State v. Bauer

• Decision Date: 16 June 1933
• Docket Number: No. 29428.,29428.
• Citation: 189 Minn. 280,249 N.W. 40
• Parties: STATE v. BAUER.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

249 N.W. 40

189 Minn. 280

STATE v. BAUER.

No. 29428.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 16, 1933.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Paul W. Guilford, Judge.

W. E. Bauer was convicted of the crime of carnal knowledge of a fifteen year old girl, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Eugene Rerat and Hughes & Rerat, all of Minneapolis, for appellant.

Harry H. Peterson, Atty. Gen., Roy C. Frank, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ed J. Goff, Co. Atty., and William G. Compton, Asst. Co. Atty., both of Minneapolis, for the State.

HOLT, Justice.

Defendant was convicted of the crime of carnal knowledge of a fifteen year old girl, and appeals from the order denying his motion for a new trial.

The first assignment of error relates to the refusal of the court to permit counsel of defendant to interrogate each prospective juror as to his knowledge of the law on these subjects, thus stated by him: "May the record show that counsel for the defendant will ask the following questions of each prospective juror: First. That the court instructs them that it is upon the State to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and if there is a reasonable doubt in their mind, if they will return a verdict of not guilty. Second. Counsel will explain to each prospective juror the fact that in a criminal case the law presumes the defendant to be innocent; and that such presumption of innocence follows the defendant throughout his trial and until the state by competent evidence rebuts that presumption and satisfies a jury beyond a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. Third. If the State fails to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, if a juror will return a verdict of not guilty to that question." Litigants in a case, criminal or civil, are entitled to a fair, competent, and impartial jury. They should have the opportunity on the voir dire examination of the prospective jurors to ascertain their relationship to the parties and any bias they may entertain concerning the subject matter of the action. We may also assume they have the right to ascertain the mental competency of the jurors and to acquire sufficient knowledge of them so as to intelligently exercise the peremptories the statutes give. But jurors are not to undergo a course of instructions on the law at the hands of the attorneys, or to pass an examination therein, or to disclose in advance of the evidence how they will decide the case. On the law propositions upon which counsel proposed to interrogate he knew that no court would fail to instruct the jury selected, so he proposed to consume time to no purpose. Such examination as defendant's counsel desired to make has been held improper. In State v. Douthitt, 26 N. M. 532, 194 P. 879, 880, the court said: "The examination of jurors would be interminable if parties were allowed to take up the whole law of the case item by item, and inquire as to the belief of the jurors and their willingness to apply it." In People v. Conklin, 175 N. Y. 333, 67 N. E. 624, 626, it was stated: "A juror cannot be a law to himself, but is bound to follow the instructions of the court in that respect, and hence his knowledge or ignorance concerning questions of law is not a proper subject of inquiry upon the trial of the challenge for cause." To the same effect are State v. Turley, 87 Vt. 163, 88 A. 562, and Ryan v. State, 115 Wis. 488, 92 N. W. 271. The learned trial court thus aptly characterized the procedure counsel sought to establish: "Apart from the authorities above cited, if defendant has a legal right to examine, as a matter of law, prospective jurors, first instructing them as to the law and then exacting a promise to apply such law favorable to the defendant, then there is no limit to which he may not go. He may explain and exact a promise in reference to the law of circumstantial evidence, confessions, corroborating testimony, accomplices, credibility of witnesses, and numerous other matters which he thinks are favorable to his case. If he has this right the State has likewise the same right to inquire in reference to the law favorable to the State. * * * In the case at bar the defendant was expressly given the right to inquire of the juror if he would follow the instructions of the court in matters of law." We think the record does not show that any right of defendant was violated in impaneling of the jury.

The only other assignment of error which merits comment...