State v. Bannock
| Decision Date | 06 June 1893 |
| Citation | 53 Minn. 419 |
| Parties | STATE OF MINNESOTA <I>vs.</I> FRANK C. BANNOCK. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Frank C. Bannock was accused of larceny and convicted in the Municipal Court of the City of Duluth. Questions of law arose on the trial which, in the opinion of the court, were so doubtful as to require the decision of this court. The defendant desiring it, the case was reported so as to present the questions and certified here. 1878 G. S. ch. 117, § 11; Sp. Laws 1891, ch. 53, § 46.
The defendant was accused of stealing a toy rocking-horse worth $9.95, from Panton & Watson. He was arrested and brought into court on December 26, 1892. He pleaded not guilty, and thereupon the Judge explained to him his right to a trial by jury. He then waived trial by jury, and the hearing was adjourned to December 30, 1892. On that day defendant appeared and asked leave to withdraw his waiver of a jury trial, and demanded to be tried by jury. The court refused to permit defendant to withdraw his waiver of a jury trial, and he excepted to the ruling. He was then tried before the court and found guilty and fined $25 and costs. Defendant asked for a stay of proceedings for twenty days, and it was granted. On January 14, 1893, he moved for a new trial, which was denied, and on January 21, 1893, the questions were, at his request, certified to this court by Eric L. Winje, Special Judge. See State v. Woodling, ante, p. 142.
Edson, Edson & Campbell, for the defendant.
The Attorney General and Henry F. Greene, for the State.
In the municipal court of the city of Duluth the defendant was accused of the crime of larceny of the grade of a misdemeanor. He interposed a plea of not guilty, and waived a trial by jury. The cause was then adjourned to a subsequent day, at which time the defendant asked leave to withdraw his waiver of a trial by jury, and he then demanded a jury trial. This was refused; the judge proceeded to a trial without a jury; the defendant was found guilty, and a fine of $25 and costs was imposed. The case is certified to this court, under the statute, for our opinion upon the questions (1) whether the defendant could effectually waive his right to a jury trial, and (2) whether, having declared such waiver, he could afterwards revoke it, and demand a trial by jury.
1. The reasons upon which our decision in State v. Woodling, ante, p. 142, (54 N. W. Rep. 1068,) was founded, are decisive of the first of the questions above stated. In that case it was considered with respect to offenses within the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, that the constitution does not require that trials shall be by jury; that, if the accused cannot effectually waive his right of trial by jury, it is only because public policy forbids it; and that public policy does not forbid this, as respects such offenses. The statute, long in force, expressly authorizing the accused in a justice's court to waive a trial by jury, was considered...
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