State v. Barnett, (AC 16926)

• Decision Date: 01 June 1999
• Docket Number: (AC 16926)
• Citation: 734 A.2d 991,53 Conn. App. 581
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICKY LEE BARNETT

53 Conn. App. 581

734 A.2d 991

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICKY LEE BARNETT

(AC 16926)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 28, 1998.

Officially released June 1, 1999.

Spear, Hennessy and Daly, JS. Robert J. McKay, special public defender, with whom, on the brief, was Gregory A. Thompson, for the appellant (defendant).

James M. Ralls, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James Thomas, state's attorney, and Kevin Murphy, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

HENNESSY, J.

The defendant, Ricky Lee Barnett, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of rioting in a correctional institution in violation of General Statutes § 53a-179b, possession of a weapon or dangerous instrument in a correctional institution in violation of General Statutes § 53a-174a, assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1) and (4), and § 53a-8, and assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-60 (a) (1) and 53a-8. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly denied his motions for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial because (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of rioting in a correctional institution, assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree, (2) the state improperly charged him as both a principal and an accessory to the first degree assault and the court improperly instructed the jury that he could be convicted as both, (3) the state committed prosecutorial misconduct, (4) the trial court improperly deprived him of his right to have the trier of fact decide factual issues by holding that there were dangerous instruments at or near dormitory 4B on the date of the incident, (5) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the second degree assault charge, (6) his conviction of assault in the first degree of John Bratz, another inmate, under both subdivisions (1) and (4) of § 53a-59 (a) were multiple punishments for the same offense and violated his right against double jeopardy under the United States and the Connecticut constitutions, and (7) the trial court improperly admitted into evidence a list of inmates inside dormitory 4B after the riot. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In July, 1994, the defendant was housed in building four, dormitory B (dorm 4B) of the Carl Robinson Correctional Institution in Enfield. Building four is one of six buildings considered minimum to medium security and, like all six buildings, is divided into an A side and a B side. Each side has bathrooms, a dayroom, a telephone area, windows and two entrances. Each side houses approximately eighty-five inmates. The inmates have access to an outside area where they can interact freely.

On July 12, 1994, at approximately 5:45 p.m., two opposing groups of inmates lined up in the outside area and began attacking each other with makeshift weapons. Initially, the inmates were attacking only opposing gang members; however, the attacks spread to nongang members on the basis of where they were from and whether they were homosexuals. Most of the inmates wore cloth masks or T-shirts covering their faces. Correction officers in dorm 4 locked the outside doors. Shortly thereafter, inmates started to smash the windows and climb inside in search of other inmates. The officers from dorm 4 and an inmate locked themselves in a bathroom.

The defendant was outside at the start of the riot. Shortly thereafter, the defendant and others broke the windows and climbed into dorm 4B through the broken windows. The defendant was seen carrying various makeshift weapons. He was also seen pointing out to other inmates those who were either homosexual or not from Hartford. The defendant and about six other inmates were seen near Richard Mann in the back of the dorm where Mann was stabbed to death.

The defendant pointed out to one inmate, who was known as Hammer, another inmate, Kenneth Henton, as being from Bridgeport. Hammer hit Henton on the head with a pipe and Henton was knocked unconscious. The correction officers in the bathroom heard the inmates beating up Henton. When the correction officers left the bathroom, they saw Henton lying on the floor in a pool of blood. Henton initially was placed in the medical unit at the correction facility and he was later transferred to the hospital. Henton regained consciousness in the hospital. He had four missing teeth, two stab wounds in his thumb and had been stabbed in his eye and ear.

The defendant and a group of inmates surrounded another inmate, John Bratz, and began attacking him. During the attack, the defendant hit Bratz with what appeared to be a metal vacuum cleaner pipe. During the attack, Bratz sustained multiple stab wounds to his arm, his teeth were knocked loose and his head was split open. He also had wounds to his head, shoulders and upper body. He lost a considerable amount of blood. Bratz was carried to the medical unit and lost consciousness several times due to the pain. Bratz went into shock and was admitted to a hospital where he underwent surgery.

During the incident, approximately 300 inmates were armed. Small fires blazed and doors and windows were damaged and broken. The approximately fifty correction officers were unarmed and outnumbered and focused their efforts on retrieving staff from the dorms until reinforcements from the state police and correctional emergency response team arrived. Order was not restored in the facility until after 11 p.m. Other facts will be discussed where relevant to the issues on appeal.

I

The defendant first claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of rioting in a correctional institution, assault in the first degree and assault in the second degree. "The standard of review employed in a sufficiency of the evidence claim is well settled. [W]e apply a two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [trier of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.... State v. James, 237 Conn. 390, 435, 678 A.2d 1338 (1996)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Crespo, 246 Conn. 665, 670, 718 A.2d 925 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1125, 119 S. Ct. 911, 142 L. Ed. 2d 909 (1999).

"As we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt... nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been found credible by the [trier of fact], would have resulted in an acquittal.... On appeal, we do not ask whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that supports the [trier's] verdict of guilty." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 671.

A

The defendant first claims that the evidence presented was insufficient to support his conviction of rioting in a correctional institution in violation of § 53a-179b¹ because the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "did incite, instigate, cause, aid, abet, assist and take part in a disorder, disturbance or riot." We decline to review this claim.

"We are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief.... Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Raymond v. Rock Acquisition Ltd. Partnership, 50 Conn. App. 411, 420, 717 A.2d 824 (1998); see also State v. Leary, 51 Conn. App. 497, 499, 725 A.2d 328 (1999); Blakeney v. Commissioner of Correction, 47 Conn. App. 568, 586, 706 A.2d 989, cert. denied, 244 Conn. 913, 713 A.2d 830 (1998). "Where a claim is asserted in the statement of issues but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive discussion or citation of authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cummings v. Twin Tool Mfg. Co., 40 Conn. App. 36, 45, 668 A.2d 1346 (1996). In his brief, the defendant sets out this claim, the relevant facts, the reviewability, and the standard of review; however, he does not provide this court with any citation to legal authority. In fact, he did not provide this court with any legal analysis of this issue. Accordingly, we decline to review this claim.

B

The defendant next claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59 (a) (1) and (4)² and § 53a-8³ against Bratz. We disagree.

It should be noted that, in this case, the defendant was charged with assault against Bratz as an accessory, and, therefore, the state did not need to prove that the defendant actually caused serious physical injury to Bratz. It is enough for the state to prove that the defendant, acting with the intent to cause serious injury to Bratz, solicited, requested, commanded, importuned or intentionally aided another person to cause serious physical injury to Bratz by means of a dangerous weapon. See General Statutes §§ 53a-59 and 53a-8.

The defendant first argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he caused the injury to Bratz. Specifically, the defendant argues that there was no evidence introduced that he caused the injury to Bratz. The defendant further argues that, with regard to his culpability as an accessory, there was insufficient evidence that he intended to aid the principal and that he intended to commit the offense...