State v. Balfour
Decision Date | 05 July 1991 |
Citation | 814 P.2d 1069,311 Or. 434 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review, v. Donald BALFOUR, Petitioner on Review. TC C8801-30735; CA A49467; SC S36884. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Martin W. Reeves, Portland, filed the petition and argued the cause for petitioner on review.
[311 Or. 435-A] Robert M. Atkinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. With him on the response were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., and Virginia L. Linder, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Mary Burns Tomlinson, Lake Oswego, filed a brief for amicus curiae Oregon State Bar.
In each of four cases that were consolidated for the purposes of decision before the Court of Appeals, appointed counsel for an indigent appellant determined that there were no meritorious issues on which to base an appeal. In three of the cases, counsel moved to withdraw; in the fourth, the Court of Appeals raised the issue of withdrawal on its own motion. The Court of Appeals declined to permit counsel to withdraw. State v. Balfour, 100 Or.App. 1, 784 P.2d 1103 (1989). Review was sought only in the lead case, which is a criminal appeal. We conclude that counsel need not withdraw in such cases. We vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further consideration.
The specific circumstances of the four consolidated cases are described in the Court of Appeals' opinion and do not require iteration here. See State v. Balfour, supra, 100 Or.App. at 5-7, 784 P.2d 1103 (reciting facts). The following summary statement of the Court of Appeals is sufficient to set the stage for its decision:
* * * "
Id. at 5, 784 P.2d 1103. The Court of Appeals concluded that counsel should not be permitted to withdraw from representation under the circumstances then present, and it detailed generally applicable requirements that counsel must fulfill before withdrawal might be possible, based on that court's understanding of the requirements of federal constitutional case law. Id. at 10, 784 P.2d 1103. We allowed review to address the important questions involved.
We address in this opinion the ethical and federal constitutional 1 obligations of Oregon appointed appellate counsel in a criminal appeal when counsel determines that only non-meritorious arguments exist on which to base an appeal. 2 We conclude that in such circumstances counsel need not seek to withdraw. We hold that the continued presence of counsel in the appeal is ethically permissible. We set out hereafter procedures that we believe are constitutionally adequate, governing the prosecution of an appeal from the filing of a notice of appeal to a decision by the Court of Appeals.
The decisional backdrop against which we consider the issues presented by this case is a fairly well defined and limited universe of cases. The first decision of consequence dealing with counsel's desire to resign from an appeal that has, so far as counsel can discern, no merit is Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). That decision was followed chronologically by State v. Horine, 64 Or.App. 532, 669 P.2d 797, rev. den. 296 Or. 237, 675 P.2d 490 (1983), in which the Court of Appeals outlined certain procedures to be followed in such cases in the Oregon Court of Appeals, while acknowledging that the procedures were at variance with the procedures described in Anders. In 1988, the Supreme Court of the United States decided McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 100 L.Ed.2d 440 (1988), and Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). The Oregon Court of Appeals, in this case, viewed McCoy and Penson as the death knell for the procedures that it had approved in State v. Horine. The court revised the requirements for attorney resignation accordingly.
Each of the rationales for the decisions in the cases cited is a significant piece of the challenge that we confront today, which is to configure a system of practice in Oregon's appellate courts that will accommodate the ethical obligations of counsel; satisfy the federal constitutional requirements of effective representation, substantial equality, and fair process for indigent appellants; and serve the perceived needs of an effectively administered appellate decision-making process. We therefore examine the cases in some detail.
As noted, Anders v. California, supra, is the starting point for any decision in this area. The pertinent facts in Anders are as follows:
386 U.S. at 739-40, 87 S.Ct. at 1397-98 (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court of the United States began its analysis by referring to a continuing line of its cases that had established the right to counsel for a criminal defendant on appeal and further had established the principle that the basic nature of appellate review for a criminal defendant cannot depend on the defendant's financial status. 386 U.S. at 741-42, 87 S.Ct. at 1398-99. The Court then set forth its holding, which has come to be known as the "Anders brief" requirement:
386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400. (Footnote omitted.)
The Anders holding is significant in three material aspects: First, it determined that the California procedure then in use (i.e., the so-called "no merit letter") was inadequate under the federal constitution; second, the Court established the appropriate procedure (the so-called Anders brief); and third, the Court stated its rationales. Only the third aspect requires further elaboration.
Anders held that the California procedures violated the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment: "We have concluded that California's action does not comport with fair procedure and lacks that equality that is required by the Fourteenth Amendment." 386 U.S. at 741, 87 S.Ct. at 1398. See also 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400 ( ). Following its description of the Anders brief, the Court re-emphasized its constitutional purpose, viz., to assure equality for indigent appellants:
386 U.S. at 745, 87 S.Ct. at 1400. See also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611-12, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 2444, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974) (...
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