State v. Barefield
| Decision Date | 20 April 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 15366-8-I,15366-8-I |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Michael E. BAREFIELD, True Name: George Meskuotis, Appellant. |
Appellant George Meskuotis 1 appeals from the judgment and sentence entered on a jury's verdict finding him guilty of negligent homicide (former RCW 46.61.520). Meskuotis maintains that the trial court erred (1) by admitting evidence of blood alcohol tests without first requiring an adequate foundation, (2) by failing to require jury unanimity regarding the mode of committing the offense, and (3) by admitting into evidence a gruesome photograph of the accident scene. He further contends that the judge should have dismissed his conviction at his sentencing
hearing because, prior to sentencing, he was unlawfully detained in federal penitentiary in violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (the IAD). We affirm.
On July 6, 1979, Meskuotis was involved in a two-car traffic accident on Highway 169 in Maple Valley. The person riding with Meskuotis and the driver of the second car were killed. No one saw the accident. Meskuotis was charged with two counts of negligent homicide.
Testimony at trial showed that the accident had been caused by Meskuotis' Volkswagen pickup. One of the troopers who investigated at the scene of the accident testified that, judging from the tire marks, scuff marks, and gouge marks, the pickup had crossed the center line and had collided with the approaching car, a Volkswagen Rabbit. Another trooper testified that the Volkswagen Rabbit was knocked backwards and lifted up into the air by the Volkswagen pickup.
Meskuotis testified that, at the time of the accident, he was not driving the Volkswagen pickup, but was asleep on the passenger side. However, one of the troopers testified that, on impact, Meskuotis had not been ejected as far as the other person in the Volkswagen pickup. Meskuotis was found approximately 7 feet from the point of impact; the other person was found approximately 47 feet from the point of impact. The trooper concluded, therefore, that Meskuotis was the driver of the Volkswagen pickup because the driver's path, at impact, would have been impeded by the steering wheel and, consequently, the driver would not have been ejected as far as the passenger. Another trooper testified that, judging from the mangled floor pedals on the driver's side of the vehicle, the driver would have experienced serious leg injury. Meskuotis sustained severe lacerations and fractured both ankles. From this evidence it was determined that Meskuotis had been the driver.
Meskuotis admitted that on the day of the accident he had been drinking. At approximately 6:30 p.m. he had When evidence of Meskuotis' blood alcohol level was admitted at trial, defense counsel objected on the following grounds: (1) the officer failed to advise Meskuotis of his right to have additional blood tests; (2) the State failed to show that the test tube was free from adulteration; and (3) no blank test was performed. Defense counsel also objected to admission of a photograph of the accident scene in which the victim in the Volkswagen Rabbit was pictured in the crunched vehicle with blood on his arm. Finally, the defense requested jury instructions requiring unanimity concerning the mode of committing the offense. The request was denied.
stopped at his fellow passenger's house where he had consumed two to three beers as well as two drinks of orange juice mixed with "Everclear", which, according to Meskuotis, is 180 proof grain alcohol. A trooper at the accident scene testified that Meskuotis smelled strongly of alcohol. Blood tests run at the hospital after the accident indicated that Meskuotis' blood alcohol level was .18 grams percent. 2
On December 29, 1979, the jury found Meskuotis guilty of both counts of negligent homicide. However, Meskuotis failed to appear for sentencing, having apparently left the state. On May 17, 1982, he was sentenced by federal officials in Oregon for the federal offense of bank robbery. He was then transported to the United States penitentiary in Pursuant to the IAD Meskuotis was returned to Washington in June 1984 for sentencing on the negligent homicide conviction. On July 10, 1984, he was sentenced on that conviction to two 10-year prison terms to run concurrently with each other but consecutive to the federal sentence. This appeal followed.
Leavenworth, Kansas to serve his federal sentence.
The following sequence of events is pertinent to Meskuotis' claim that he was unlawfully detained in federal penitentiary prior to his sentencing in Washington.
8/10/79 Meskuotis charged with two counts of
negligent homicide under alias "Michael
E. Barefield".
2/22/80 Meskuotis fails to appear for sentencing.
1/4/82 Meskuotis' true identity discovered.
5/17/82 Meskuotis sentenced by federal officials
to 12 years for bank robbery.
6/10/82 Meskuotis arrives at federal penitentiary
in Leavenworth, Kansas.
3/83 Meskuotis writes to attorney who
represented him on federal bank robbery
charges to find out how he could get
transferred to Seattle for sentencing.
4/18/83 Meskuotis informed by the Public Defense
Program Office Coordinator in Seattle that
he would be transferred to Seattle when
his sentence was completed in Leavenworth.
5/4/83 Alix Foster, Meskuotis' former trial
attorney, advises him of his right to
speedy sentencing under the IAD.
5/5/83 Meskuotis requests copy of detainer from
his case manager at Leavenworth. Case
manager does not comply.
and the necessary certificate be forwarded
to Washington. Case manager fails to
comply with Meskuotis' request.
11/83 Foster intervenes with federal authorities
in Leavenworth.
12/20/83 Detainer processed by federal officials.
1/10/84 Detainer forms received by prosecutor's
office in Seattle.
6/14/84 Meskuotis returned to Washington. King
County sentencing hearings scheduled.
Meskuotis requests continuance.
7/10/84 Meskuotis sentenced.
Meskuotis first contends that the trial court erred at his sentencing hearing by denying his motion to dismiss, thereby violating the speedy disposition provision of the IAD, RCW ch. 9.100.
A detainer has been defined as:
[A] request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is imminent.... Detainers generally are based on outstanding criminal charges, outstanding parole or probation violation charges, or additional sentences already imposed against the prisoner.
(Citations omitted.) Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, ----, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 3403, 87 L.Ed.2d 516, 520 (1985).
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is a compact among member states, the United States, the territories The IAD provision at issue in this appeal provides a method for the prisoner to initiate resolution of outstanding charges against him:
and possessions of the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto[735 P.2d 1343] Rico. 3 Cuylerv. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 435 n. 1, 101 S.Ct. 703, 705 n. 1, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981). IAD, Article II(a). Because it is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact, interpretation is a question of federal law. Cuyler, at 442, 101 S.Ct. at 708
Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint....
(Emphasis added.) Article III(a).
By its express terms, the IAD applies only to a detainer based on an "untried indictment, information, or complaint". Article III(a). However, in Tinghitella v. California, 718 F.2d 308 (9th Cir.1983), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals construed the IAD to include sentencing detainers. The court reasoned as follows: First, the term "trial" in the speedy trial clause of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution has been interpreted to include sentencing. Id. at 311 (citing Walsh v. United States, 423 F.2d 687, 688 (9th Cir.1970)). Therefore, the requirement of bringing a prisoner to "trial" within 180 days of the Both the rehabilitative and fair treatment purposes of the IAD would be better effectuated by construing trial to include sentencing. A prisoner with foreknowledge of a time certain for imprisonment in the receiving state (here, California) presumably will more easily undergo rehabilitation than one with knowledge merely of the range of possible sentences. Moreover, treatment of prisoners in the sending...
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