State v. Baldwin

• Decision Date: 08 May 1890
• Citation: 45 N.W. 297,79 Iowa 714
• Parties: THE STATE v. BALDWIN
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

45 N.W. 297

79 Iowa 714

THE STATE v. BALDWIN

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

May 8, 1890

Decided May, 1890.

Appeal from Jefferson District Court.--HON. H. C. TRAVERSE, Judge.

THE indictment returned against the defendant is in two counts the charging part of each being as follows: "The said Lawson J. Baldwin, on or about the twenty-eighth day of June in the year of our Lord one thousand, eight hundred and eighty-five, in the county aforesaid, in and upon the body of one Mattie Rodabaugh, then and there being, wilfully feloniously, premeditatedly, and with malice aforethought did commit an assault with some instruments to the grand jury unknown, then and there held in the hands of the said Lawson J. Baldwin; and then and there said Lawson J. Baldwin did wilfully, feloniously, deliberately, premeditatedly, and of his malice aforethought, thrust into the body and puncture and lacerate the womb and private parts of said Mattie Rodabaugh, then and there and thereby wilfully, feloniously, deliberately, premeditatedly, and of his malice aforethought, inflicting upon the body, womb and private parts of the said Mattie Rodabaugh, who was then and there a pregnant woman, mortal wounds, the number of which is to the grand jurors unknown, of which mortal wounds the said Mattie Rodabaugh, in Van Buren county, Iowa, on the eighth day of July, A. D. 1885, then and there did die. And the grand jurors aforesaid further aver and charge that the said defendant, Lawson J. Baldwin, at said time and place, and in the manner and by the means aforesaid, thrust into the body, womb and private parts of the said Mattie Rodabaugh said unknown instruments, with intent to produce a miscarriage of said Mattie Rodabaugh, the said miscarriage not being necessary to save the life of said Mattie Rodabaugh, contrary to and in violation of the law. Second count. The said Lawson J. Baldwin, on or about the twenty-eighth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand, eight hundred and eighty-five, in the county aforesaid, in and upon the body of one Mattie Rodabaugh, a pregnant woman, then and there being, wilfully, deliberately, feloniously, premeditatedly, and with malice aforethought, did commit an assault, and then and there the said Lawson J. Baldwin did wilfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and of his malice aforethought, and with the intent to produce the miscarriage of said Mattie Rodabaugh, administer and cause to be taken by said Mattie Rodabaugh certain drugs, substances, and medicines, to the grand jurors unknown, the same not being necessary to save the life of the said Mattie Rodabaugh, then and there being, and thereby wilfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and of his malice aforethought, causing the said Mattie Rodabaugh, by means of said drugs, substances and medicines, to sicken and languishingly live, and on the eighth day of July, A. D. 1885, in Van Buren county, state of Iowa, to die, contrary to and in violation of law." The defendant having pleaded not guilty, the case was tried to a jury, and a verdict of "guilty of murder in the second degree" returned. Defendant moved for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment, which motions were overruled, and judgment entered on the verdict; to all of which the defendant excepted, and from which he appeals.

REVERSED.

M. A. McCoid and W. A. Work, for appellant.

John Y. Stone, Attorney General, and J. S. McKemey, Special Prosecutor, for appellee.

OPINION

GIVEN, J.

I.

Our attention is first directed to the overruling of the defendant's motion in arrest of judgment. The grounds of his motion are that the indictment is void for duplicity, "in that it charged the offense in two inconsistent groups of facts;" that the indictment charges murder in the first degree, and the defendant was put upon trial thereunder for murder in the second degree; that the offense charged, as disclosed in the evidence, is one of necessity before the fact, and the indictment does not disclose any party with whom defendant is charged to have associated in the commission of the offense, and because on the whole record no legal judgment can be pronounced. "The indictment must charge but one offense, but it may be charged in different forms to meet the testimony." Code, sec. 4300. There is but one offense charged in this indictment, the murder of Mattie Rodabaugh. In the first count it is charged to have been committed with some instrument to the grand jurors unknown, and in the second by administering and causing to be taken certain drugs, substances and medicines, to the grand jurors unknown.

We do not think that either count charges murder in the first degree, as neither charges an intent to take life. State v. Gillick, 7 Iowa 287; State v. Johnson, 8 Iowa 525. We think the indictment charges murder in the second degree, and, therefore, the defendant was rightly put upon trial for that offense.

If the indictment did charge murder in the first degree, the state would certainly have the right to waive a trial as to that degree, and claim a conviction for any lesser degree embraced in the charge. Such a case would differ materially from those referred to, wherein the party was put upon trial for a higher degree than that charged.

There is a view of the testimony, and probably the most tangible one, that would make the defendant guilty as an accessory before the fact, if guilty at all. Code, section 4314, is as follows: "The distinction between an accessory before the fact and a principal is abrogated, and all persons concerned in the commission of a public offense, whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet its commission, though not present, must hereafter be indicted, tried and punished as principals." It follows from this provision of the statute that there was no variance between the charge in the indictment and the testimony. We discover no reason in the record why a legal judgment could not be pronounced, and, therefore, conclude that there was no error in overruling the defendant's motion in arrest of judgment.

II. On the trial the court admitted, over defendant's objections,...