State v. Ayotte
| Decision Date | 03 March 1975 |
| Citation | 333 A.2d 436 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Michael H. AYOTTE. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Lawrence J. Zuckerman, G. Arthur Brennan, Asst. Attys. Gen., Portland, for plaintiff.
Caron, Ayotte & Caron, by Ronald E. Ayotte, Saco, for defendant.
Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD and DELAHANTY, JJ.
The Defendant, who was convicted in the Superior Court of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, had moved before trial that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that
'he was denied the right to a blood test to determine his blood alcohol level after having requested a test following his arrest . . ..'
After hearing, his motion was denied. The Defendant then went to trial and was convicted.
The only questions raised by his appeal are whether the evidence presented at the hearing on his motion was such as to compel a conclusion that the conduct of the arresting officers effectively deprived him of the opportunity to have a test of his blood administered as guaranteed him by 29 M.R.S.A., § 1312, and that in its totality, this conduct denied him due process under the law. 1 In short, was the Justice clearly erroneous in denying the Defendant's motion to dismiss before trial?
We believe that he was not and we deny the appeal.
The testimony presented at the hearing on the motion would have justified the Justice in finding these facts:
Sometime in the evening of October 22, 1972, two officers of the Maine State Police arrested the Defendant on Route 5 near the Country Club in Saco. The Defendant, who was then 20 or 21 years old, was placed in the police cruiser and the officers explained to him his rights under the Miranda doctrine and under 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312, our implied consent law. He was unknown to the officers. He refused to give his name to the officers, furnished no identity, could produce no driver's license or registration for the car but told the officers he had 'borrowed' the car, that it belonged to his mother, that his father was dead. At one point the officers were unable to control the Defendant physically and he 'broke arrest' (in a manner not described by the record) and was subsequently handcuffed by them.
During this time the officers sought and learned by radio the name of the owner of the car. The owner proved to be the then County Attorney of York County. The officers suspected that the Defendant might be the County Attorney's son but when they inquired as to this the Defendant answered that his father was dead. At about this time another automobile appeared and parked parallel to the cruiser and the Defendant shouted to the driver, a young acquaintance, 'Go get my father.' This young man drove to the Country Club, 50 yards away, expecting to find the Defendant's father there but he found the Club closed. He returned to the police cruiser. At the officers' request he then took home a passenger in the Defendant's car, a young man who was not under arrest.
The Defendant responded to the officers' explanation of the implied consent law by demanding a blood test. The officers suggested having Dr. Fortier of Saco extract the blood sample and the Defendant agreed but also told them any doctor of their choice would be satisfactory to him. The officers radioed the Scarboro barracks to ascertain if Dr. Fortier would be available to extract the specimen. While the police were on the way to the Saco police department with the Defendant, they were told by radio that Dr. Fortier was not available but that Dr. Richards of Alfred would be available. The officers then continued on past Cutts Avenue (on which the Saco police station is located) and headed toward Alfred. The Defendant then told the officers that he did not want a 'blood test, breath test or anything,' that he did not want to go to Alfred and he wanted to be released on bail in Saco. The officers told the Defendant that until he disclosed his identity he would not be able to obtain bail, and that in the meantime they would have to detain him in the County jail at Alfred. 2
It is the Defendant's contention, first, that he was denied the opportunity to have a test of his blood administered by a physician of his own choice which he says is assured him by our implied consent statute.
Our present statute, 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312, prohibits driving while intoxicated or under the influence, and creates standards defining prima facie proof of intoxication based upon certain blood-alcohol levels. Some analysis of this statute and the background against which its predecessor and it were enacted is necessary in determining what relevant rights it gave this Defendant.
P.L.1969, ch. 439, which was the predecessor of our present statute, established that an operator of a motor vehicle within the state, if arrested for a drinking-driving violation, should be deemed to have consented to a chemical test of his blood or urine. The arrested person was authorized to designate which of the two tests should be administered, and sanctions were provided in the event he refused to submit to one of the tests. This original statute added a provision permitting the arrested person to have a second test performed by a physician of his own choice, at state expense.
P.L.1969, ch. 439 was repealed during the next legislative session and replaced by a statute of similar import, P.L.1971, ch. 547, with which we are now concerned. The new statute refers to tests of blood or breath and eliminates the second at-state-expense test. Our interest concerns the following language:
'Any person who operates or attempts to operate a motor vehicle within this State shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test to determine his blood-alcohol level by analysis of his blood or breath, if arrested for operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
He shall be informed by a law enforcement officer of the tests available to him, and said accused shall select and designate one of the tests. At his request he may have a test of his blood administered by a physician of his choice, if reasonably available.' 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312.
It was made clear long before the implied consent law became a part of our drinking-driving statute that a person who is under arrest and charged with operating while under the influence of liquor is entitled, under due process of law, to have a reasonable opportunity, consistent with safe custody, to procure the seasonable taking of a blood sample for test purposes. State v. Munsey, 152 Me. 198, 127 A.2d 79 (1956).
Prior to enactment of the implied consent law, the State had no parallel right of obtaining a blood-alcohol test against the Defendant's wishes.
The overall purpose of the implied consent law was to increase the availability of reliable evidence as to the true state of a driver's sobriety. A specific purpose was to induce reluctant arrested drivers to submit to one of two statutorily approved methods of...
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...of determining their blood-alcohol level by providing sanctions in the nature of license suspensions for refusal...." State v. Ayotte, 333 A.2d 436, 439 (Me.1975) (emphasis added). The element of coercion in the statute was not unintended; 11 once the statute comes into play and the driver ......
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