State v. Assmann

Decision Date21 April 1896
Citation24 S.E. 673,46 S.C. 554
PartiesSTATE v. ASSMANN.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from general sessions circuit court of Lexington county Witherspoon, Judge.

William J. Assmann was convicted of neglecting to turn over to his successor money received by him as clerk of court for Lexington county, and appeals. Affirmed.

Andrew Crawford and Robt. W. Shand, for appellant.

P. H Nelson, for the State.

JONES J.

The appellant, William J. Assmann, having been clerk of the court for Lexington county, was succeeded in office, December 8 1891, by Isaiah Haltiwanger. While Assmann was clerk he received in his official capacity $1,926.45 in the case of Ex parte Fort, Administratrix, In re Boyd v. Lee, which was not turned over to his term of office and the qualification of his successor. For this default he was indicted under section 304, Cr. St., and was tried at the court of general sessions for Lexington county, September term, 1895, before his honor Judge I. D. Witherspoon and a jury, convicted, and sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and imprisonment in the county jail for three months. The defendant appeals, and alleges that the trial judge erred in refusing to quash the indictment, in his rulings as to evidence, in his charge, and in his refusals to charge as follows: "First. That his honor erred in refusing to quash the indictment (1) because it does not state that the offense charged was committed in Lexington county; (2) because it does not allege that the money charged not to have been turned over was ever received by the defendant; (3) because it does not charge that defendant neglected or refused to turn over moneys in his hand to his successors in office; (4) because it charges defendant with not turning over to his successor moneys remaining in his hand of one certain estate, named, whereas indictment lies only for not turning over all the moneys remaining in his hands as clerk. Second. That his honor erred in refusing to permit the defendant, when a witness, to testify (1) Whether or not there were other moneys with which he was chargeable as clerk of court that he did not turn over to his successor within thirty days after such successor had qualified; (2) what defendant's credit was in the Carolina National Bank at the time that he collected money as clerk of court; (3) with what intent defendant expended moneys which were in his hands as clerk; (4) what amount of property defendant then owned. Third. That his honor erred in not charging the jury, as requested: (1) That the provision of the criminal law under which this indictment has been brought requires a clerk of court, on the qualification of his successor, to surrender all the property of his office, other than the money in hand, and within thirty days thereafter to turn over all the moneys remaining in his hands as clerk, to such successor. But this statute applies only to property and money actually in hand, but were not, because previously spent or disposed of by him. (2) The jury cannot convict the defendant under this indictment if they believe that this failure to turn over all the moneys for which he was then responsible as clerk was because it was out of his power to do so. (3) That if the jury find that there is no evidence in the case that Haltiwanger, as clerk of court, and successor in office to Assmann as clerk of court, made a demand on said Assmann for the moneys remaining in his hands as clerk in the case named in the indictment, that then the jury cannot convict. Fourth. That his honor erred in charging the jury: (1) 'That the matter of motive or intent does not enter into this case. (2) That the charge was that defendant, when he went out of office, had funds belonging to this Fort estate; *** that he failed, refused, at the time that he went out of office, or within thirty days thereafter, to pay over to his successor ***; that the offense consists in the omission or refusal to perform an official duty upon the part of Mr. Assmann,--that is, the omission or neglect to pay over this money, or the refusal to pay it over, if it was in his hands, upon demand. Refusal implies demand.' (3) That ' the motive and intent, I must charge you, according to my construction of this statute, right or wrong, does not enter into the question."'

