State v. Barnes

• Citation: 747 S.E.2d 912
• Decision Date: 17 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. COA13–76.,COA13–76.
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Christopher L. BARNES.
• Court: Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US)

747 S.E.2d 912

STATE of North Carolina

v.Christopher L. BARNES.

No. COA13–76.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Sept. 17, 2013.

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 17 February 2012 by Judge W. Allen Cobb, Jr., in Wayne County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 June 2013.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General Erica Garner, for the State.

Anna S. Lucas, for Defendant.

ERVIN, Judge.

Defendant Christopher L. Barnes appeals from a judgment sentencing him to a term of six to eight months imprisonment based upon his convictions for simple possession of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance in a penal institution or local confinement facility. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the possession of a controlled substance in a local confinement facility on the grounds that the evidence did not support his conviction for committing that offense or, alternatively, that the trial court erred by entering judgment against him based upon both his convictions for possession of a controlled substance in a confinement facility and simple possession of the same controlled substance. After careful consideration of Defendant's challenges to the trial court's judgments in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that, while the trial court correctly denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the possession of a controlled substance in a local confinement facility charge, it erred by entering judgment based on Defendant's convictions for both possession of a controlled substance in a local confinement facility and simple possession of marijuana, so that Defendant's conviction for simple possession of a controlled substance must be vacated and this case must be remanded to the Wayne County Superior Court for resentencing.

I. Factual Background

A. Substantive Facts

At approximately 2:00 a.m. on 21 January 2011, Officer Melvin Smith of the Goldsboro Police Department observed Defendant drive his vehicle onto Ash Street in Goldsboro without operating his headlights. As a result, Officer Smith stopped Defendant's vehicle. Upon approaching Defendant, Officer Smith noticed a strong smell of alcohol about his person. After observing that Defendant's speech was slurred and after hearing Defendant state that he was “not that drunk,” Officer Smith requested that Defendant exit his vehicle and perform certain field sobriety tests. As a result of Defendant's performance on these field sobriety tests, the smell of alcohol about Defendant's person, and Defendant's red and glassy eyes, Officer Smith determined that Defendant was “appreciably impaired” as the result of his consumption of alcohol and arrested him for driving while subject to an impairing substance.

After being placed under arrest, Defendant was handcuffed with his hands behind his back, searched for weapons, and transported to the Wayne County jail. Upon his arrival at the jail, Defendant requested to use the restroom. As part of his attempt to honor Defendant's request, Officer Smith changed the positioning of Defendant's handcuffs so as to place Defendant's hands in front of his body. In addition, Officer Smith placed himself in a position to observe Defendant's effort to use the restroom without seeing his private parts.

While in the restroom, Defendant urinated on himself, accused Officer Smith of being responsible for this mishap, and refused to cooperate with Officer Smith any further. As a result, Officer Smith was required to enlist help from other officers in returning Defendant to the location at which breath samples were taken from individuals who had been placed under arrest for driving while impaired. After Defendant was seated in a chair at that location, a bag containing a substance ultimately determined to be marijuana fell from his pants leg.

B. Procedural Facts

On 3 October 2011, the Wayne County grand jury returned bills of indictment charging Defendant with possession of methylenedioxyamphetamine, possession of the same substance in a penal institution or local confinement facility, ¹ possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, and possession of marijuana in a penal institution or local confinement facility. The charges against Defendant came on for trial before the trial court and a jury at the 13 February 2012 criminal session of the Wayne County Superior Court. At the conclusion of the State's evidence, the trial court dismissed the possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver charge while allowing the jury to consider the issue of Defendant's guilt of the lesser included offense of simple possession of marijuana. On 16 February 2012, the jury returned verdicts convicting Defendant of simple possession of marijuana and possession of marijuana in a penal institution or local confinement facility. On 17 February 2012, the trial court consolidated Defendant's convictions for judgment and sentenced Defendant to a term of six to eight months imprisonment. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's judgment.²

II. Legal Analysis

A. Possession of a Controlled Substance in a Local Confinement Facility Charge

In his initial challenge to the trial court's judgment, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the possession of a controlled substance in a local confinement facility charge. More specifically, Defendant contends that the record evidence was not sufficient to support the jury's decision to convict him of committing this offense given that the record did not contain evidence tending to show that he intended to possess a controlled substance in a local confinement facility. Defendant's contention lacks merit.

