State v. Baudhuin
| Decision Date | 10 December 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-1391-CR,86-1391-CR |
| Citation | 141 Wis.2d 642,416 N.W.2d 60 |
| Parties | STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. James H. BAUDHUIN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Barry M. Levenson, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, for the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner; Donald J. Hanaway, Atty. Gen., on brief.
Randall J. Nesbitt, Sturgeon Bay, argued, for defendant-appellant; Pinkert, Smith Weir & Jinkins, Sturgeon Bay, on brief.
The issue in this case is whether the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 1 prohibit the police from seizing, without a warrant, an automobile and its occupants when there is a factual basis upon which to stop the driver for a traffic violation, but when the police officer intends only to render assistance to the driver and not to issue a traffic citation.
The defendant, James Baudhuin, was charged in a criminal complaint dated November 14, 1985, with third offense drunken driving arising out of a traffic arrest on October 26, 1985. Baudhuin moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that the arrest was illegal. He alleged that at the time of the stop the officer had neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to believe that a violation of the law had occurred.
The defendant's motion to dismiss was heard in the Door county circuit court before the Honorable Edwin C. Stephan. Judge Stephan denied the motion, stating in a written order:
Following a trial to the court, Baudhuin was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant. He was fined $1,000 plus costs and sentenced to 30 days in jail. His driving privileges were revoked for 18 months, and he was ordered to participate in an alcohol assessment program. The sentence was stayed pending appeal.
In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction with directions to dismiss the complaint. 136 Wis.2d 558, 402 N.W.2d 390. The court of appeals held that the stop of defendant's car was illegal.
At about 2:00 a.m. on October 26, 1985, Officer Guy V. Binish was on patrol in the city of Sturgeon Bay. Officer Binish was an experienced police officer with more than eight years on the force. He testified that a car turned onto the street directly in front of him and was operating at a very slow speed.
The speed limit was 25 miles per hour. Binish testified he paced the car for six to seven blocks and estimated that it traveled no more than 17 miles an hour. Binish saw no flat tires or defective lights or any other condition that explained the slow rate of speed. There were eight to ten vehicles behind the squad car and none in front of defendant's slow moving car. Officer Binish testified he believed the car was impeding traffic.
After following for at least eight blocks, Officer Binish stopped the slow moving car "to see if the driver needed a hand if he had something mechanically wrong with his car." Officer Binish explained to Baudhuin that the reason for the stop was that Baudhuin "was only doing 17 miles an hour in a 25 speed zone." Although Baudhuin was apparently impeding traffic, Binish did not anticipate issuing a traffic citation. Binish asked Baudhuin "if there was something wrong with his car that I [Binish] could help him with."
As soon as Baudhuin began to talk, the officer detected a strong odor of intoxicant on his breath and noticed that Baudhuin was slurring his words. Binish asked the defendant to get out of the car to perform field sobriety tests. The defendant complied and submitted to several tests, the results of which led Binish to conclude that the defendant was not capable of driving and was "well beyond the legal limit of intoxication."
A breathalyzer test taken at the police station registered .25 percent blood alcohol. The defendant was charged with violating sec. 346.63(1)(a) and (b), Stats. 2 Baudhuin had been convicted of two other operating under the influence of intoxicant charges within the past five-year period.
At the motion to dismiss hearing, the defendant offered evidence contrary to the officer's testimony to show that Baudhuin drove somewhere between 20 and 23 miles per hour. The defense also offered evidence contrary to the officer's testimony regarding the number of automobiles following the defendant's and the location of the officer's vehicle with respect to the defendant's.
The defendant argues that in denying the motion to dismiss on the basis of a public safety stop, the judge made no finding of probable cause. While it is true that the judge did not specifically find probable cause for the stop, the judge found the officer had "reasonable cause to stop the defendant at the time and place." The judge further stated that because the officer did not indiscriminately stop the defendant without a reason, there was no demonstration of a violation of his constitutional rights. The judge concluded that the situation basically involved a public safety stop.
Although the judge did not specifically state that traffic was impeded, he stated that the case involved a situation where the defendant was traveling "unusually slow." This statement, coupled with the finding of reasonable cause for the stop, indicates that the judge believed the officer's version of the disputed facts rather than those presented by the defendant. The credibility of witnesses and weight to be given their testimony are matters for the trial court to decide. Leciejewski v. Sedlak, 116 Wis.2d 629, 637, 342 N.W.2d 734 (1984).
The state advances two arguments. First, when the police perform legitimate and traditional police functions in stopping a vehicle to render assistance, the lack of probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that the law has been violated does not render the stop illegal so as to require suppression of inadvertently discovered criminal evidence. The state alternatively argues that even though the officer intended to stop the defendant's car only to see if he needed assistance, the officer had a factual basis upon which to stop Baudhuin for a traffic violation and, therefore, the stop was reasonable and, therefore, legal.
As this court has stated, an appellate court is concerned with whether a court decision being reviewed is correct, rather than with the reasoning employed by the circuit court. If the holding is correct, it should be sustained, and this court may do so on a theory or on reasoning not presented to the trial court. Liberty Trucking Co. v. ILHR Department, 57 Wis.2d 331, 342, 204 N.W.2d 457 (1973).
We have previously recognized that stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Guzy, 139 Wis.2d 663, 674, 407 N.W.2d 548 (1987); State v. Goebel, 103 Wis.2d 203, 208, 307 N.W.2d 915 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). The validity of such a search and seizure depends initially upon whether the defendant in this case was lawfully stopped. Section 345.22, Stats., provides that: "A person may be arrested without a warrant for the violation of a traffic regulation if the traffic officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is violating or has violated a traffic regulation." Implicit in the authority to arrest for a traffic violation is the authority to stop the vehicle where the officer has reasonable grounds to believe the violation has occurred. The legality of the initial stop is a question of law and we are not bound by the court of appeals decision on this question. See State v. Wisumierski, 106 Wis.2d 722, 733, 317 N.W.2d 484 (1982); State v. Williamson, 113 Wis.2d 389, 401, 335 N.W.2d 814 (1983). For the reasons discussed below, we decline to sustain the stop on the basis of either a "Good Samaritan" stop or a public safety stop.
The state concedes and the record shows that the officer intended to stop the defendant's car to see if Baudhuin needed assistance. The officer stated at the time of the stop that he did not intend to issue Baudhuin a ticket for impeding traffic.
The state cites State v. Goebel, 103 Wis.2d at 208, 307 N.W.2d 915, for this court's recognition of the importance and propriety of citizen-police contacts. In Goebel, this court stated:
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