State v. Barksdale
| Decision Date | 24 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Opinion No. 5812,Appellate Case No. 2017-002306 |
| Citation | 433 S.C. 324,857 S.E.2d 557 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The STATE, Appellant, v. Leon LaGwan BARKSDALE, Respondent. |
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of Greenwood, all for Appellant.
Appellate Defender David Alexander, of Columbia, for Respondent.
In this criminal appeal, the State appeals the trial court's suppression of incriminating statements that Leon L. Barksdale made regarding his alcohol consumption prior to a traffic accident. The State argues (1) the record contains no evidence to support the court's ruling that Barksdale was in custody at the time he was questioned regarding his alcohol consumption; (2) the court erred by utilizing an incorrect definition of "custody" as set forth in Miranda v. Arizona1 and its progeny; and (3) the court improperly relied on the subjective intentions and knowledge of the officer that questioned Barksdale rather than the totality of the circumstances. We reverse and remand.
On the evening of October 21, 2013, at approximately 9:15 P.M., Officer Patrick Craven of the Laurens Police Department responded to a traffic accident involving a sedan and a motorcycle. EMS and other officers were already at the scene of the accident when Officer Craven arrived. After learning that the other officers had not yet determined the sedan driver's identity, Officer Craven began asking individuals at the scene who was driving, and Barksdale answered he was the driver. Officer Craven asked Barksdale for his driver's license, car registration, and proof of insurance, and he allowed Barksdale to return to his car for the requested documentation. After Barksdale left to find the documentation, Officer Craven immediately remarked to another officer "I think he has been drinking," "that boy's been drinking," and "he smells like alcohol." Officer Craven then asked another officer to accompany him while he spoke with Barksdale to confirm he smelled alcohol on Barksdale's person.
When Barksdale returned with the requested documentation, Officer Craven asked him, Barksdale did not answer, and Officer Craven repeated the question multiple times. Barksdale then confessed that he had consumed a forty-ounce beer at home before the accident occurred. Following his confession, EMS requested to speak with Barksdale to evaluate his health.
As EMS spoke with Barksdale, Officer Craven found an open, cold, forty-ounce beer bottle near Barksdale's car, which he suspected belonged to Barksdale. The bottle matched an unopen beer found in the passenger compartment of Barksdale's car. At that point, Officer Craven decided to administer field sobriety tests to Barksdale and asked other officers to not "let [Barksdale] walk off." Officer Craven then moved his patrol vehicle to an adjacent gas station parking lot so the dash camera could better capture footage of the field sobriety tests.2 After Officer Craven moved his vehicle, the camera showed Barksdale sitting in the passenger seat of his car speaking with EMS. Officer Craven spoke with EMS, and he asked Barksdale to follow him to the front of his car. Officer Craven informed Barksdale he was not under arrest and asked if he would submit to field sobriety tests. Barksdale agreed to take the tests.
Officer Craven administered five different field sobriety tests. Immediately after concluding the tests, Officer Craven asked Barksdale to rate his current sobriety on a scale of one to ten, with ten being the most inebriated Barksdale had ever been prior to that night. Barksdale responded, Officer Craven then asked Barksdale if he could feel the effects of alcohol, and Barksdale responded "yeah, I can feel that." Officer Craven then placed Barksdale under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol and Mirandized him. Thereafter, Barksdale admitted that the open beer found near his car was his and he threw it out to avoid an open container charge.
The State charged Barksdale with felony driving under the influence, and a jury trial commenced on October 23, 2017. After the jury was empaneled but before trial began, Barksdale objected to the admission of his statements to Officer Craven pertaining to his alcohol consumption. The trial court held a Jackson v. Denno3 hearing during which Officer Craven testified regarding his encounter with Barksdale and the court reviewed Officer Craven's dash camera footage.
During the hearing, Barksdale argued that all statements he made before receiving Miranda warnings should have been suppressed as a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights because he was under custodial interrogation from the outset of Officer Craven's arrival at the scene. Barksdale asserted he was in custody because (1) he was involved in a traffic accident and bound by law to remain at the scene, (2) the nature of the accident scene was not merely a routine traffic stop, (3) Officer Craven instructed other officers not to allow Barksdale to "walk off," (4) the interrogation process was prolonged, (5) Barksdale was immediately identified as a suspect, and (6) EMS and several officers were on the scene.
