State v. Arnold, 20160
| Decision Date | 28 January 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 20160,20160 |
| Citation | 221 S.E.2d 867,266 S.C. 153 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Carl Jackson ARNOLD, Appellant. |
G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Karl L. Kenyon, William M. Epps, Jr., and Robert P. Lusk, of Anderson, Kenyon & Epps, Anderson, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Asst. Atty. Gen. Joseph R. Barker and Staff Atty. Robert N. Wells, Jr., Columbia, for respondent.
Appellant, Carl Jackson Arnold, was found guilty of murder at the February, 1975 Term of General Sessions Court for Anderson County and sentenced to life imprisonment. Five exceptions constitute the basis for this appeal. Finding no prejudicial error, we affirm the conviction.
The indictment stemmed from a shooting incident which occurred in Anderson County on May 31, 1974. The deceased, Ronnie Davis, died as a result of a pistol wound in the chest at the hands of the appellant.
At the trial a number of witnesses were called to testify to the circumstances surrounding the shooting of the deceased by the appellant. We briefly summarize the facts, as presented by this testimony.
On the night before the shooting, the deceased visited a tavern owned by appellant's father, but operated by appellant that night. Appellant, believing the deceased was attempting to steal a case of beer, confronted the deceased and precipitated a fight. This confrontation ended with appellant's striking the deceased on the head with a pool cue stick.
On the ensuing afternoon the deceased attended a softball game at the Iva Ball Park. Although in uniform he did not actually play in the game involving the 'Misfits', a team to which he belonged. The appellant also attended the game, but as a spectator, with his girl friend. She carried a handbag in which appellant had earlier placed his pistol.
Immediately after the game appellant and his girl friend walked from behind third base where they had been seated across the field to where the deceased was leaning against a car near first base. The appellant approached to within several feet of the deceased, pulled the pistol from his girl friend's bag and shot the deceased in the chest from which wound he died. No words were exchanged between the appellant and the deceased. The deceased was not armed.
The appeal alleges error in the trial judge's denying appellant's motion for a mistrial based on prejudicial and inflammatory remarks of the solicitor, inasmuch as they tended to imply that Mr. Anderson, appellant's attorney, had improperly influenced the testimony of a witness.
Appellant called as a character witness, Mr. Francis Campbell. They had previously coached youth teams at the YMCA. Mr. Campbell testified that the reputation of the deceased was bad. On cross examination the solicitor, apparently attempting to impeach his testimony, asked if the deceased's reputation 'was bad because of what people told you--not what you saw?' The witness replied, 'I know from my actions in the community, my peers, that--,' whereupon the solicitor interrupted by asking, 'Mr. Anderson is a peer because he is on the Board of the YMCA?'.
The trial judge sustained the immediate objection of the defense, and instructed the jury to ignore the question. Ordinarily, judgment will not be reversed because of incompetent questions asked a witness where the jury was instructed to disregard them. McCrae v. McCoy, 214 S.C. 343, 346, 52 S.E.2d 403 (1949). We find that the judge's instruction cured any possible prejudice resulting from any implication of misconduct on the part of appellant's counsel.
It is the general rule of this State that the ordering of, or refusal of a motion for mistrial is within the discretion of the trial judge and such discretion will not be overturned in the absence of abuse thereof amounting to an error of law. State v. Lake, 257 S.C. 407, 409, 186 W.E.2d 256, 257, (1972). We find no abuse in the denial.
Appellant next alleges prejudicial error in the denial of his motion for mistrial based on the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury to read newspapers or listen to radio or television accounts of the trial. The record reveals that although the trial judge did not so instruct, defense counsel did not so request. At the beginning of the second day of trial, defense counsel moved for a mistrial stating an account of the trial in the Anderson Independent would possibly be adverse to appellant. The court on its own initiative asked the jury if anyone had read the article and none answered. Counsel for appellant made no requests for additional inquiry. The newspaper article was not made part of the record and no juror acknowledged reading it.
Appellant has not shown any prejudice resulting from the newspaper article, nor from television or radio reports about the trial. In ...
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State v. Stanley
...State v. Harris, 340 S.C. 59, 530 S.E.2d 626 (2000); State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 502 S.E.2d 63 (1998); see also State v. Arnold, 266 S.C. 153, 157, 221 S.E.2d 867, 868 (1976) (noting the general rule of this State is that "the ordering of, or refusal of a motion for mistrial is within the......
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State v. Belcher
...(1985); State v. Griffin, 277 S.C. 193, 285 S.E.2d 631 (1981); State v. Mattison, 276 S.C. 235, 277 S.E.2d 598 (1981); State v. Arnold, 266 S.C. 153, 221 S.E.2d 867 (1976); State v. Alford, 264 S.C. 26, 212 S.E.2d 252 (1975); State v. Maxey, 262 S.C. 504, 205 S.E.2d 841 (1974); State v. Mar......
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State v. Adams
...State v. Harris, 340 S.C. 59, 530 S.E.2d 626 (2000); State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 502 S.E.2d 63 (1998); see also State v. Arnold, 266 S.C. 153, 157, 221 S.E.2d 867, 868 (1976) (the general rule of this State is that "the ordering of, or refusal of a motion for mistrial is within the discre......
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State v. Bell, No. 2008-UP-249 (S.C. App. 5/7/2008)
...of law. State v. Harris, 340 S.C. 59, 530 S.E.2d 626 (2000); State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 502 S.E.2d 63 (1998); see also State v. Arnold, 266 S.C. 153, 157, 221 S.E.2d 867, 868 (1976) (the general rule of this state is that "the ordering of, or refusal of a motion for mistrial is within th......