State v. Baker

Decision Date24 January 1973
Citation320 A.2d 801,164 Conn. 295
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Orlando BAKER.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court

Igor I. Sikorsky, Jr., Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Bernard D. Gaffney, Asst. State's Atty. with whom, on the brief, was John D. LaBelle, State's Atty., for appellee (state).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD and BOGDANSKI, JJ.

MacDONALD, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from a conviction of the crimes of the sale of marijuana and the possession of a controlled drug. The sole assignment of error pressed and argued on the appeal raises the issue as to whether the defendant's constitutional rights to due process and speedy trial were violated where the warrant on which he was arrested was issued six months prior to his actual arrest. Even assuming that the issue now pressed was properly raised in the trial court-a fact which the record does not disclose-we find no merit to the defendant's present claim.

'The Sixth Amendment provides that '(i)n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . ..' On its face, the protection of the amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been 'accused' in the course of that prosecution. These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not yet accused nor would they seem to require the Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time.' United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313, 92 S.Ct. 455, 459, 30 L.Ed.2d 468.

'A delayed arrest does not in and of itself deny any constitutional rights. The Statute of Limitations is a citizen's primary guarantee protecting him from having to answer overly stale criminal charges. . . . If one is arrested within the time limits imposed by the applicable Statute of Limitations it is incumbent upon him to show that he suffered some significant prejudice as a result of any delay in the making of the arrest.' United States v. Scully, 415 F.2d 680, 683 (2d Cir).

In State v. Hodge, 153 Conn. 564, 219 A.2d 367, the defendant's claimed denial of his right to a speedy trial was based on a delay between the alleged offense and his arrest rather than, as here, a delay between the issuance and execution of the arrest warrant. In that case we said (p. 567, 219 A.2d, p. 369): 'Ordinarily a delay between the time of an offense and the time of making an arrest will not affect the legality of the arrest or of the criminal proceedings subsequent thereto.' We then pointed out (p. 569, 219 A.2d, p. 370): 'Whether an accused has been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial depends upon the facts in a particular case.' And finally, after a discussion of the particular circumstances involved there, we stated (p. 571, 219 A.2d p. 370), in language equally applicable to the facts of this case: "Three reasons have been suggested for according an accused a speedy trial: (1) to protect the accused from prolonged preliminary imprisonment; (2) to relieve him of anxiety and public suspicion attendant upon an untried accusation; and (3) to insure that means of proving his innocence will be within his reach by minimizing the possibility of witnesses becoming unavailable and their memories dulled.' . . . None of these reasons can be said to apply in this case so as to affect the trial to the disadvantage of the defendant. Under all the circumstances, we conclude that there was no denial of the defendant's right to a speedy trial.'

Obviously, the first two reasons mentioned above are not applicable here. With respect to the third, the record discloses no offer of evidence of prejudice by reason of the delay and, on the contrary, an examination of the appendix to the defendant's brief indicates that the defendant testified as to his whereabouts and activities on the day in question and produced...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • State v. Holmes
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 24 December 2019
    ...machinery to try defendants accused of crime"). The same is true of the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial; see State v. Baker , 164 Conn. 295, 296, 320 A.2d 801 (1973) ("[o]n its face, [the right to a speedy trial] is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends on......
  • State v. McCoy, 88
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • 5 May 1981
    ...v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1978); People v. Hannon, 19 Cal.3d 588, 138 Cal.Rptr. 885, 564 P.2d 1203 (1977); State v. Baker, 164 Conn. 295, 320 A.2d 801 (1973); Preston v. State, 338 A.2d 562 (Del.1975); Henson v. United States, 287 A.2d 106 (D.C.App.1972); see also Coca v. Distric......
  • State v. Wall
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 19 March 1996
    ... ... See General Statutes § 54-91a ... 12 A six month delay in executing an arrest warrant does not violate a defendant's speedy trial right. State v. Baker, 164 Conn. 295, 297, 320 A.2d 801 (1973). " 'On its face, the protection of the [sixth] Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been "accused" in the course of that prosecution.' " Id., at 296, 320 A.2d 801, quoting United ... ...
  • State v. McCarthy
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 4 September 1979
    ...United States v. Aberson, 419 F.2d 820, 821 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1066, 90 S.Ct. 1497, 25 L.Ed.2d 687 (1970); State v. Baker, 164 Conn. 295, 297, 320 A.2d 801 In the present case, the defendant claims he was prejudiced by the "oppressive" conditions he had to endure in jail, by ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT