State v. Jackson
| Decision Date | 31 March 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 31,836-KA.,31,836-KA. |
| Citation | 736 So.2d 967 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Bryan O'Neal JACKSON, Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Amy C. Ellender, Louisiana Appellate Project, Counsel for Appellant.
Richard Ieyoub, Attorney General, Robert W. Levy, District Attorney, A. Scott Killen, Assistant District Attorney, Counsel for Appellee.
Before BROWN, GASKINS and KOSTELKA, JJ.
The defendant, Bryan O'Neal Jackson, pled guilty as charged to possession of cocaine, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967; however, he reserved his right to a Crosby appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. The defendant received a three-year suspended sentence, with three years of supervised probation and a $1,000.00 fine, with imposition of six months in the parish jail in default of payment of the fine. Finding that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.
On October 31, 1996, Officers Curtis Hawkins and Carl Washington were on bicycle patrol when they saw the defendant sitting on a concrete parking barrier in the parking lot of John's Number 1 Beer Store. The store is located in an area of Ruston known for drug trafficking and violence. On many prior occasions, police officers — including Officer Hawkins — had removed weapons from people selling drugs in John's parking lot. The owner of John's had requested that the police remove people loitering on the premises and had several large "No Loitering" signs placed at both ends of the building. The defendant had been ordered by police to leave the premises on several prior occasions at the request of the owner.
Officer Hawkins approached the defendant and performed a pat-down search for weapons while Officer Washington observed. Officer Washington testified that the defendant appeared to be nervous throughout the encounter. Officer Washington stated that after Officer Hawkins commenced a pat-down search, the defendant tried to remove his hands from the wall and put them into his right front pants pocket. Officer Washington testified that during the course of the pat-down search, the defendant made a statement, containing the word "dope," to a bystander who asked what "the police had him for." He testified that he then observed Officer Hawkins reach into the defendant's right front pants pocket and withdraw from it a brown paper towel containing what appeared to be crack cocaine.
Officer Hawkins testified that as he and Officer Washington approached, the defendant was acting nervous, looking from side to side, and he thought that the defendant was going to run away. Therefore, based on his knowledge of the "high crime" neighborhood, of the drug sales that took place in this parking lot, the fact that he removed weapons from people in this area all the time, and his numerous previous requests to the defendant to leave the premises, Officer Hawkins asked the defendant to put his hands on the wall and commenced a pat-down search of the defendant. Officer Hawkins testified that the defendant continuously made attempts to move his hand to his waistline or front pocket area after the pat-down search had commenced, leading Officer Hawkins to believe that the defendant was reaching for a weapon. Finally, Officer Hawkins testified that in response to a question from a bystander, during the pat-down search, the defendant made a statement to the effect of: "He got me with a pocket full of dope."
Officer Hawkins felt a lump in the defendant's right front pants pocket during the pat-down search and Officer Washington was able to see it as well. After the defendant stated that the officers had "got him with a pocket of dope," Officer Hawkins reached into the defendant's right front pants pocket and retrieved the contraband which consisted of several rocks of crack cocaine wrapped in a brown paper towel.
The defendant was charged by bill of information with possession of cocaine, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967. Following a hearing on an unsuccessful motion to suppress the evidence seized from the search, the defendant pled guilty, reserving his right under State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976), to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The defendant received a three-year suspended sentence and was ordered to pay a $1,000.00 fine and serve six months in jail if he defaulted on this payment.
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain incriminating evidence seized from his person by the police.
Great weight is afforded to the trial court's determination of a motion to suppress, as it had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to weigh the credibility of their testimony. State v. Goodjoint, 30,727 (La.App.2d Cir.6/24/98), 716 So.2d 139; State v. White, 27,188 (La.App.2d Cir.8/23/95), 660 So.2d 515; State v. Jackson, 26,138 (La.App.2d Cir.8/17/94), 641 So.2d 1081.
The question to be initially analyzed is the lawfulness of the officer's original investigatory stop. The right of law enforcement officers to temporarily detain and interrogate persons reasonably suspected of criminal activity is well established. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Fauria, 393 So.2d 688 (La.1981); State v. White, supra; La.C.Cr.P. art. 215.1. The right to make an investigatory stop must be based on reasonable cause to believe that the suspect has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. White, supra; State v. Washington, 621 So.2d 114 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993), writ denied, 626 So.2d 1177 (La.1993); State v. Patterson, 588 So.2d 392 (La.App. 4th Cir.1991); State v. Thibodeaux, 531 So.2d 284 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1987). Reasonable cause for an investigatory stop is something less than probable cause, but the officer must have "articulable knowledge" of particular facts which, in conjunction with reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, provide reasonable grounds to suspect the detainee of criminal activity. State v. Flowers, 441 So.2d 707 (La.I983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 945, 104 S.Ct. 1931, 80 L.Ed.2d 476 (1984); State v. Rodriguez, 396 So.2d 1312 (La. 1981); State v. Washington, supra; State v. Thibodeaux, supra. Whether an officer has a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop should be determined under the totality of the circumstances, in light of the officer's experience, training and common sense. The officer's experience may be a consideration in ascertaining whether his inferences from the given facts were reasonable. State v. Jackson, supra; State v. Leary, 627 So.2d 777 (La. App. 2d Cir.1993), writ denied, 93-3187 (La.3/25/94), 635 So.2d 237.
Flight, a furtive gesture, nervousness, or startled behavior at the sight of a police officer is not, by itself, sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. However, this type of conduct may be a factor leading to a finding of reasonable cause. State v. White...
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