The State argued Barksdale's incriminating statements were admissible because Officer Craven asked the questions as a routine investigation of a traffic accident. The State also asserted that Barksdale could not have heard Officer Craven instruct the other officers to not let Barksdale leave the scene because EMS was speaking with Barksdale at that time and, therefore, it should not be considered in evaluating the totality of the circumstances.
The trial court suppressed all of Barksdale's pre- Miranda statements made to Officer Craven. The court found that "based upon the totality of the circumstances, it certainly [was] clear ... that as soon as Officer Craven started talking [to Barksdale] he smelled alcohol." The court weighed the fact that Officer Craven never advised Barksdale that he was not in custody. The court noted that (1) once Officer Craven smelled alcohol on Barksdale, he was not "in any position to allow Mr. Barksdale to leave the scene" and (2) several minutes after smelling the alcohol, Officer Craven advised other officers to not let Barksdale leave. In conclusion, the court determined that "at the very outset Officer Craven would not have allowed [Barksdale] to leave" and Miranda warnings were therefore required.
Immediately after the court made its ruling, the State conceded that it no longer had a case against Barksdale and dismissed the charges. This appeal followed.
Did the trial court err in suppressing Barksdale's statements based on a finding that Barksdale was in custody at the time he was questioned regarding his alcohol consumption?
"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only." State v. Jenkins , 412 S.C. 643, 650, 773 S.E.2d 906, 909 (2015). The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
State v. Jackson , 384 S.C. 29, 34, 681 S.E.2d 17, 19 (Ct. App. 2009). This court will not disturb the trial court's admissibility determinations absent a prejudicial abuse of discretion. State v. Adkins , 353 S.C. 312, 326, 577 S.E.2d 460, 468 (Ct. App. 2003). "An abuse of discretion arises from an error of law or a factual conclusion that is without evidentiary support." State v. Irick , 344 S.C. 460, 464, 545 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2001). "Appellate review of whether a person is in custody is confined to a determination of whether the ruling by the trial [court] is supported by the record." State v. Evans , 354 S.C. 579, 583, 582 S.E.2d 407, 409 (2003).
The State argues the trial court erred in suppressing Barksdale's statements pertaining to his alcohol consumption because the court misinterpreted the definition of "custody." Specifically, the State contends the court improperly relied upon Officer Craven's subjective intent and views in determining if Barksdale was in custody at the time he made the incriminating statements. We agree.
We find the trial court's determination that Barksdale was in custody when Officer Craven questioned him regarding his alcohol consumption was based on an error of law. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This constitutional safeguard protects individuals from overzealous police practices and limits the admissibility of incriminating statements, "whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of [a] defendant unless [the prosecution] demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. "A statement obtained as a result of custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the suspect was advised of and voluntarily waived his [constitutional] rights." State v. Miller , 375 S.C. 370, 379, 652 S.E.2d 444, 449 (Ct. App. 2007).
Miranda warnings, the procedural safeguards used to secure the privilege against self-incrimination, are required for official interrogation "only when a suspect ‘has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.’ "
State v. Easler , 327 S.C. 121, 127, 489 S.E.2d 617, 621 (1997), (quoting Miranda , 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602 ), overruled on other grounds by State v. Greene , 423 S.C. 263, 814 S.E.2d 496 (2018). A significant deprivation of freedom "has been interpreted as meaning formal arrest or detention associated with a formal arrest." Id. at 127, 489 S.E.2d at 621 ; see also Howes v. Fields , 565 U.S. 499,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Lowery
...seen the accident, and the defendant made statements "during the course of this routine investigation"); State v. Barksdale , 433 S.C. 324, 335, 857 S.E.2d 557, 562 (Ct. App. 2021) (finding the defendant was not in custody where the police officer responded to the scene of a traffic acciden......
- In re Mendelsohn