State v. Bare

Decision Date09 August 1983
Docket NumberNo. 533A82,533A82
Citation309 N.C. 122,305 S.E.2d 513
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. Paul Wilson BARE.

Rufus L. Edmisten, Atty. Gen. by George W. Boylan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.

Adam Stein, Appellate Defender, by Malcolm R. Hunter, Jr., Asst. Appellate Defender, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant.

FRYE, Justice.

Defendant presents on appeal three issues to this Court. First, he contends that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to instruct the jury to carefully scrutinize the testimony of a particular witness if it found that the witness was testifying in return for special consideration from the police and prosecution. Second defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing a State's witness to testify that he began doing undercover work after personally seeing the effect of drugs on two people, testimony defendant claims is not only irrelevant but also prejudicial. Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to prohibit death qualification of the jury, permitting the State to ask prospective jurors death qualification questions, and striking for cause those jurors opposed to the death penalty. We have carefully reviewed each of these issues and hold that no prejudicial error was committed. Defendant, therefore, is not entitled to a new trial.

I.

The State's chief witness and an eye witness to the murder and kidnapping of the victim in this case, Lonnie Gamboa, was Joseph Eugene Vines. Before testifying to the events surrounding these crimes, Vines testified extensively about his background. He stated, in essence, that he makes his living traveling from city to city working as an undercover agent for various state and federal law enforcement agencies. It was this undercover work which Vines indicated brought him into contact on 20 December 1981 with two men, Gary Miller and "Red" Hattaway. After being introduced to Miller and Hattaway, Vines was told that he was "going to be doing some work with them so I could become part of their family."

The next day, Vines met Gamboa while he was sitting with Hattaway at a table in a Pizza Hut. At that time Hattaway told Gamboa that he owed him $120,000; Gamboa said he only owed Hattaway about $30,000. In addition, Hattaway asked Gamboa to tell him what happened to $380,000 worth of drugs that had come into town and for which he had not received any money. Hattaway also asked Gamboa if he had any property which he could sign over in order to help pay back the money he owed. Gamboa said he had two acres of land, a van and a trailer, the titles to which he would sign over to Hattaway.

On the morning of 23 December 1981, Hattaway called Vines and gave him the name which Gamboa was to use in transferring the titles to the various properties. In addition, he told Vines to tell Gamboa to bring the transcript of the trial in which Gamboa and Miller testified. Hattaway told Vines he wanted to read the transcript to determine which of the two men had lied at trial.

Later that day Vines picked up Gamboa at his home and drove to a bar. Hattaway later arrived and the three then left the bar, got into Hattaway's car and drove to the parking lot of another bar where they picked up Miller. At that point, Miller asked Gamboa "why he was telling lies" on him. Gamboa's hands were then taped together and Gamboa was put into the trunk of the car and told he was being taken to Virginia "to talk to the big man." The four men then drove to the Blue Ridge Parkway in two cars, turning off onto an old paved rural road. After driving a short distance they arrived at defendant's house and parked in front of an old blue trailer nearby. Gamboa was let out of the trunk and handcuffed to a tree. Miller and Vines then went to a garage located behind the blue trailer and Hattaway introduced Vines to defendant, Paul Wilson Bare, for the first time.

Later that evening, Vines and Miller went to the tree to which Gamboa was handcuffed, uncuffed him, and the three went to the garage near Bare's home. Still later that evening, after conferring with Miller and Hattaway, Bare told Gamboa that he would have to go to the "big man's house." Bare then left the garage, returning a few minutes later with a white rag or towel. At that point, Bare told Gamboa that he was going to have to blindfold him because he did not want him to know where he lived "even though we are going through the back way, through the fence" presumably to get to the big man's house. Bare put the blindfold on Gamboa. Bare, Gamboa, Miller and Vines then got into a truck which Bare drove.

