State v. Arthur
| Decision Date | 29 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 38339 |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF IDAHO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DAVID JARED ARTHUR, JR., Defendant-Appellant. |
2012 Unpublished Opinion No. 421
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Canyon County. Hon. Renae J. Hoff, District Judge.
Order revoking probation and requiring execution of unified ten-year sentence
with five-year determinate term for felony driving under the influence, affirmed;
order denying I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of sentence, affirmed.
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Russell J. Spencer, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Pursuant to a binding I.C.R. 11 plea agreement, David J. Arthur, Jr. pled guilty to felony driving under the influence. I.C. §§ 18-8004, 18-8005. One of the terms of the agreement was that Arthur waived "any appeals that may be lawfully waived, including, but not limited to, any appeal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 and any appeal for post-conviction relief." The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with a minimum period of confinement of five years. However, pursuant to the plea agreement, the district court suspended the sentence and placed Arthur on probation for four years. Thereafter, the district court revoked Arthur's probation and ordered execution of his original sentence. Arthur filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of his sentence, which the district court denied. Arthur appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and in denying his Rule 35 motion.
As a preliminary matter we address the state's contention that Arthur waived his right to appeal from the revocation of his probation and denial of his Rule 35 motion. A defendant's waiver of the right to appeal as a term of a plea bargain is generally valid and enforceable. I.C.R. 11(d)(1); State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994). Because plea agreements are contractual in nature, they generally are examined by courts in accordance with contract law standards. State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005); State v. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 410-11, 64 P.3d 335, 336-37 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 741,
744, 52 P.3d 886, 889 (Ct. App. 2002). As with other types of contracts, the interpretation of unambiguous terms and the legal effect of the plea agreement are questions of law to be decided by the Court. Doe, 138 Idaho at 410-11, 64 P.3d at 336-37. Such interpretations require a trier a fact to discern the intent of the contracting parties, generally by considering the objective and purpose of the provision and the circumstances surrounding the formation of the agreement. State v. Allen, 143 Idaho 267, 272, 141 P.3d 1136, 1141 (Ct. App. 2006).
The plea agreement unambiguously provided that Arthur waived "any appeals that may be lawfully waived, including, but not limited to, any appeal pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35." Therefore, we hold that Arthur's appellate challenge to the denial of his Rule 35 motion was waived by his plea agreement. See State v. Rodriguez, 142 Idaho 786, 787, 133 P.3d 1251, 1252 (Ct. App. 2006). The waiver of the right to appeal in Arthur's plea agreement does not contain any specific language that the waiver would extend to subsequent probation revocation proceedings. We need not decide in this case whether a general waiver of "any appeals that may be lawfully waived" is sufficient to waive the right to appeal from a subsequent order revoking probation because it is plain from the record that the district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking probation.
The trial court's factual findings in a probation revocation proceeding, including a finding that a violation has been proven, will be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 765, 171 P.3d 253, 256 (2007); State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070 (Ct. App. 2003). It is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probationa court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717.
Where a violation of the terms of probation was not willful on the part of the defendant or was due to circumstances outside of the defendant's control, the district court may not revoke probation without first considering whether there were any adequate alternative methods to address the violation. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 106, 233 P.3d 33, 37 (2009); State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001). If the trial court determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not adequate in a particular situation to meet the state's legitimate interest in punishment, deterrence, or the protection of society, the court may imprison a probationer who has made sufficient, genuine efforts to obey the terms of the probation order. Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106, 233 P.3d at 37; Leach, 135 Idaho at 529, 20 P.3d at 713.
Arthur asserts that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Arthur willfully violated the terms of his probation. Arthur first admitted to violating the terms of the probation by consuming alcohol. However, the district court then reinstated Arthur's probation with the condition, imposed at Arthur's request, that he participate and complete the Lighthouse Rescue Mission's New Life Program and have no additional probation violations. Three weeks later, Arthur again violated the terms of his probation by being terminated from the New Life Program. Arthur admitted to being terminated from the New Life Program and the state dismissed an allegation that Arthur had violated his probation by refusing to comply with a request to submit to testing for alcohol or controlled substances. Arthur was terminated from the New Life Program for the following rule violations:
The district court revoked Arthur's probation and ordered execution of his original sentence without modification. Arthur argues that the acts leading to his discharge from the New Life Program were not willful. Specifically, he asserts that he was unable to provide the requested urine sample due to a "shy bladder." However, it is plain from the record that Arthur was given a urine sample cup at 5:30 a.m. but, by noon, had failed to provide a sample and admitted to hisprobation officer that he had urinated several times that morning. Arthur further contends that any allegations that he was verbally intimidating to other program members and...
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