State v. Bashaw
Decision Date | 15 November 1983 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent on review, v. Daniel Lewis BASHAW, Petitioner on review. CA A26802; SC 29804; CA A26803. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
John Daugirda, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for petitioner on review. With him on the petition and brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.
Thomas H. Denney, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent on review. On the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Atty. Gen., William F. Gary, Sol. Gen., and Linda Acaldo, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem.
Defendant seeks reversal of his convictions for first degree rape and attempted rape in the first degree, ORS 163.375, contending that the trial court erred by refusing to give the following instruction:
The state alleged that the defendant raped a 12-year-old child and attempted to rape an 11-year-old child. Considerable testimony flowed back and forth during the trial regarding the credibility of the victims. The defendant was able to present the testimony of several witnesses who impeached the children on certain points and several witnesses who offered damaging character testimony about the children. Further, the defendant also took the stand and categorically denied the rape and attempted rape allegations.
The instruction requested by the defendant should never be given in any rape case. Such an instruction may imply to a jury that the court is expressing reservations about the credibility of the alleged victim. It is the jury that is charged with the duty to weigh and evaluate the credibility of all witnesses. The court should refrain from issuing any instruction that diminishes this responsibility or promotes judicial intervention in an area traditionally reserved for the jury. State v. Mains, 295 Or. 640, 669 P.2d 1112 (1983).
The requested instruction quoted above was given apparent approval by the Court of Appeals in State v. Stocker, 11 Or.App. 617, 619, 503 P.2d 501 (1972), rev. den. (1973). 1 It was spawned in Oregon over 70 years ago in State v. Friddles, 62 Or. 209, 210, 123 P. 904 (1912). Justice Henry J. Bean, writing for the court, said, "The charge of rape is one which, as Lord Hale observes, is 'an accusation easily to be made, hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused though never so innocent.' "
We do not know what made Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale 2 an authority on defense against rape for his day, but his comment does not reflect contemporary thought or experience. His comment reflects a view of the rape victim and the crime of rape which simply is not borne out. The jury instruction which arose from this view assumes that the charge of rape is easily made. In fact, quite the opposite is true. Rape is one of the most under-reported crimes. 3 The crime is one of degradation as well as violence, and fear of reprisal and embarrassment contributes to the victim's hesitation to report it. Those who do report it must confront the trauma of the encounter with the police, the investigation of the crime and the ordeal of trial. 4
The instruction also states that the charge of rape is more difficult to defend against than other crimes. Once again, statistics throw doubt upon this assumption underlying the instruction:
(Footnotes omitted.) Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 Colum.L.Rev. 1, 6 (1977). 5
In short, we find no reason to continue the institutional assumption that alleged rape victims are less trustworthy witnesses than other victims of crime. 6 We note that we are among a growing number of jurisdictions that have jettisoned the cautionary instruction. See, Arabian, The Cautionary Instruction in Sex Cases: A Lingering Insult, 10 S.W.U.L.Rev. 585 (1978).
We do not say a trial court may never approve a cautionary instruction involving a witness. The interest of justice may require an appropriate instruction in a special situation. 7 But, this is not such a case. A witness should not be cloaked with a judicially implied credibility taint simply because the witness claims to be the victim of a rape. We hold the trial court was correct in refusing to give the requested instruction.
The Court of Appeals, 667 P.2d 581, is affirmed.
1 In three post-Stocker cases, the Court of Appeals has ruled there was no abuse of discretion in failing to give a similar cautionary instruction. See, State v. Romel, 57 Or.App. 372, 377-78, 644 P.2d 643 (1982); State v. Blake, 53 Or.App. 906, 909, 633 P.2d 831 (1981), rev. dismissed 292 Or. 486, 640 P.2d 605 (1982); State v. Harwood, 45 Or.App. 931, 609 P.2d 1312, rev. den. 289 Or. 337 (1980). In Harwood, the Court of Appeals held:
Harwood, 45 Or.App. at 941, 609 P.2d 1312.
Rather than give the Stocker instruction, the trial judge in the present case gave a standard credibility instruction as follows:
3 Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 Colum.L.Rev. 1, 5 (1977) citing Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports for the United States (1974). Berger notes that
4 Police treatment of the rape victim, often unsympathetic, has been documented in Galton,...
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TABLE OF CASES
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