstances. State v. Bostic, 26,000 (La.App.2d Cir.05/04/94), 637 So.2d 591, writ denied, 94-1476 (La.10/14/94), 643 So.2d 159. The diligence of the police officers in pursuing a means of investigation likely to quickly confirm or dispel their suspicions should be considered. State v. Bostic, supra, citing, U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).
The defendants argue that the detention lasted approximately thirty-nine minutes, the time between the original stop of the Suburban at approximately 3:00 p.m. and the stop of the Escort at 3:39 p.m. However, the record before us fails to bear out this claim. While the exact time for each event of the stop is absent from the record before us, the Consent to Search form reveals that the consent to search the Suburban occurred at 2:52 p.m. Shortly thereafter, the driver of the Suburban was allowed to leave. After the Suburban was allowed to leave, Neal then advised Coleman to be on the lookout for the Escort. Neal testified that approximately thirty minutes from the time he notified Coleman, he got word that Coleman had stopped the Escort; the citation issued to Bailey indicates that the time was 3:39 p.m. From this evidence, it is apparent that the defendants would have been released from Neal's stop at approximately 3:09 p.m. Thus, from the time of consent until release of the vehicle, approximately seventeen minutes would have elapsed. Defendants have presented no evidence to show that an unreasonable amount of time elapsed between the time of the original stop and the execution of the Consent to Search form. Furthermore, we note that the FBI printout of the criminal records of Garror and Arnold, which were obviously generated as the result of Neal's verbal request, show print times between 2:54 and 2:57 p.m. With the verbal requests being made prior to the consent, and the printouts presumably generated within a short time after the verbal request, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the total time consumed was quite minimal.1 Moreover, Neal's testimony that he immediately asked Garror for a license or identification and then to follow him to his unit when Garror produced neither, shows the time between the initial stop and the criminal history check likewise to have been of short duration.
When a police officer detains a vehicle beyond the initial stop, he must have a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of...
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