State v. Baldwin

• Decision Date: 22 December 1925
• Docket Number: No. 26206.,26206.
• Citation: 281 S.W. 943
• Parties: STATE v. BALDWIN.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

281 S.W. 943

STATE v. BALDWIN.

No. 26206.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

December 22, 1925.^*

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; V. H. Falkenhainer, Judge.

Sylvester Baldwin was convicted of robbery, and on appeal the judgment of conviction was affirmed. On further consideration, on court's own motion, order of affirmance vacated, former opinion withdrawn, and rehearing granted.

Jones H. Parker, of St. Louis, for appellant.

Robert W. Otto, Atty. Gen., and Harry L. Thomas, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BLAIR, J.

On December 22, 1925, and during the present term of this court, an opinion was filed whereby the judgment of the trial court in this case was affirmed. No motion for rehearing was filed within 10 days, and the judgment of affirmance has thus become final, unless the court, upon its own motion, sets same aside. The majority of the court are of the opinion that this should be done.

[1] Ordinarily a statement of the reasons for such action is wholly unnecessary, because the power of the court to set aside its judgments at the same term at which they were rendered cannot be and is not challenged. Its duty to do so rests upon the circumstances of the particular case. Since one of the judges has seen fit to prepare and file a formal protest against the action of the majority, it is necessary that the reasons actuating the majority in making the order be stated, lest the action of the court be misunderstood, and such action appear to be capricious and indefensible.

It appears from the record that the prosecuting witness was the only witness who testified to the presence of appellant at the scene of the robbery and to his participation therein. For reasons not appearing in the record, appellant did not take the witness stand in his own behalf. He produced several witnesses, who testified to his presence elsewhere at the time the alleged robbery was committed. The jury did not deem such alibi to have been sufficiently established. No circumstances connecting appellant with the robbery were given in evidence, other than the bare, but positive, identification of the prosecuting witness, when appellant was said to have been seen by the aid of a street light. Such evidence was, of course, sufficient to support the verdict, if appellant was otherwise properly and fairly tried.

The circuit attorney of the city of St. Louis has written to this court, and, among other things, said:

"I have investigated the matter and examined affidavits of police officers showing that Baldwin could not have been at the scene of the robbery as described by the prosecuting witness at the time the prosecuting witness claimed he was robbed. The prosecuting witness has made an affidavit that he is not certain that Baldwin was one of the men that robbed him. I am sure that this case should be reversed outright in the interest of justice. I feel that Baldwin is not guilty of the crime charged, as seven people have either made affidavit or testified that Baldwin was at a different place at the time the robbery was supposed to have been committed."

The prosecuting witness, Roy F. Smith, made the following affidavit, which is before the court:

"I was the prosecuting witness in the case of State v. Sylvester Baldwin. At the time I testified in court that I felt certain that Sylvester Baldwin was one of the parties that robbed me on January 3, 1924. But I have thought much about the identity of Baldwin, and while I sometimes feel that he is one of the men, then at other times I feel that I may be mistaken. Feeling this way about it, I don't wish to do any man a wrong, and as I can't feel all the time that Baldwin was one of the men, I wish that those in authority to deal with matters of this sort right the wrong that has been done Mr. Baldwin."

In addition to the foregoing, two police officers of the city of St. Louis, who did not testify as witnesses in the trial below, have made affidavits that at the very moment and for a while before and after the alleged robbery was committed appellant was present at a certain soft drink establishment, where they were also present. The affidavits of these policemen and the affidavit of the prosecuting witness, together with the letter of the circuit attorney reporting the result of the subsequent investigation made by him, unless they are disregarded as unworthy of belief, are very convincing evidence that the appellant is not guilty of the crime for which) he was tried and that the verdict of the jury was a most grievous miscarriage of justice.

Although such letter and affidavits are not before us in the due and orderly course of judicial procedure, and our attention has been called to them in a manner rather unusual and possibly irregularly, nevertheless the real situation is now known to us. We cannot close our eyes and ignore it. Conscience forbids such course. The situation presents a powerful appeal to the conscience and sense of justice of right-thinking men everywhere. As judges we cannot smugly ignore facts which govern and control men of conscience, who are not charged, as we are, with the sacred duty of seeing that right and justice shall prevail over technicality — that substance shall not be sacrificed to form.

[2] None of the foregoing considerations could justify reversal of the judgment against appellant, because they do not appear in the record before this court, and his conviction, unjust though it may be, must be affirmed or reversed upon the record made at his trial. If that judgment was rendered after a fair trial, it cannot be overturned, even though appellant be in fact not guilty. In that event, he must be remitted to executive clemency alone. But this court should not refuse again to review the record merely because appellant may ask for such clemency. Our judgment fastens upon appellant indelibly the stigma of having been a felon. Such stigma executive clemency cannot remove. In view of the very persuasive showing of innocence now made, the judgment of the trial court should not be permitted to stand until a further review of the record convinces the court, after carefully going over the record again, that no reversible error was committed against him in his trial.

[3] Counsel strenuously urge that this court has not adequately and fully considered alleged highly prejudicial error shown by the record. Be that as it may — for this is not the time nor place to consider that question— the majority of the court feel that, under the circumstances above outlined, humanity and common justice alike demand that a rehearing be had, even though it turn out that the same result shall be reached after such rehearing. If we have overlooked prejudicial error, and such omission was due to the...