State v. Azukas
| Decision Date | 23 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 17163.,17163. |
| Citation | 278 Conn. 267,897 A.2d 554 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut. v. Anthony AZUKAS. |
Jessica Probolus, special deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John A. Connelly, state's attorney, and Robin Lipsky, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).
BORDEN, NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.
The defendant, Anthony Azukas, appeals1 from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a). The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress certain statements that he had made to the police because: (1) the police made an illegal warrantless entry into the defendant's bedroom; and (2) the defendant never waived his right against self-incrimination and provided his statements as a result of police coercion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The defendant was charged with the murder of the victim, Scott Mascia, in violation of § 53a-54a (a). Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress any oral and written statements that he had made to the police, as well as any evidence to which he had directed them subsequent to his arrest. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion in its entirety. Following the jury's guilty verdict, the court rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict and sentenced the defendant to the maximum penalty of life imprisonment.2 This appeal followed.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On the evening of January 26, 1998, the defendant and three friends, Christopher Foody, Maria Bologna, and Jason Gray, were driving in Foody's car on Cooke Street in Waterbury. Foody was driving, the defendant was seated in the front passenger seat, Gray was seated behind the defendant and Bologna was seated behind Foody. While driving in the neighborhood of Cooke Street, Foody took out a handgun, and he and Gray took turns shooting at street signs and parked cars. After reloading the gun from a box of bullets that he had with him, Gray passed the weapon to the defendant. Foody then pulled up behind the victim's vehicle, which was stopped at a red light on Cooke Street. As the light changed, the victim made a left turn onto Moran Street, and Foody pulled into the oncoming traffic lane and tried to speed past the victim's car on the wrong side of the road. As the cars were next to each other, the defendant pointed the gun at the victim and fired four shots at him from approximately four feet away, resulting in the victim's death.
On the day following the shooting, the defendant buried the weapon in the bushes alongside his house, but fearing that the gun still could be discovered, the defendant and Gray thereafter retrieved the weapon, filed off the serial numbers, dismantled it and then threw the pieces into Lakewood Lake. On the night of the shooting, the defendant and Gray also discarded the spent shell casings from the gun into a river located close to the defendant's house.
Upon their arrival at the crime scene on the night of the shooting, the Waterbury police department began an extensive investigation into the victim's murder, but the case remained unsolved for four years. On the fourth anniversary of the victim's death, newspaper and television segments publicized the incident, and a reward was offered for any information that might help solve the crime. A short time later, the police received information that the defendant, Foody, Gray and Bologna were all involved in the shooting. Subsequently, Foody, Bologna and Gray gave statements to the police that they were with the defendant on the night of January 26, 1998, and had witnessed him shoot the victim.
On February 22, 2002, the police learned that the defendant was staying with his girlfriend, Jennifer Czerna, and their infant child, at a house located at 200 Wakefield Circle in East Hartford, which was owned by his girlfriend's father, William Czerna (Czerna). The following morning, Sergeant Gary Pelosi and Lieutenant Scott O'Connor, as well as several other members of the Waterbury police department, went to Czerna's home in order to speak with the defendant to see if he had any information to assist them in their investigation. The defendant agreed to accompany the police back to Waterbury, where he was advised of and waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Upon learning that Foody was in the process of making a statement to the police, and that Pelosi was also in contact with Gray, the defendant confessed, both orally and in writing, to having shot the victim. As part of his confession, the defendant failed to explain his motive for shooting the victim, and stated: "I didn't know the guy or his car and had no reason to shoot at him." Subsequent to providing the police with a voluntary statement, the defendant led O'Connor to the place where he and Gray had discarded the weapon. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.
The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress his confession because the police had illegally entered his bedroom without a warrant. Specifically, the defendant contends that the trial court improperly concluded that Czerna had the authority to consent, and did in fact consent, to the police entering the bedroom that the defendant shared with Czerna's daughter. Accordingly, the defendant argues, the warrantless entry by the police into the defendant's bedroom violated his constitutional rights and tainted any consent he gave to accompany the police back to Waterbury for questioning. We disagree.
The following additional procedural history and facts are relevant to our analysis of this claim. The defendant moved to suppress as evidence all of his oral and written statements, as well as his disclosure of the location where he and Gray disposed of the murder weapon, on the basis that this evidence had been gathered as a result of a warrantless entry into his bedroom at 200 Wakefield Circle, which violated his rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution, and article first, § 7, of the Connecticut constitution.3 After a full evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's motion in its entirety. The trial court ruled that the defendant was living at Czerna's home on the morning of February 23, 2002, and that he had a right to privacy in the bedroom that he shared with Czerna's daughter. The trial court further ruled, however, that, prior to speaking with the defendant, Pelosi and the other police officers obtained valid consent from Czerna both to enter the premises at 200 Wakefield Circle, and also to leave the entryway of the home and go upstairs to the defendant's second floor bedroom. Specifically, the trial court found that "there was a consent to all of the areas where the police went and there were no limitations [placed] upon the police in any way."
The trial court found the following facts in support of its ruling. On the morning of February 23, 2002, Pelosi and five other members of the Waterbury police department proceeded to the 200 Wakefield Circle address in East Hartford. Pelosi and two other officers knocked on the front door of Czerna's home, while O'Connor led a team that went to a back entrance to the home located off of the living room. At the time of the officers' arrival at 200 Wakefield Circle, Czerna recently had completed the overnight shift at his place of employment, and was awake and watching television in the living room of his home.
When Czerna answered the knock at his front door, Pelosi identified himself as a police officer and informed Czerna that he wanted to talk to the defendant. Czerna let Pelosi and the other officers into the entryway of his home and informed them that the defendant was in an upstairs bedroom with his daughter. At this point, O'Connor knocked on the back door of Czerna's home, and Czerna voluntarily admitted O'Connor and two other officers into his living room. Pelosi then obtained permission from Czerna to leave the entry-way and go upstairs to the bedroom occupied by the defendant, which was the first room upon reaching the second floor landing. The door to the defendant's bedroom was partially open and Pelosi could see the defendant and his girlfriend half asleep on the bed. Pelosi entered the bedroom, introduced himself to the defendant, and asked him if he would be willing to accompany the police to the Waterbury police department. The defendant agreed and voluntarily accompanied Pelosi downstairs. The trial court found that neither Pelosi nor the other officer who had gone upstairs to locate the defendant used any force against the defendant, conducted a search of his bedroom or restrained the defendant in any way.
While Pelosi located the defendant in the second floor bedroom, O'Connor remained downstairs with two other officers and engaged in casual conversation with Czerna. O'Connor did not conduct a search of the premises or make a showing of force against Czerna or any other member of the household. After coming downstairs with Pelosi, the defendant finished getting dressed in the presence of Czerna and O'Connor, and then left with Pelosi and the other officers to travel back to Waterbury for questioning. At no point did the defendant indicate that he was unwilling to accompany the police for the purposes of a voluntary interview, and he was not handcuffed or placed in restraints either in Czerna's home or on the...
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