State v. Bartlett

• Decision Date: 01 January 1849
• Citation: 30 Me. 132
• Parties: THE STATE v. ANSON BARTLETT & al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

30 Me. 132

THE STATE v. ANSON BARTLETT & al.

Maine Supreme Judicial Court

January 1, 1849

In a charge for a conspiracy, if the act to be done is in itself illegal, the indictment need not set forth the means by which it was to be accomplished.

If the act to be done is not in itself unlawful, but becomes so from the purposes for which, and the means by which, it is to be done, the indictment must set out enough to show the illegality.

The crime of conspiracy to obstruct and injure the administration of public justice consists in the unlawful purpose.

An indictment, charging a conspiracy to hinder and injure the administration of public justice, by obtaining a counterfeit bill from the hands of a person to whom it had been uttered, so that it could not be had as evidence upon a criminal prosecution, is sufficient. It need not allege the means to be used, nor that the bill was in the hands of the person named, nor need the bill be described, nor need it be alleged, that the defendants knew that it had been uttered wilfully.

THIS was an indictment against defendants for a conspiracy.

The defendants contended that the second count was insufficient in law.

1. Because it does not particularly set forth the means intended to be employed by the defendants, and show that those means were illegal and criminal.

2. Because it does not set forth specifically the object, purpose and intentions of the alleged conspiracy, and show that such objects constituted crime, in law.

3. Because said indictment does not set forth any certain description of crime, and does not state the facts by which any crime is constituted.

4. Because the conspiracy, as charged, is not to do an illegal act in itself; and the object to be effected thereby and the means to be employed to effect it, are not sufficiently set forth.

5. Because it does not set forth that said "counterfeit bank bill," was in the hands, possession, or under the control of said Gilmore, or that said Gilmore in fact had such bill or any right to it.

6. Because it does not sufficiently set forth and describe said bill.

7. Because said count does not set forth, that said Fish knew that the bill was not true and was false and counterfeit, or that said Bartlett and Hewett knew that said Fish had so uttered said bill, or that it was false and counterfeit.

But the Court overruled the objections, and ruled that the indictment was sufficient, to which rulings the said defendants excepted.

Morrill and Bradbury, for defendants.

The charge is of a conspiracy to hinder, obstruct and injure the administration of public justice.

The inquiry is, when may an individual be said to do an "illegal act," "injurious to the administration of public justice?"

1. "The act," must in and of itself, be "illegal," independent of, and without respect "to, the administration of public justice." The act must be shown to be unlawful; malum prohibitum or malum in se.

2. It must be injurious to the "administration of public justice."

3. In order to "injure the administration of public justice," "public justice" must be in the act or condition, of being administered. The term implies doing, and not a state, a procedure, the act of administering.

The indictment is insufficient in this: — 1. It does not allege or charge that "any illegal act," was done, nor an "intent to do an illegal act," for any purpose. 2. Nor does it allege that public justice was being administered, that there were, or were to be, any judicial proceedings. Nor does it appear, or is it possible to conceive how "the administration of public justice," was to be injured and obstructed by the attempt to obtain the bill.

The rule is, when the acts set out are not of themselves necessarily unlawful, but become so by their peculiar relations or circumstances, all the matters must be set forth in which its illegality consists. 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 189; The People v. Eckford, 7 Cowen, 535; Lambert v. The People, 9 Cowen, 578; Law Reporter, April No.; 4 Wend. 229.

It is not even charged that Gilmore had such bill in his possession. Whether what is alleged they conspired to do, be unlawful, depends upon the means used, or the objects aimed at.

It is not charged that they resorted to any "illegal acts," or used any improper means, to effect the purpose, or that in fact any act was done to obtain the bill. It is a charge for conspiracy "to obtain," not for obtaining. They conspired to obtain, but never did obtain.

The bill is not sufficiently described. 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 142.

Tallman, Attorney General, for the State.

TENNEY, J. — The persons against whom the verdict was rendered, with John C. Fish, who was acquitted, were charged in the second count in the indictment, with unlawfully conspiring, combining, confederating and agreeing together, deceitfully and fraudulently to obtain from Arza Gilmore and to get into their possession, a certain false, forged and counterfeit bank bill, which the said John C. Fish had before that time uttered and tendered in payment as true to the said Gilmore, with the fraudulent intent, wrongfully and wickedly to hinder, obstruct and injure the administration of public justice, against the peace of the State, and contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided. The statute relied upon in support of this indictment, is c. 161, § 11, which...