State v. Bartlett, 17060
| Citation | 355 S.E.2d 913,177 W.Va. 663 |
| Decision Date | 01 April 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 17060,17060 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of West Virginia v. James L. BARTLETT, II. |
Syllabus by the Court
1. " Syl. pt. 4, State v. Johnson, 157 W.Va. 341, 201 S.E.2d 309 (1973).
2. A term which is widely used and which is readily comprehensible to the average person without further definition or refinement need not have a defining instruction.
3. In a prosecution under W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(a) [1983], the prosecution need not put on medical or scientific evidence of a causal link between the accused's intoxication and the accident in which the accused was involved. The jury may infer such a causal link once it has been shown that the driver was intoxicated, that the vehicle was driven in a negligent manner, and that an accident occurred.
4. Syl. pt. 5, State v. Cobbs, 40 W.Va. 718, 22 S.E. 310, overruled on other grounds, State v. Chaney, 117 W.Va. 605, 186 S.E. 607 (1936).
5. "Appellate review of a claim of inconsistent verdicts is not generally available." State v. Hall, --- W.Va. ---, 328 S.E.2d 206 (1985).
6. " 'A criminal case will not be reversed unless the record shows error committed, prejudicial to the prisoner.' Syl. pt. 1, State v. Lane 44 W.Va. 730, 29 S.E.1020 (1898). "Syl., State v. Lane, 168 W.Va. 490, 285 S.E.2d 138 (1981).
Harry G. Deitzler, P.A., Parkersburg, for appellee.
William E. Kiger, Parkersburg, for appellant.
On the evening of 30 April 1984, the petitioner, James L. Bartlett, II, and his friends Stephanie Spindle and Laurine Tuell, became intoxicated at the home of Gerald L. Bartlett. At about 1:15 a.m. on 1 May 1984, while returning from Gerald Bartlett's home, petitioner drove his pickup truck into a telephone pole on East Street in Parkersburg. Stephanie Spindle was killed as a result of the collision. Petitioner was indicted on counts of speeding, reckless driving, driving under the influence of alcohol, involuntary manslaughter, and violations of W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(a) [1983] and W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(b) [1983], respectively the felony and misdemeanor provisions relating to the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol, which is a contributing cause of a fatality. 1
Petitioner was tried in the Circuit Court of Wood County. Petitioner contended that he was run off the road by an on-coming vehicle and that he skidded on gravel and sand on the berm. The State introduced evidence that defendant was speeding and that defendant was not run off the road. The State's case was based on the contention that the speeding was the cause of the accident.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of violating W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(a) [1983]. On appeal, petitioner raises numerous counts of error, each of which we find without merit. We therefore affirm.
Petitioner contends initially that the trial court erred in failing to include in its jury charge defendant's proposed Instruction No. 5, which provided:
The driver of a motor vehicle is not liable either criminally or in a civil suit for unavoidable or inevitable accidents. The mere fact that an accident occurs which results in personal injury, death or property damage does not warrant a conviction of a criminal offense unless it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the injury or death was caused by the driver's reckless disregard of the safety of others. An unavoidable or inevitable accident is such an occurrence or happening as, under all the facts in circumstances, could not have been foreseen or anticipated in exercise of ordinary care as the proximate cause of the injury or death. In other words, where the accident did not occur as the result of the driver's reckless disregard of the safety of others and he could not have anticipated or foreseen the resulting accident, the accident is deemed to have been an unavoidable or inevitable accident for which no criminal liability attaches.
Therefore, if the jury and each member of the jury believe to even the slightest degree that the accident in which STEPHANIE SPINDLE was killed was unavoidable or inevitable and was not the result of the Defendant's reckless disregard of the safety of STEPHANIE SPINDLE then you may not convict the Defendant of the offenses charged in either COUNT ONE or COUNT TWO of the indictment.
The petitioner similarly contends that the trial court erred in excluding from its jury charge defendant's proposed Instruction No. 2 regarding the definition of the term "contributing cause", which provided:
The indictment in this case charges that the Defendant, at the time of the accident in which it is alleged that STEPHANIE SPINDLE was killed occurred, was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and that this was a contributing cause to the death of STEPHANIE SPINDLE. Before the jury may return a verdict of guilty as to either COUNT ONE or COUNT TWO of the indictment, the jury, and each member of the jury, must believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident and that this was a contributing cause to the death of STEPHANIE SPINDLE.
The term contributing cause means that the Defendant's operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol lead to and was one of the precipitating causes for the accident occurring. If the jury, and each member of the jury, believe that the accident would have occurred and the death of STEPHANIE SPINDLE would have occurred in spite of the Defendant having operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol then the jury should not find that the Defendant's operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol was a contributing cause to the accident in which STEPHANIE SPINDLE was killed.
The definition of contributing cause given by the trial court provided:
The term contributing cause as used in these instructions means that the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol was one of the precipitating causes of the accident occurring and the resultant death of Stephanie Spindle.
The "unavoidable or inevitable accident" instruction was not an instruction the trial court was required to give. Saying that the accident was unavoidable or inevitable is merely another way of saying that the petitioner's misconduct was neither a proximate nor a contributing cause of the accident. The court instructed the jurors that, in order to convict the petitioner under W.Va.Code, 17C-5-2(a) [1983], they must find both that: (1) Mr. Bartlett's driving at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent under the circumstances proximately caused Stephanie Spindle's death; and, (2) Mr. Bartlett's intoxication was a contributing cause of Ms. Spindle's death.
Petitioner sought to prove a lack of causation by eliciting testimony regarding the presence of sand and gravel on the shoulder of the road and the proximity of the telephone pole to the edge of the road. Petitioner also offered testimony that he was run off the road by another vehicle. However, this testimony was contradicted by testimony offered by the State, and the jury was entitled to draw its own conclusions based on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. In any event, the jury was clearly aware that the petitioner was seeking through this evidence to negate the element of causation. Counsel for the defense was permitted to argue extensively during closing statements that the accident would have occurred even had Mr. Bartlett not been intoxicated, and that, therefore, his intoxication could not have been a contributing cause of the death of Stephanie Spindle. Although the court was required to instruct the jury regarding every material element of the offense, State v. Parks, 161 W.Va. 511, 243 S.E.2d 848 (1978), the court was not required to paraphrase and recast an instruction that adequately set forth the causation requirements. As we held at Syl. pt. 4 of State v. Johnson, 157 W.Va. 341, 201 S.E.2d 309 (1973):
Syl. pt. 4, State v. Bingham, 42 W.Va. 234, 24 S.E. 883 (1896).
We find that the jury charge adequately set forth and defined the requirements of proximate and contributing causation. We therefore hold that the court did not err in refusing defendant's Instructions Nos. 2 and 5.
Petitioner also contends that the trial court erred in failing to include in its jury charge his proposed Instruction No. 1 defining the term "reckless disregard for the safety of others." This proposed instruction provided:
The indictment in this case is charges of the Defendant acted, or failed to act, in reckless disregard for the safety of others when he was operating a motor vehicle on East Street in the City of Parkersburg, Wood County, West Virginia, during the early morning hours of May 1, 1984. In order for the jury to return a verdict of guilty as to the charges contained in COUNT ONE or COUNT TWO of the indictment the jury and each member of...
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