Before the jury was sworn, the defendant moved to quash the indictment on the four grounds set out in exception 1 above, which motion was refused. The following is the indictment: "The State of South Carolina, County of Lexington. At a court of general sessions begun and holden in and for the county of Lexington, in the state of South Carolina, at Lexington C. H., in the county and state aforesaid, on the third Monday of September, in the year of our Lord 1895, the jurors of and for the county aforesaid, in the state aforesaid, upon their oath present: That William J. Assmann, late of the county and state aforesaid, on the 1st day of April, in the year of our Lord 1890, and on divers other days since said day, and up to the 8th day of December, in the year of our Lord 1891, with force and arms unlawfully did commit official misconduct in this: that he, the said William J. Assmann, was duly elected clerk of the court of common pleas and general sessions of Lexington county at the regular general election in the year 1888, and duly qualified as such within the time required by law, and entered upon and continued to discharge the day duties of said office up to and until the 8th day of December, in the year of our Lord 1891, at which time one Isaiah Haltiwanger succeeded him, the said William J. Assmann, as clerk of the court of common pleas and general sessions of the county of Lexington aforesaid, and entered upon the discharge of the duties of said office. And at that time aforesaid to wit, on the 8th day of December, in the year of our Lord 1891, the said William J. Assmann then and there had and held in his hands a certain sum of money, to wit, the sum of nineteen hundred and twenty-six 45/100 dollars, which had been received him, the said William J. Assmann, as clerk as aforesaid, in proceedings had in a case entitled 'Ex parte E. E. Fort, as administratrix of the estate of Hugh L. Boyd, deceased, In re E. E. Boyd, as administratrix as aforesaid, plaintiff, vs. Mary L. Lee, as executrix, and others, defendants' which said sum of money the said William J. Assmann, upon the succession of him, the said Isaiah Haltiwanger, to the office aforesaid, at the time aforesaid, and within thirty days thereafter, he, the said William J. Assmann, failed to pay over to his successor in office as clerk of the court of common pleas and general sessions of Lexington county, to wit, to the said Isaiah Haltiwanger, the aforesaid sum of nineteen hundred and twenty-six 45/100 dollars, paid him as clerk as aforesaid, under the proceedings aforesaid,--against the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state. P. H. Nelson, Solicitor."

The first question is, does the indictment allege, that the offense was committed in Lexington county? We think that it does. "County of Lexington" appears in the margin. In the caption, which, as our courts have declared ( State v. Moore, 24 S.C. 155), ends with the word "presents," we find "County of Lexington," at "Lexington Court House," "in the county and state aforesaid," "of and for the county aforesaid." While it is true that the caption is strictly no part of the indictment or charge which defendant is called upon to answer (State v. Williams, 2 McCord, 301), still it does not follow that the place mentioned in the margin or in the caption, or in the "commencement" of an indictment, may not be carried forward into the "statement" or charging part of the indictment by such words as "county aforesaid," "then and there," etc. In Clark's Criminal Procedure (page 247) it is stated: "Where the county is mentioned in the margin or commencement, or perhaps even in the caption only, it will be sufficient to refer to it afterwards by the words 'in the county aforesaid,' or 'then and there;"' citing 2 Hale, P. C. 180, 2 Hawk. P. C. c. 25 § 34; Rex v. Burridge, 3 P. Wms. 496; Haskins v. People, 16 N.Y. 344; Barnes v State, 5 Yerg. 186; Strickland v. State, 7 Tex. App. 34; State v. Conley, 39 Me. 78; Turns v. Com., 6 Metc. (Mass.) 224; State v. Ames, 10 Mo. 743; State v. Cotton, 4 Fost. (N. H.) 143; State v. Slocum, 8 Blackf. 315; Evarts v. State, 48 Ind. 422; State v. Bell, 3 Ired. 506; State v. Tolever, 5 Ired. 452; Noe v. People, 39 III. 96; Hanrahan v. People, 91 III. 142; State v. Salts (Iowa) 39 N.W. 167; State v. Reid, 20 Iowa, 413. An information that did not state in its body the place where the offense was committed was nevertheless held sufficient where the county was mentioned in the caption, and the words of reference "then and there" were used in charging the crime. State v. S. A. L., 77, Wis. 467, 46 N.W. 498. In State v. Moore 24 S.C. 155, the case of Reeves v. State, 20 Ala. 33, was cited. In this last case, on the margin of the indictment, appeared the words, "The State of Alabama, Butler County." In the body of the indictment it was recited that "the grand jurors," etc., "of the county of Buter, upon their oath present," etc.,without repeating again the name of the county, not naming any other county, but charging that the offense was committed "in the county aforesaid." The court sustained in the indictment, holding that, since there was no such county as "Buter," which the court was bound to know, the words "in the county aforesaid" must refer to the county stated in the margin. Now, the charge against the defendant was his failure to perform a duty required of him as clerk of the court. It was alleged in the charging...

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