State v. Barth

• Decision Date: 06 July 1886
• Parties: STATE v. BARTH.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

25 S.C. 175

STATE v. BARTH.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

July 6, 1886

The defendant, in his trial for murder, having introduced testimony of his good character, the Circuit Judge erred in charging the jury that the law limits the effect of good character to doubtful cases, and that only in such cases is it available.

Before COTHRAN, J., Berkeley, October, 1885.

Upon the only point decided by the court, the opinion fully states the case.

Messrs. Mitchell & Smith , for appellant.

Mr. Solicitor Jervey , contra.

OPINION

MR JUSTICE MCGOWAN.

The defendant was tried at the October term of the court for Berkeley County, for the murder of one James Hutchinson. The principal defence was that the killing was in self-defence but he was found guilty of manslaughter, with a recommendation to mercy, and sentenced to five years in the penitentiary. His counsel made a motion for a new trial, and that being refused, he appeals to this court upon the following grounds:

1. " That his honor erred in charging that the good character of the accused was not a fact like all other facts proved in the case, to be weighed and estimated by the jury but that its value was limited to doubtful cases; whereas he should have charged the jury that the good character of the accused is a fact fit like all other facts proved in the case to be weighed and estimated by the jury, and its value is not to be limited to doubtful cases.

2. " That his honor erred in refusing to grant a new trial, when it appeared that there was an improper and illegal influence brought to bear on one of the jurors, to the prejudice of the defendant, by a constable in charge of the said juror, attending to a call of nature, as set forth in the affidavits of R. J. Magill and George F. Haselden.

3. " That his honor should have granted a new trial, it appearing that an impartial trial was impaired by the clothing of the deceased being carried into the jury room during their deliberations, and examined by them, or some of them, without the order of the court or consent of counsel for the prisoner.

4. " That on the motion for a new trial, his honor erred in excluding from consideration the affidavit of George Coleman, one of the jurors empannelled in the case," & c.

As to the first exception. There was uncontradicted testimony as to the good character of the defendant-that he was not given to seek quarrels, and was " " peaceable and quiet." The court was requested to charge, " That the good character of the accused is a fact fit like all other facts proved in the case to be weighed and estimated by the jury, and its value is not to be limited to doubtful cases; on the contrary, it may create a reasonable doubt as to evidence, which might otherwise appear conclusive; and such also is the effect of the bad character of the deceased." This request was refused, and instead thereof the court charged as follows: " That request involves the consideration of what appears to be a solecism of law, or rather I should say a paradox. You have heard in every case you have sat upon, that the defendant was entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt; now, here is a request which says that the good character of the accused is a fact, like all other facts proved in the case, to be weighed and estimated by the jury, and its value is not to be limited to doubtful cases. The law does limit it to doubtful cases. That is the only class of cases in which good character is available; yet it looks paradoxical to say that a man would need the benefit of a good character in a doubtful case. Now, what does it mean? It is not a paradox when properly understood. Good character is not of any avail as against positive proof. If it were allowed to raise a doubt in the minds of the jury, it would be tantamount to saying to a man, you may go and commit one crime, and, your character up to that time being good, the value of that character will raise such a doubt in the minds of the jury that you can be acquitted. That won't do. That would be licensing every one and any one in the community to commit one crime. What does it mean, then? It means this, and I can make it clearer by an illustration than by a definition. *** Character is valuable in law, valuable in society, it is valuable everywhere, but only in doubtful cases; that is, as to the motive with which a thing is done," & c.

Was this error of law on the part of the judge? The law is tender to the life and liberty of the citizen. It declares that no man shall be convicted of crime unless the proof is clear " beyond a reasonable doubt," and, certainly when a felony is charged, it also gives the accused the privilege of proving his general good character; that is to say, a character inconsistent with the crime charged. In these rules of evidence we see no necessary paradox; there is between them no conflict or inconsistency, unless we limit the rule as to good character to doubtful cases. In that view it would seem that this rule is at least superfluous, for in a doubtful case the party is entitled to be acquitted under the general rule as to doubt, without any aid from that as to character. But does the law absolutely limit the rule as to good character to doubtful cases? If so, such evidence is made dependent, not on any established principle, but on what may be the facts of a particular case, without having the means of deciding in advance to which category, as being clear or " " doubtful," it may belong. As we understand, it is the privilege of the accused, in all cases where character is admissible, to put in evidence his good character without regard to the other proofs in the case, and it is for the jury to consider it in connection with the other evidence, and determine what force and effect it should have.

It may be true generally that evidence of good character should have more weight in doubtful cases of a particular character; and we think some confusion upon the subject has...