After driving 10 or 15 minutes, Bare stopped the truck. Vines helped Gamboa out of the truck; Bare then led the group up a little hill of small pines and seedlings. Bare headed for a fence; the group followed. Bare then took Gamboa by the arm and led him through a hole in the fence. Bare motioned to Vines with his shotgun for Vines to follow Gamboa. Just inside the fence Vines stated he saw a huge hole, a mine shaft. Miller motioned to Vines to push Gamboa into the hole. Vines did so but Gamboa did not fall all the way. Bare then told Vines to help Gamboa out of the hole, giving him a six-foot long limb to do so. After Vines helped Gamboa out of the hole, Bare then motioned with his shotgun to Vines for him to shove Gamboa into the hole again. Vines did so. This time Gamboa apparently fell all the way down the hole. Bare then threw the six-foot tree limb into the hole. At that point, Vines testified that the following conversation took place:

A. Then Mr. Bare told us to pick up some rocks, couple of rocks apiece and throw them down the hole to make sure Mr. Gamboa wasn't hung up anywhere in the hole, which Mr. Miller and I did, we each threw two stones about this size.

Q. Is that about eight inches across?

A. Like river rocks, kind of oblong and round.

Q. What happened next?

A. As they went down it sounded like they hit a couple of times and sounded like they hit something that was tin and at that time Mr. Miller turned to Mr.--and said, 'That makes 22.' and Mr. Bare said, 'No, that's 23.'

Bare was found guilty of first-degree kidnapping and first-degree murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation. During the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury found three aggravating circumstances: (1) that defendant had previously been convicted of a felony involving the use of violence to the person; (2) that the capital felony was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping; and (3) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. The jury, however, recommended a life sentence after determining that they could not unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances were sufficiently substantial to call for the imposition of the death penalty. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison for the murder conviction and a concurrent term of forty years for the kidnapping conviction.

A.

We first consider defendant's contention that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing defendant's request for a special instruction to the jury that the testimony of Vines should be examined with great care if the jury found that Vines was testifying in return for special consideration from the police and prosecution. With respect to defendant's request for special instructions, the trial court noted:

Mr. Siskind [defendant's attorney] asked that I instruct the jury as to the effect of witnesses having immunity or quasi-immunity and the court has refused because there is no evidence any witness has immunity from the State of North Carolina; the fact Mr. Vines testified he did not have immunity and could be indicted any time.

Defendant concedes that "[c]learly, the trial court was correct when it said that there had been no evidence of a formal grant of immunity." Accordingly, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1052(c) (1978), which requires the trial court to inform the jury of a grant of immunity and to "instruct the jury as in the case of interested witnesses", is not applicable. 1 However, defendant contends that because Vines had not been arrested or indicted in connection with the incident even though his own testimony indicated that he was guilty of murder, it is "crystal clear that the prosecutor had exercised his discretion under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1054 not to prosecute Vines at least in part upon the understanding that Vines would testify against Bare and others." 2

It is only those special instructions which are supported by the evidence that must be given to the jury. State v. Bock, 288 N.C. 145, 158-59, 217 S.E.2d 513, 522 (1975). The uncontroverted evidence at trial was that there was no "understanding or agreement" not to try Vines for murder or to reduce any charges or to recommend any sentence concessions as provided by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1054(a). Indeed, Vines testified as follows:

Q. Have you ever been promised anything else other than the Witness Protection Program for testimony you are giving here and participation in this case?

A. No sir I have not even been promised to put on Witness Protection; the case is still in Washington and still deciding if they are going to put me under witness protection. Not been promised anything by Mr. Chapman, Ashburn or anything else.

Q. So far as you know if they wanted to charge you today they could?

A. Yes sir.

Q. But they never said they wouldn't charge you, is that correct?

A. No sir, they didn't tell me they would not.

In addition, as the State points out, Thomas L. Chapman, a federal agent, testified with regard to the possible "indictment" of Vines as follows:

Q. Well sir, isn't it true in order to get into the program, if Mr. Ashburn is the man who did it, whoever is in charge, have to first tell the government they will not be indicted for the crime which he was involved?

A. No sir, that is incorrect, he could be put in...

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