1. Standard of Review

In considering whether to grant a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court must determine “ ‘whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged and (2) that defendant is the perpetrator of the offense.’ ” State v. Bradshaw, 366 N.C. 90, 93, 728 S.E.2d 345, 347 (2012) (quoting State v. Lynch, 327 N.C. 210, 215, 393 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1990)). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. In conducting the required analysis, the “trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, drawing all reasonable inferences in the State's favor.” Id. at 92, 728 S.E.2d at 347 (quoting State v. Miller, 363 N.C. 96, 98, 678 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “All evidence, competent or incompetent, must be considered. Any contradictions or conflicts in the evidence are resolved in favor of the State, and evidence unfavorable to the State is not considered.” Id. at 93, 728 S.E.2d at 347. We review the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence using a de novo standard of review. State v. Smith, 186 N.C.App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007).

2. Defendant's Mental State

In his brief, Defendant argues that N.C. Gen.Stat. § 90–95(e)(9), which prescribes the punishment for possession of a controlled substance in a local confinement facility, should not be construed as a strict liability statute and contends that, since the record is devoid of any evidence tending to show that Defendant specifically intended to bring a controlled substance into the jail, his motion to dismiss this charge should have been allowed. Although portions of Defendant's argument reflect a correct understanding of the applicable law, we are unable to agree with his ultimate conclusion that the trial court should have granted his dismissal motion.

The term mens rea refers to “[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime.” Black's Law Dictionary 999 (7th ed.1999). Although culpable or criminal negligence may suffice to support a defendant's conviction for committing a criminal offense in some instances, see State v. Oakman, 191 N.C.App. 796, 800, 663 S.E.2d 453, 457 (noting that “culpable negligence can satisfy the intent requirement for certain crimes”), disc. review denied,362 N.C. 686, 671 S.E.2d 330 (2008), a conviction for committing many, if not most, crimes requires proof that the defendant acted with either general or specific intent. But see, e.g., State v. Jones, 353 N.C. 159, 167, 538 S.E.2d 917, 924 (2000) (stating that “[a]rson, as a ‘malice’ type crime, is neither a specific nor a general intent offense but requires ‘willful and malicious' conduct”) (quoting State v. Vickers, 306 N.C. 90, 100, 291 S.E.2d 599, 606 (1982)). For example, “[f]irst degree murder, which has as an essential element the intention to kill, has been called a specific intent crime ... [while] [s]econd degree murder, which does not have this element, has been called a general intent crime.” State v. Coble, 351 N.C. 448, 449, 527 S.E.2d 45, 47 (2000) (quoting State v. Jones, 339 N.C. 114, 148, 451 S.E.2d 826, 844 (1994), cert. denied,515 U.S. 1169, 115 S.Ct. 2634, 132 L.Ed.2d 873 (1995)) (quotation marks omitted). The difference between these two categories of criminal offenses is that “[s]pecific-intent crimes are crimes which have as an essential element a specific intent that a result be reached,” while “[g]eneral-intent crimes are crimes which only require the doing of some act.” Oakman, 191 N.C.App. at 800, 663 S.E.2d at 457 (quoting State v. Pierce, 346 N.C. 471, 494, 488 S.E.2d 576, 589 (1997)) (citations and internal quotations omitted). A court determines whether a particular criminal offense constitutes a general or specific intent crime by examining the elements which must be proved in order to support a conviction for committing that offense. See, e.g., State v. Mize, 315 N.C. 285, 293, 337 S.E.2d 562, 567 (1985) (stating that “[t]he mens rea or the criminal...