State v. Babb
Decision Date | 02 November 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 7711SC416,7711SC416 |
Citation | 34 N.C.App. 336,238 S.E.2d 308 |
Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Clinton BABB. |
Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Asst. Atty. Gen. James Peeler Smith, Raleigh, for the State.
Pittman, Staton & Betts by Stanley W. West and William W. Staton, Sanford, for defendant appellant.
Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion for judgment as of nonsuit on the ground that there was no evidence that the tires and tubes were stolen property?
The indictment charges that defendant did feloniously receive property knowing the same to have been "feloniously stolen, taken, and carried away, . . ." The quoted words are a short-hand definition of common-law larceny. But the evidence fails to establish common-law larceny of the tires and tubes. One element of common-law larceny is that the property must be taken under such circumstances as to amount technically to a trespass, a wrongful taking and carrying away. State v. Griffin, 239 N.C. 41, 79 S.E.2d 230 (1953); State v. Delk, 212 N.C. 631, 194 S.E. 94 (1937); State v. Watts, 25 N.C.App. 194, 212 S.E.2d 557 (1975).
All of the evidence tends to show that Richard Cummings was, and for several years had been, the foreman of the truck tire department of Budd's Master Tire Service, Inc. He had apparent and actual authority to sell the truck tires and accessories in his department. As a witness for the State, Cummings testified that he had pled guilty to the charge of "larceny by employee." We must assume that he was charged with and pled guilty to the violation of G.S. 14-74, which provides in substance that if any servant or other employee to whom property shall be delivered for safekeeping by the master converts the same to his own use with the intent to steal and defraud contrary to the trust; or if any servant shall embezzle such property, or otherwise convert the same to his own use, with intent to steal or defraud the master, he "shall be fined or imprisoned . . . not less than four months nor more than ten years, at the discretion of the court: . . ."
In State v. Higgins, 1 N.C. 36 (1792), it was pointed out that G.S. 14-74 was a substantial prototype of an old English statute, 21 Henry VIII, c. 7, ss. 1, 2. The court held that defendant was not a "servant" within the meaning of the statute, then determined that under the indictment charging a violation of the statute defendant could not be convicted of common-law larceny. We quote pertinent excerpts from the decision:
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It is clear from Higgins that the purpose of the statute was to make the conduct described therein a crime because it did not constitute the crime of common-law larceny. In State v. Wilson, 101 N.C. 730, 7 S.E. 872 (1888), it was held that a defendant could not be convicted for a violation of G.S. 14-74 under an indictment charging common-law larceny; that it was necessary to allege that the property was received and held by defendant in trust, or for the use of the owner, and being so held, it was feloniously converted or made away with by the servant or agent.
G.S. 14-71 provides that if any person shall receive property "the stealing or taking whereof amounts to larceny or a felony, either at common law or by virtue of any statute made or hereafter to be made, . . ." (Emphasis added.) It appears that under the statute the property knowingly received or concealed could include not only stolen property but trust property converted in violation of G.S. 14-74 or property taken in violation of any other felony statute. But if the property knowingly received was not stolen but was taken in violation of some felony statute, the indictment should so allege.
As a general rule the indictment must sufficiently define the crime or set forth all its essential elements for the purpose of informing the accused of the specific offense of which he is accused so as to enable him to prepare his defense or plead his conviction or acquittal as a bar to further prosecution for the same offense. State v. Wells, 259 N.C. 173, 130 S.E.2d 299 (1963). "An indictment for an offense created by statute must be framed upon the statute, and this fact must distinctly appear upon the face of the indictment itself; and in order that it shall so appear, the bill must either charge the offense in the language of the act, or specifically set forth the facts constituting...
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State v. Brown, 8129SC854
...that nothing contained in this section shall extend to ... servants within the age of 16 years." According to State v. Babb, 34 N.C.App. 336, 238 S.E.2d 308 (1977), an indictment charging a violation of G.S. 14-74 must allege that the property was received and held by the defendant in trust......
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Williams v. Boylan-Pearce, Inc., BOYLAN-PEARC
...against defendant, an element of larceny. See State v. Brown, 56 N.C.App. 228, 287 S.E.2d 421 (1982); see also State v. Babb, 34 N.C.App. 336, 238 S.E.2d 308 (1977). Defendant's motions for a directed verdict and for judgment N.O.V. were properly Next we address plaintiff's contention that ......
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State v. Keyes, s. 832SC50
...A defendant must be convicted, if convicted at all, of the particular offense charged in the bill of indictment. State v. Babb, 34 N.C.App. 336, 340, 238 S.E.2d 308, 310 (1977). We hold that there was a fatal variance between the allegations of the indictment and the proof the State present......
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State v. Daniels
...requires that a trespass, actual or constructive, be shown. State v. Bullin, 34 N.C.App. 589, 239 S.E.2d 278 (1977); State v. Babb, 34 N.C.App. 336, 238 S.E.2d 308 (1977); State v. Bailey, 25 N.C.App. 412, 213 S.E.2d 400 (1975). Not only is this element different from the essential elements......