State v. Barrett

• Decision Date: 10 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 255A93,255A93
• Citation: 469 S.E.2d 888,343 N.C. 164
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Jeffrey Lee BARRETT.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 888

469 S.E.2d 888

343 N.C. 164

STATE of North Carolina v. Jeffrey Lee BARRETT.

No. 255A93.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

May 10, 1996.

Michael F. Easley, Attorney General by Ellen B. Scouten, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.

Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender by Staples Hughes, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.

FRYE, Justice.

Defendant, Jeffrey Lee Barrett, was indicted for two counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery with a dangerous weapon [hereinafter armed robbery]. He was tried capitally. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts of first-degree murder based on theories of premeditation and deliberation and felony murder. Defendant was also found guilty of the felony of armed robbery.

After a capital sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, the jury recommended death for both first-degree murder convictions. As to both first-degree murder convictions, the jury found as aggravating circumstances that the murders were committed for pecuniary gain and that each murder was part of a course of conduct of other crimes of violence against another person. No juror found any mitigating circumstances. The trial judge arrested judgment as to the armed robbery conviction and, in accordance with the jury recommendation, imposed sentences of death for each of the murder convictions.

Defendant makes thirteen arguments on appeal to this Court. We reject each of these arguments and conclude that defendant's trial and capital sentencing proceeding were free of prejudicial error and that the death sentences are not disproportionate. Accordingly, we uphold defendant's convictions for first-degree murder and sentences of death.

The State's evidence at trial tended to show the following facts and circumstances: On 5 August 1989, defendant offered to sell Mitchell Turner a kilogram of cocaine for $17,000. The going price for this amount of cocaine was between $27,000 and $30,000. The men decided to exchange the cocaine for the money on 6 August 1989 at Turner's Auto Sales (the car lot), a business owned by Lawrence Turner, father of the victims Mitchell and Michael Turner. On the way to meet defendant, Mitchell picked up McGarrett Clanton, told him of the deal, and stated that he wanted Clanton to come along so that he could "cook the cocaine" to determine if it was real.

Mitchell and Clanton met defendant and two other men, who were described by witnesses as a tall man and an older man, at the car lot. Defendant and his companions arrived in a red T-1000 Pontiac automobile. The men decided to go inside to transact their business. Defendant asked where the money was, and Mitchell informed him that his brother Michael would be bringing it later. Once inside, defendant stated that he was uncomfortable and asked Mitchell to go with him to the woods to make the deal. Mitchell suggested that they go to the house of Ella Williams (Mitchell's girlfriend). Mitchell then called his brother Michael with instructions to meet them at Williams' house with the money.

Defendant and his companions travelled in the red Pontiac, while Clanton and Mitchell took Mitchell's Chevy Blazer truck. After arriving at Williams' house, defendant and Mitchell went into the bedroom, while Clanton and the other two men waited in the living room. After two or three minutes, Mitchell and defendant left the bedroom and exited the house through the back door. After a while, Mitchell and defendant reentered the house, and all of the men left the house. Mitchell and defendant did not transact the deal at Williams' house and returned to the car lot. As they drove back to the car lot, Mitchell told Clanton that defendant was trying to fool them. Mitchell again phoned Michael and made him aware of the change in plans.

When defendant and his companions drove into the car lot, defendant parked the Pontiac automobile so that it was facing the street. The men then entered the office. Not long after they were in the office, Michael arrived in a burgundy van. Once inside, Mitchell decided they needed to buy some baking soda, an ingredient needed to test the cocaine. Defendant suggested that he and the tall man accompany Clanton and Michael to purchase the baking soda, leaving Mitchell and the older man in the car lot office. Defendant, Clanton, Michael, and the tall man After purchasing the baking soda and a beer, defendant, the tall man, Clanton, and Michael headed back towards the car lot. Defendant asked Michael, who was driving, to turn off the road. Michael refused to do so. As they approached the car lot, defendant requested that Michael continue past the car lot. Ignoring defendant's request, Michael turned into the car lot and parked the van so that it faced the office door.

travelled in the burgundy van to Brookhaven Shop and Wash, a store located approximately a mile and [343 N.C. 171] a half from the car lot. As they drove to the store, Clanton noticed a clear plastic bag containing money between the front seats of the van.

Defendant exited the van first and proceeded to the front of the van, while the tall man went to the passenger side of the Pontiac T-1000 automobile. Michael grabbed the clear plastic bag containing money, and he and Clanton exited the van. Michael and Clanton noticed a white powder on the ground outside the office door. The powder had not been there before they left, and Clanton told Michael that something was wrong. Defendant approached Clanton and Michael and attempted to put his arms around them. He asked Michael to drive him down the road, and Michael again refused. Clanton backed away while Michael took out his key and approached the office. Michael was standing very close to defendant. Clanton turned around and started running away from the car lot. The tall man pursued Clanton. Clanton heard a shot, and when he turned around noticed that the tall man had stopped chasing him. Shortly thereafter, Clanton saw the Pontiac automobile leaving the car lot.

Clanton ran to the house of Clifford Joyner and requested a ride to Turner's Grocery, another business owned by the victims' family. Upon arriving at the grocery store, Clanton told Randy Turner, a brother of the victims, and Mr. and Mrs. Turner, the victims' parents, that he thought Mitchell and Michael were dead. Randy and Mrs. Turner travelled to the car lot where they found the bodies of Michael and Mitchell. Michael was outside of the office with his back against the open screen door, and Mitchell was lying on the floor inside the office. The police, dispatched because of a report of gunfire, arrived while the family was in the office.

When the police entered the office, they found two packages wrapped in duct tape and containing a powdery white substance. One package had been cut open. The substance was found on the floor under Mitchell's body and on the desk. Laboratory tests revealed that the white powdery substance found on the floor and in packages in the office was starch, not cocaine. Police also discovered an electric frying pan with a liquid in it and a bag from a video rental store in Richmond, Virginia. The bag contained a roll of duct tape and a package of baking soda. Another bag containing a package of baking soda and a beer was found in the burgundy van.

Autopsies revealed that both victims died of gunshot wounds. Michael was shot once in the head, and Mitchell was shot twice, once in the back and once in the lower abdominal region. Michael's wound to the head and Mitchell's wound to the abdomen were made with the gun placed firmly against their skin, while the shot to Mitchell's back was made while Mitchell was bent over. It was not possible to determine which of Mitchell's wounds was inflicted first. The differences in the areas around the two contact wounds, the one to Mitchell's abdomen and the one to Michael's head, suggested that the wounds were caused by different guns.

Defendant did not testify and presented no evidence during the guilt/innocence phase of his trial. Defendant's motion to dismiss, made at the close of the evidence and renewed after the jury verdicts were announced, was denied by the trial court.

As defendant's first argument, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to convict him of the first-degree murders of Mitchell and Michael Turner. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury and to support jury verdicts finding defendant guilty on both counts of murder in the first degree.

On a defendant's motion for dismissal on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court must determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense. State v. Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 236, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991). What constitutes substantial evidence is a question of law for the court. Id. To be "substantial," evidence must be existing and real, not just "seeming or imaginary." State v. Earnhardt, 307 N.C. 62, 66, 296 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1982). Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Vause, 328 N.C. at 236, 400 S.E.2d at 61. "If there is substantial evidence--whether direct, circumstantial, or both--to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied." State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 382-83 (1988).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference and intendment that can be drawn therefrom. State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 99, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980). The determination of the witnesses'...